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Preface
This issue covers diverse themes related either to socio-economic impacts of telecommu-
nication and Internet, to techno-economic models of telecommunication development and
markets, or to game-theoretical modeling of related subjects. It contains ten papers.
Andrzej P. Wierzbicki in his paper Socio-Economic Challenges from and for Future Internet
takes the view that from the dynamics of the development of Internet itself (or Future
Internet) result challenges for the socio-economic development and even for the paradigm of
understanding economy; such challenges must be taken into account ﬁrst, then – in a feedback
loop – they lead to the modiﬁcation of socio-economic challenges for Future Internet. This
change of perspective is necessary because the analysis of socio-economic challenges for
Future Internet is typically based on a classical paradigm of equilibrium economics. While
useful, this paradigm is limited and has been shown incomplete, e.g., by the recent world-
wide ﬁnancial and economic crisis. This paper shows that the informational revolution –
including but not limited to the development of Internet – has already changed the behavior of
main socio-economic agents as well as of economic markets and our understanding of them;
thus, new perspectives are needed. The paper also shows that a useful perspective is that not
of expected beneﬁts from Future Internet – there are many such beneﬁts and they will surely
motivate enough economic development of Future Internet – but of socio-economic threats
resulting from the dynamic development of the Internet. There are several such threats and
conﬂicts discussed in the paper.
Cristina Casanueva-Reguart and Antonio Pita S. in the paper Telecommunications, Universal
Service and Poverty in Mexico: a Public Policy Assessment (1990–2008) analyze the
design and implementation of telecommunications service policies targeted at the poorest
regions of Mexico (1990–2008). It begins by deﬁning universal access and service policies,
their economic and social rationale. Secondly, it discusses the scope of public policies on
universal service provision designed by Mexican authorities to achieve the goal of universal
access. Thirdly, the paper analyzes the distributive eﬀects of this set of policies among the
poorest sectors of the population. The sources on which this research was based were two
national surveys: the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2008), and the Household
Survey of the Access and Use of Information Technologies (2007). The additional informa-
tion on regional economic development was based on the poverty indexes by the national
population council and economic information given by Mexico Census Bureau. Additional
use was made of the annual reports prepared by Ministry of Communications, statistics
published by the Federal Telecommunications Commission and oﬃcial documents prepared
by the government agencies. Finally, a series of in-depth interviews was conducted with the
former representatives of the Oﬃce of Rural Telephony. Finally, the article discusses, in the
light of available evidence, possible explanations for the apparent failure of the universal ser-
vice policy that was implemented to bring at least basic voice services to Mexico’s neediest.
This explanation is seen in proﬁt-maximizing policies of privatized telecom operators, not
interested in providing universal service; to overcome this, a stronger regulation policies are
needed. of available evidence, possible explanations for the apparent failure of the universal
service policy that was implemented to bring at least basic voice services to Mexico’s need-
iest. This explanation is seen in proﬁt-maximizing policies of privatized telecom operators,
not interested in providing universal service; to overcome this, a stronger regulation policies
are needed.
Yousef Gasiea, Margaret Emsley, and Ludmil Mikhailov in the paper Rural Telecommunica-
tions Infrastructure Selection Using the Analytic Network Process analyze the applicability
of a multicriteria decision-making method, speciﬁcally the analytic network process (ANP),
to model the selection of an appropriate telecommunications infrastructure technology,
capable of deploying e-services in rural areas of developing countries. It aims to raise
awareness among telecommunication planners about the availability of ANP, and to demon-
strate its suitability to enhance the selection process. The proposed model is constructed
based on concerned experts’ subjective views of relevant selection criteria and potential
technology alternatives. Its network structure takes account of all possible dependencies and
interactions among criteria and alternatives.
Paweł Olender in his paper Stochastic Models in Techno-Economic Analysis of Broadband
Access Networks presents a techno-economic model of broadband access, which was imple-
mented and used to carry out analyses for one of the biggest city in Poland. A stochastic
approach was applied in order to take uncertainty into consideration, resulting in a more
robust solution, therefore, improving the safety of investment. Analyses concern FTTH
(ﬁbre to the home) technology, a type of generic FTTx network architecture. It uses optical
ﬁbre in local telecommunication loop, what is becoming more and more popular. Presented
results show the usefulness of techno-economic surveys in planning access networks devel-
opment. The appropriate choice of network parameters, such as the aggregation ratio, is
essential and could signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the proﬁtability of investment.
Wojciech Stańczuk, Piotr Pałka, Jozef Lubacz, and Eugeniusz Toczyłowski in their paper
A Framework for Evaluation of Communication Bandwidth Market Models present a method
of analysis of market-based models for resource allocation in communication networks. It
consists of several stages: classiﬁcation of a market model, generation of input data, data
adaptation to a tested model, test calculations and, ﬁnally, presentation and interpretation of
results. A set of general criteria to assess various models has been proposed. Tests are run
using dedicated computer applications, data is stored in open XML-based format originated
in the multicommodity market model. Network topologies are derived from the SNDlib
library.
Piotr Pałka and Eugeniusz Toczyłowski in their paper Pricing Rules Comparison in the
Context of Bandwidth Trade compare two pricing rules in the context of bandwidth trade.
Allocation and pricing rules, together with a set of signals received from independent agents,
constitute a market mechanism. The analyzed pricing rules are the well known Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves rule (VCG) and the parametric pricing rule (PPR). These pricing rules are
applied to the allocation rule speciﬁed by the balancing communication bandwidth trade
model (BCBT).
Kamil Kołtyś, Piotr Pałka, Eugeniusz Toczyłowski, and Izabela Żołtowska in their paper
Bandwidth Trading: A Comparison of the Combinatorial and Multicommodity Approach
compare two diﬀerent double-sided bandwidth auction mechanisms, that seem to be well
suited approaches for trading indivisible units of bandwidth: combinatorial auction c-SeBiDA
and multicommodity mechanism BACBR-I. The c-SeBiDA mechanism considers two types of
commodities: inter-node links and paths consisting of particular links. Market participants
may bid a single link, or a bundle of links, constituting a speciﬁc path. The BACBR-I
mechanism is a multicommodity exchange model, that allows bidders to place buy oﬀers
not only for individual or bundled links, but rather for end-to-end connections. Therefore,
it is the decision model that allocates the most eﬃcient links to connections. A large set
of experiments was performed to test the allocation and computational eﬃciency obtained
under both approaches.
Krzysztof Malinowski, Ewa Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz, and Przemysław Jaskóła in their
paper Price Method and Network Congestion Control consider price instruments that are
useful in achieving market balance conditions in various markets. Those instruments can
be also used for control of other composite systems. The formulation and basic properties
of the price method are reviewed and then the congestion control by price instruments in
a computer network is described and tested.
Keiichi Niwa, Tomohiro Hayashida, and Masatoshi Sakawa in their paper Computational
Methods for Two-Level 0-1 Programming Problems through Distributed Genetic Algorithms
consider a two-level 0-1 programming problem in which there is not coordination between
the decision maker (DM) at the upper level and the decision maker at the lower level.
A revised computational method is proposed that solves problems related to computational
methods for obtaining the Stackelberg solution. Speciﬁcally, in order to improve the com-
putational accuracy of approximate Stakelberg solutions and shorten the computational time
of a computational method implementing a genetic algorithm (GA) proposed by the authors,
a distributed genetic algorithm is introduced with respect to the upper level GA, which
handles decision variables for the upper level DM. Parallelization of the lower level GA is
also performed along with parallelization of the upper level GA. The proposed algorithm is
also improved in order to eliminate unnecessary computation during operation of the lower
level GA, which handles decision variables for the lower level DM. In order to verify the
eﬀectiveness of the proposed method, comparisons with existing methods are outlined by
performing numerical experiments to verify both the accuracy of the solution and the time
required for the computation.
Ichiro Nishizaki, Tomohiro Hayashida, and Noriyuki Hara in the paper Coordination Games
with Communication Costs in Network Environments deal with a coordination game in a net-
work where a player can choose both an action of the game and partners for playing the game.
In particular, a player interacts with players connecting through a path consisting of multiple
links as well as with players directly connecting by a single link. Decay or friction of payoﬀs
with distance as communication costs are represented, and the eﬀect of the communication
cost on the behavior of players in the game and network formation is analyzed. Properties
of equilibrium networks are investigated by classifying the link cost and the communication
cost, and the diversity of the equilibrium networks is indicated.
Andrzej P. Wierzbicki
Guest Editor
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Abstract—There are several papers available addressing the
challenges for Future Internet that result from socio-economic
aspects; such challenges must be obviously taken into account
when constructing and developing Future Internet. This pa-
per, however, takes an opposite view that from the dynamics
of the development of Internet itself (or Future Internet) re-
sult challenges for the socio-economic development and even
for the paradigm of understanding economy; such challenges
must be taken into account first, then – in a feedback loop –
lead to the modification of socio-economic challenges for Fu-
ture Internet. This change of perspective is necessary because
the analysis of socio-economic challenges for Future Internet
is typically based on a classical paradigm of equilibrium eco-
nomics. While useful, this paradigm is limited and has been
shown incomplete, e.g., by the recent world-wide financial and
economic crisis. This paper shows that the informational revo-
lution – including but not limited to the development of Inter-
net – has already changed the behavior of main socio-economic
agents as well as of economic markets and our understand-
ing of them; thus, new perspectives are needed. The paper
also shows that a useful perspective is that not of expected
benefits from Future Internet – there are many such benefits
and they will surely motivate enough economic development
of Future Internet – but of socio-economic threats resulting
from the dynamic development of the Internet. There are
several such threats and conflicts that can be foreseen: the
conflict between corporatization and governance; the conflict
between direct and indirect limits to freedom; the trend to-
wards elitarism inherent in Internet development dynamics
versus democracy; the threat of network and computer domi-
nation over people, etc. Some of such threats and conflicts are
discussed in the paper.
Keywords—Future Internet, informational revolution, socio-
economic changes and challenges.
1. Introduction
The beginnings of informational revolution can be dated
not from the development of computers, but from devel-
opments that enabled broad social use of computers and
computer networks, thus from the development of an inex-
pensive personal computer (Apple II, 1977) and from the
de-classiﬁcation of Internet (1983), thus around from 1980.
Computers were invented 40–50 years earlier: analog com-
puters in 1931 (by a telecommunication engineer, later
presidential advisor Vannevar Bush), digital computers in
1936 (by a telecommunication engineer Konrad Zuse, not
by a mathematician Alan Turing, whose theoretical pa-
per was published after the engineering patent of Zuse).
This is similar to the dating of industrial revolution in
around 1760 with the inventions of James Watt – who only
made possible a broad social use of a steam engine (danger-
ous because unstable before Watt) invented by Newcoman
at least 40 years earlier, by supplementing the engine with
a feedback control system of rotational speed, thus making
it safe for a broad use.
Here I should make clear my basic assumption about the
development of new technologies. The popular theories
of a co-evolution of social attitudes and technological so-
lutions (see [1], [2]) are applicable only to a continuous
near-equilibrium evolution, certainly not applicable to such
events as the invention of James Watt, the emergence of
Internet, or even the construction of a Future Internet. By
this I do not mean that Future Internet should be a clean-
slate solution; I mean only that a technological solution
of this magnitude of social impact was until now – and
should be in future – based on a vision that hopefully would
meet social expectations at least 40 years from its concep-
tion. Internet was based on such a vision, even if its suc-
cess has outgrown the scope of that vision. Every radically
new technology (computers, transistors, mobile telephony,
digital television, see [3]) is usually conceived at least
40 years before its broad social use and is based on a vision,
not on a co-evolution of social attitudes and technological
solutions.
Today it is clear that a broad social use of personal com-
puting and of computer networks (Internet, WWW) has
changed essentially the social fabric of developed societies,
and has created many new opportunities and challenges
(see, e.g., [4], [5]). The informational revolution is mani-
fested in its three main megatrends [6]:
– the technological megatrend of digital integration
(also called convergence);
– the social megatrend of dematerialization of work
and changing professions;
– the intellectual megatrend of changing perception of
the world.
We shall not discuss here these megatrends in detail, I quote
them only to illustrate that we can take for granted tremen-
dous socio-economic and even intellectual changes result-
ing from informational revolution, even if this revolution
was enabled by technological developments.
Thus, when the authors of an extremely interesting book
Towards the Future Internet: A European Research Perspec-
tive [7] include several papers addressing the challenges
for Future Internet that result from today’s socio-economic
needs, I respond with the question what are the challenges
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from Future Internet, the aspects that the Future Internet
will add to the informational revolution and socio-economic
developments in the future. To analyze this issue, I will
follow the dynamic programming paradigm: imagine what
would be the world in the year 2050 and then analyze chal-
lenges resulting from the dynamics and conﬂicts of the
development. The choice of the date 2050 is substanti-
ated because we see – already from the examples of de-
lays quoted above, but the mobile telephony had a delay of
about 50 years before its broad social use, the digital tele-
vision even more, the transistors about 40 years – that new
technologies achieve its full social impacts with substantial
delay, amounting today to 40–60 years; this delay might
shorten in the future, but not immediately. Therefore, in
2050 we shall count with a broad social use of technolo-
gies that we start to develop today. The issue is what social
needs they will satisfy and what socio-economic conﬂicts
or threats they will create; to analyze this issue, we need
a vision of the year 2050.
2. A Personal Vision of the Year 2050
This is obviously a personal vision, expressing my personal
views and experience in future studies. It is true that during
the informational revolution everything ﬂows, the world is
a collection of chaotic systems from which new patterns of
order emerge. Thus, many unpredictable changes can occur
and every detailed, quantitative forecast should be treated
with suspicion. However, the dynamic of social changes
is slow, people do not change their accustomed modes of
behavior, the qwerty keyboard will be used in 2050 even if
it is not optimal.
Moreover, the stories about full unpredictability of the
world, about the phenomenon of black swan1, are means
of brainwashing people. Internet was not a black swan,
already in 1970 Arpanet (although classiﬁed) started its
functioning, protocol IP and e-mail (together with using
the sign @ in addressing) were devised in 1972, Internet
was de-classiﬁed in 1983, and the fact, that after 40 years
only about 1/6 of world population uses Internet is a small
delay compared to mobile telephony or digital television.
Thus, until 2050 we shall certainly have many novel inven-
tions, theories or even scientiﬁc revolutions, but they will
not have a broad social impact before 2050. Imagine, for
example, that somebody invents today an avio-car (a ﬂying
car), suﬃciently eﬃcient and with low emissions. Before
it will be developed to a suﬃciently inexpensive and safe
version (together with appropriate traﬃc regulations) for
a broad social use, certainly more than 40 years will be
needed. On the other hand, some inventions or develop-
ments known today might be developed for a broad social
use before 2050.
1Black swan is a metaphor of an unpredictable phenomenon (see [8]).
The main example of this phenomenon was supposedly the emergence of
Internet. Already in early 80-ties, I tried to convince my Polish colleagues
about the inevitability of the development of social importance of Internet,
only very few believed me. Thus, we have not the phenomenon of black
swan, rather the phenomenon of Cassandra.
Thus, if we guess correctly which rudimental develop-
ments or inventions known today will meet in future broad
socio-economic needs, we can if not forecast, then at least
construct a probable vision of the world in 2050. I use
the words constructing a vision of future, because hu-
manity always constructed future based on some visions;
if we build a house, we construct future following some
vision.
In such a vision, I see three main development forces that
correspond to main socio-economic needs and will shape
the future society. These are:
– the need of living in a clean environment, expressed
by the idea of sustainable development;
– the need of boundless communication, expressed by
the informational revolution with all its derivative
consequences;
– the need of prolonging life, expressed by the idea of
bio-technological revolution.
The last one – the bio-technological revolution – is also
related to the concept of radical evolution, or human evo-
lution reinforced by technology (see, e.g., [9]). However,
I do not believe that major social needs will contribute
to the start of radical evolution, or full bio-technological
revolution (with similar or even larger controversies than
those associated with the information revolution today), be-
fore 2100. Until 2050, on the other hand, the need of pro-
longing life will support a broad implementation of some
elements of bio-technological revolution, particularly for
elder people.
The second one – informational revolution – started around
1980, as we noted above, and already has tremendous im-
pacts. It will continue; together with other main develop-
ment forces, it will determine the socio-economic impact
from the Future Internet.
The ﬁrst one – sustainable development – expresses a ma-
jor social need of living clean and preserving environment
for future generations. It was perceived earlier than the
other major needs (see, e.g., [10]), thus the concept of sus-
tainable development is well known and broadly discussed.
However, I believe that the problem how and in what pro-
portions we should support development caring about its
sustainability and clean environment at least in the interest
of our children will remain a fundamental one at least until
2050 and will determine the solutions of related problems
such as energy provision, transportation, life style, details
of environmental protection. Both the informational rev-
olution and the rudiments of bio-technological revolution
will contribute to the solution of such problems.
Before turning to the issue of challenges from the Future
Internet, we shall analyze shortly what might be the impact
of these three major socio-economic forces before 2050.
However, I must stress – before this analysis – a fundamen-
tal assumption: until 2050 we will not be faced by a major
global catastrophe, economic larger than the current crisis,
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military of world-wide character, or cosmic. This assump-
tion is obviously optimistic, and it can be fulﬁlled only if
we increase global governance; thus, I will also discuss
shortly this issue.
2.1. Sustainable Development
Without a major catastrophe, the world economy will be
forced – by public opinion and preferences of consumers –
to take into account increasingly more demands of sustain-
able development, to limit harmful emissions, etc. This is
fully possible when using technologies known rudimental
today – it requires “only” money and time for their de-
tailed development, which will not happen spontaneously,
because free market promotes technologies that bring fast
returns, is bad in long term rationality. Therefore, we will
face slow but inevitable restriction of free market by the
character of demand, but also norms and regulations im-
posed by “green” consumers.
Even today, there is an intensive research on diverse
technologies either of car engines that are environmen-
tal friendly, or of limiting harmful emissions from power
plants, foundries and chemical factories, or of alternative
energy sources. In 40 years, many new inventions acceler-
ating this change will be made, but decisive will be the con-
frontation of short-term interests of corporations and long-
term interests of humanity, leading to slow and gradual, but
inevitable sharpening of environmental norms and regula-
tions. It might appear that the interests of consumers and
entire humanity are less strongly represented, are doomed
to loose in opposition to the strength of large corporations;
but the history of last 40 years shows the opposite. If
children in schools are taught to consider environmental
protection as a higher value, then as young consumers they
will not buy products of corporations that do not show suf-
ﬁcient environmental care, and a corporation might end as,
e.g., in the case of Chrysler.
It might be optimistic, but I believe that diverse sources
of environmental pollution will be until 2050 several times
reduced – at least, in developed countries, but the develop-
ing countries will catch up with environmental protection,
even if with more diﬃculty. I am not sure that this will be
suﬃcient to preserve the natural environment on our planet
in an acceptable state, but it gives a chance. Nevertheless,
it will be a diﬃcult process, with many controversies and
consequences. This process requires using new technolo-
gies, increasing automation and robotization, supports and
is supported by the transition towards knowledge economy,
but on the other hand it means also the dematerialization of
work, thus global escape of some industries towards devel-
oping countries, social disorders related to large unemploy-
ment during the period of strong structural change – and
all next 40 years will be such a period. Thus the process of
adapting to sustainable development and to new, “green”
technologies will not be easy, it will require a permanent
re-education of societies.
This is the basic challenge before the society of entire
globe: if sustainable development can be realized only by
developing knowledge-based economy, then global educa-
tion level must continuously increase. We might expect
that in 40 years a condition of employment in developed
countries – with the exception of clearly subsidiary, sup-
porting service work – will be higher education which will
be practically universal in developed countries. This does
not mean that the proportions of educational proﬁles will
precisely meet the demands of labor markets – just the op-
posite, we must become accustomed to the idea that a taxi
driver with education on the master of management level is
not a singularity, only a perturbation of fate and not a social
waste – because a highly developed society should be able
to support an excess of learning.
The development in this direction will be not uniform
around the globe. Countries such as Finland, that devote
a large portion of national income to education and science,
will win the competition towards sustainable development
and knowledge-based economy. Countries such as Poland,
where the government systematically cuts the funding of
education and science, relying rather on the private eﬀorts
of citizens educating themselves mostly in private univer-
sities, will be doomed to marginalization and the role of
civilization peripheries. They will be overtaken, e.g., by
the countries of the Far East, such as China, Korea, Viet-
nam, who devote much more attention to science and edu-
cation.
Sustainable development requires also a substantial change
of professional proportions in society. This does not mean
that in 2050 we shall observe globally the same proportions
that we observe today in the USA or Japan. For example,
the issue of a large part of society living in villages and
from agriculture can be resolved in diverse ways, not only
through the reduction of the number of farmers, increase
of farm area and the escape of remaining people to slums
around big cities. It might be resolved by a redistribution
of work and living to rural areas, aided by network tech-
nologies and new Internet.
Nevertheless, it is expected that less people will work at
the production of food and, at the same time, we can hope
that regions of endemic hunger will be eliminated from
the globe. Similarly, less people will be employed in in-
dustrial production. The rest will be employed in diverse
services, such as education, health service and old people
care.
Generally, the idea of sustainable development is based on
respect for nature. We can have the optimistic hope that
until 2050 the global environmental situation will be im-
proved, despite a further increase of the world population
(which, according to prognoses of United Nation Organiza-
tion (UNO) based on the research of International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), in these decades
will be slower and will attain a maximum precisely around
2050, with an irreversible increase of the proportion of old
people). It will not be easy, an increased international co-
operation towards this objective is necessary, helping the
developing countries to avoid environmental pollution ex-
cesses known to developed countries. But the essential con-
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dition is the stress on ecological responsibility in education,
creating the domination of green-friendly consumers.
It is also important to understand well the relation between
nature and technology: technology in itself does not kill na-
ture2. All conﬂicts concerning environmental protection are
in fact not conﬂicts about technology proper, only about its
use – often occurring between short term interests of mar-
ket entrepreneurs (obviously using technology with harm
for nature, if this brings proﬁts) and long term interests of
protecting nature, e.g., by local communities.
On the other hand, we observe a slow progress in prop-
agating and understanding environmental values: ecologi-
cal responsibility is taught world-wide and some large cor-
porations – e.g., in Japan – gradually stress environmen-
tal values. We can thus expect that the impact of green-
friendly consumers and local communities will gradually
extend to global scale and will help in improving global
ecology.
However, this will not occur without strengthening global
governance, which I discuss separately. Global governance
might be also needed for other aspects of protecting global
environment. In long history of our planet there were
several cosmic catastrophes which changed global environ-
ment radically. Humanity might decide that we are rich and
wise enough to prevent in future such catastrophes; initial
research in this respect is already conducted, but and in-
tensiﬁcation of such activities would require, e.g., estab-
lishing an international base on the Moon with the purpose
of observation of approaching cosmic bodies and suitable
reactions (changing their trajectories).
2.2. Informational Revolution and Knowledge Society
All structural changes today, closely related to informa-
tional revolution, transform the economy towards knowl-
2This is very badly understood by most humanists, social scientists and
even natural scientists, since they usually do not have courses of technol-
ogy in their curriculae – while technologists attend courses of all these
sciences, e.g., of philosophy. As a result, representatives of these sci-
ences perceive technology through the lens of humanistic philosophy of
technology which is unable to understand technology at all because of the
lack of a direct contact with technology. This often leads to the basic
error, justly condemned in cultural anthropology: the error of cultural im-
perialism, judging a diﬀerent culture without fully understanding it. For
example, some humanist philosophers of technology condemn technology
and technocracy without understanding that they actually speak about an
aggregated notion including socio-economic use of technology in mar-
ket economy, not about technology proper. Technology proper is the art
of creating tools and artifacts characteristic for a given civilization era
(see [11], [12]), and can be used both for good and bad purposes. This
great misunderstanding of technology is characteristic for entire 20th Cen-
tury, starting, e.g., with Albert Einstein who wrote already in 1917 that
“The advance of technology is a hatchet in hands of a degenerated crim-
inal” (see, e.g., [9]). Martin Heidegger described the same issue much
more deeply saying that the danger is not in the advance of technology
itself, but a dangerous fascination with the possibilities of technology by
people, particularly by people in power: “man exalts himself [with the
possibilities of technology] and appears to be the lord of the world” [11].
The fact that humans would cease to be human if they stopped technology
creation escapes the attention of humanists because they have inadequate
education in technology.
edge-based economy (see, e.g., [13]), or even knowl-
edge civilization (see [14], [15]). Without discussing these
issues in detail3 I must stress that the force of informa-
tional revolution will not diminish until 2050 though it
might address diﬀerent aspects. Two examples might be
relevant.
Multimedia record and transmission. Social demand for
multimedia record of information and occurrences as well
as transmission of such records will grow because of di-
verse reasons, such as increasing interest in enriched ﬁlms
becoming a substitute of books, the necessity of preparing
and transmitting multimedia teaching materials in spread-
ing distance education, an increasing demand for multime-
dia telephony (such as Skype), etc. We must be aware
that even if the methods of recording and transmitting dis-
tance education materials are highly developed, the tools
for creating such materials are not suﬃciently developed,
standardized and ready for market penetration. Moreover,
social customs in this respect might change slowly (e.g., be-
cause of attachment of part of society, myself included, to
the traditional form of books). However, a change in this di-
rection is inevitable, because of many reasons, such as the
power of Open Access initiatives that provide networked
free access to educational resources including increasingly
multimedia forms. On the other hand, we cannot expect
universal multimedia character of record and transmission
of information until around 2050, because of large delays
of social demands in such cases.
Ambient intelligence or wireless sensor networks. These
diverse slogans characterize diﬀerent approaches (in Euro-
pean Union and United States) to the same problem: how
to use universally inexpensive computer tools, such as mi-
croprocessors equipped with sensors and radio, to provide
for intelligent environment in human habitat. The slogan of
ambient intelligence was put forward around the year 2000
by the Information Society Technology Advisory Group
(ISTAG) of the European Commission as a driving engine
of European economy. As a member of this group I raised
then the objection that the delays and generally slow dy-
namics of changing social customs make such a slogan
unrealistic before 2030 or even 2050. The social resis-
tance in this respect might be large, because even if the
needs of health care of older people might demand contin-
uous and non-intrusive monitoring of the identity, presence,
consciousness, breath, heart beat, etc., of people in a given
room, not everybody would agree to enter such a room
without warning about monitoring and recording his per-
sonal parameters. As a result, we can expect until 2050
substantial development of ambient intelligence, but not its
universal applications. This is related to the wide-spread
fear of Orwellian utopia, of using intelligent environment
in human habitat for an excessive social control by too am-
3Knowledge was obviously used as an economic resource in all civi-
lization eras, but now it becomes – ﬁrst time in the history – a decisive
productive resource, dominating labor and capital, as a result of infor-
mational revolution. The era of knowledge civilization will be probably
not the last in human history, but it will continue at least for the entire
21th Century.
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bitious politicians, or even fear of the domination of net-
works, computers and robots over humanity, which subject
I comment in more detail later.
Beside these two examples, there are many other areas of
the impact of informational revolution on economy and so-
ciety. The great megatrend of digital integration (or con-
vergence) was not yet exploited fully. Between other ar-
eas of digital integration, several decades yet will be re-
quired, e.g., until diverse media such as newspapers, radio,
television, Internet will become more deeply integrated.
Around 2050 we might, however, expect a more deep inte-
gration of diverse information media, their networked ac-
cess in a selective or fully integrated form. Since economic
and political power of controlling media is tremendous,
only this reason – between several others – is suﬃcient
for the development of several new generations of Internet
until 2050; today we work intensively on the techniques
of Future Internet, a main subject of this paper, but we
should be aware that there might be several Future Internet
versions.
There will be also an inevitable impact of informational
revolution on the paradigms of economic science. There
are many aspects of this impact, but most important appear
to me the oligopolization of economy and the conflict about
property of knowledge. Oligopolization of economy results
from the fact that the increasing role of knowledge and in-
tellectual property in production costs inevitably leads to an
increase of positive eﬀects of scale and decrease of relative
marginal costs; the cost of duplicating a DVD plate is much
smaller than the cost of a ﬁlm production. Therefore, the
relation of market price to marginal cost, a paradigmatic
foundation of free market theory, is lost in informational
revolution era. A possible explanation is the domination
of oligopolistic economy (or monopolistic, but this form is
tightly regulated). This issue might be studied using classi-
cal mathematical game theory to compute how many times
an oligopolistic market price without collusions can exceed
ideal free market price, given market share and elasticity
of demand (and how much actual prices indicate tacit col-
lusions on the oligopolistic market), but for some reasons
such investigation is treated as a tabu in neoclassical mar-
ket economics and oligopoly theory is not taught in detail
in economic departments.
The conﬂict about property of knowledge occurs between
a classical equilibrium relation of individual knowledge and
the intellectual heritage of humanity on one side, and the
new, perturbing the classical equilibrium trend of corporate
privatization of knowledge – including both the individual
knowledge of employees of the corporation and as much
of intellectual heritage of humanity as can be privatized by
a corporation. This conﬂict is very serious even today, large
corporations do everything to maximally privatize common
knowledge of humanity and engage in this respect the ne-
oliberal interpretations of intellectual property rights (see,
e.g., [16]). This conﬂict will probably intensify and might
become the basic conﬂict of knowledge civilization. This
conﬂict is also dangerous, because – in opposition to all
classical paradigms of economics – common knowledge
is not a degradable good (it usually grows, is not dimin-
ished by a common use). Hence the classical argument of
the tragedy of commons (used to substantiate privatization
of common resources)4 is not applicable to knowledge: it
is better for a society, if as much knowledge as possible
remains public property. This means, however, that knowl-
edge based economy requires a fundamental change of the
paradigms of economics.
Even larger, than on economy, is the impact of informa-
tional revolution on society, even if a part of this impact is
related to economy. The great megatrend of dematerializa-
tion of work during informational revolution, substituting
people by automata and robots in hard productive work,
leads to an increase of the share of services in economy and
has many positive consequences. Among most important
among such consequences might be the creation of mate-
rial conditions for equality of women (it is the computer
and the robot that enable such equality); actual equality of
woman might be distant yet because cultural relations and
customs change slowly, but around 2050 we might expect
that women will achieve globally signiﬁcant progress in ac-
tual realization of their equal rights. However, this mega-
trend has also obvious negative consequences that must be
continuously counteracted: the dematerialization of work
leads to a change of professions, disappearance of old ones
and emergence of new ones that will continue until and be-
yond 2050, and results in so called (misnamed)5 structural
unemployment. Such unemployment is not a temporary
phenomenon, it can be counteracted only by intensive re-
education of labor force, in which distance and electronic
education might be decisively used.
Possibly the most important aspect of the social impact of
informational revolution is the annihilation of spatial con-
straints in the access to information and knowledge and
communication between people, i.e., the gradual spread of
multimedia access and network communication. This as-
pect is possibly more important than the Gutenberg revo-
lution that made the access to information and knowledge
universal through books – since books do not fully anni-
hilate the spatial constraint: one has to buy a book and
bring it to a small village, or to travel to a great library in
a city, while in Internet it is suﬃcient to have a broadband
access from anyplace. Depending on the conclusions of the
conﬂict about the property of knowledge and the success
of initiatives such as Open Access, after the spatial anni-
hilation might follow at least a partial annihilation of the
economic constraints (costs). Multimedia character of the
access to information and knowledge, and also multimedia
character of communication, might have a positive impact
on creativity in using these sources and on the spread of
distance and electronic education (see, e.g., [15], [17]). In
total, this is a great social revolution which will change not
4A common pasture in a local community is degraded by its too intensive
use, hence it is better to privatize it.
5Structural unemployment implies that the structure of economy has
changed and labor force must adapt to this change; but what if the structure
is continuously changing due to informational revolution and the speed of
change is limited precisely by the speed of adaptation of labor force?
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only the conditions of social life and customs, but also will
inﬂuence the trends of spatial agglomeration and regional
policy.
Until 2050 it might come to a reversal of the trend of ur-
banization of the world, to the beginnings of an actual
realization of the idea of global village. This idea was
originated much too early and until now found only deri-
sion between regional economists: all around the world,
the trend of urbanization continues. However, people are
already tired of everyday long travel between the place of
living and the place of work; the larger a metropolitan ag-
glomeration, the more probable are many hours of travel to
work. The idea of distance work was also premature, such
changes require long time of social adaptation, but until
2050 it might become a social reality. This means that re-
gional policy should seriously consider the possibilities of
regional socio-economic development based on the spread
of Internet connections, used for the activation of villages
and an attraction of out-migration from large cities.
Perhaps the most important social consequences of infor-
mational revolution concern already mentioned, fundamen-
tal change of educational systems. It is necessary to make
universal not only high education, but also continuing ed-
ucation, to large extent realized via distance or electronic
education. This must be based on a networked, multime-
dia access to sources of information and knowledge, must
use this type of access to stimulate creativity, prepare new
generations for life in a new society. This also means a ne-
cessity of changing educational paradigms and of a deep
reform of all levels of education, starting with elementary
schools. This will be not an easy change, the most paradig-
matic or even dogmatic is the educational science that suc-
cessfully resists all changes. This will not be an inexpensive
change, it will probably begin with most developed or most
forward-oriented countries (such as, e.g., Finland). Coun-
tries that will try to resist or economize on this change will
ﬁnd themselves marginalized.
Another basic aspect of informational revolution is that it
enables an improvement of the relation between people and
nature. For example, diverse distributed sensors connected
in wireless networks can much better monitor the qual-
ity of natural environment. Moreover, in knowledge based
economy it is easy to promote environment-friendly inno-
vations. This positive feedback between informational rev-
olution and knowledge-based economy on one side and the
protection of natural environment on the other side is the
reason of my optimism concerning the idea of sustainable
development discussed above.
This does not mean that the informational revolution does
not bring environmental threats. The main such threat is an
excessive exploitation, in a sense over-saturation with sig-
nals, of the natural electromagnetic environment of Earth.
This does not result as yet in serious dangers for human
health, the so called electromagnetic compatibility of elec-
tronic equipment is a subject of severe tests and norms,
and the electromagnetic spectrum management (allocation
of frequencies for commercial and other uses) is an im-
portant subject of governmental control. However, diverse
other possibilities of utilizing electromagnetic spectrum,
such as radio-astronomy, are seriously constrained by the
commercial saturation of this spectrum; this is one of the
reasons for the necessity of constructing a permanent base
on the Moon. Until 2050, the issues of management of
electromagnetic spectrum might become an area of socio-
economic conﬂicts, similar to today’s environmental con-
ﬂicts.
However, the main eﬀect of informational revolution in the
relation of people and nature is the annihilation of spatial
constraints in the access to knowledge and communication
discussed above – which might result in a choice of living
place in a close contact with nature, not only in a village but
also possibly in a forest. Thus, the idea of a global village
might become actually the global forest. This does not
mean that until 2050 cities will vanish – just the opposite,
they will grow at least until that date. However, until 2050
we might observe the beginnings of the opposite trend, the
trend of global forest.
2.3. Biotechnological Revolution
Elementary biotechnologies, such as genetically modiﬁed
crops, have already strong impact on the global economy;
it might be also argued that biotechnology is as old as
agriculture.6 However, we are far away from an actual
biotechnological revolution, including radical technologi-
cal changes in human evolution. The speculations about
radical evolution – the vision of a cyborg as a result of
a new, mostly artiﬁcial product of biotechnological rev-
olution – are already frequent, but far from realism and
such revolution will not occur for sure before 2050, prob-
ably also not before 2100. This is because even today we
observe a signiﬁcant social resistance against excessive or
unjustiﬁed automation of actions customarily reserved for
people, against domination of human subjectivity by com-
puters, networks and robots, or generally domination of
computer over people. These attitudes will not favor rad-
ical biotechnological evolution that inevitably will include
implantation of microprocessors into human body; we can
expect serious social resistance that will signiﬁcantly delay
radical evolution.
The beginnings of biotechnological revolution and radical
human evolution we might observe in areas, where the so-
cial demand will be nevertheless substantive: such an area
is health care for elder people. The implantation of a mi-
croprocessor only to stimulate heartbeat or the use of ar-
tiﬁcially developed bone cells in order to rejuvenate old
bones encounters much less social resistance, if it is evi-
dently needed and helps. Such technologies will encounter
strong economic demand, which is necessary for their grad-
ual improvement, decrease of costs, universal accessibility.
Together with elements of ambient intelligence for the non-
intrusive monitoring of the health of old people mentioned
6What is the production of beer or whisky, if not a biotechnology?
10
Socio-Economic Challenges from and for Future Internet
above, or even with mobile robots taking care of elder peo-
ple, socially acceptable elements of biotechnological rev-
olution will become a natural enhancement and continu-
ation of informational revolution. However, their broader
spread will be restricted to the cases of obvious need
and helpfulness. The health care of older people, ac-
cording to demographic prognoses, will become a seri-
ous problem around 2050 and thus might be an engine
of economic growth, particularly in developed countries.
First after a longer time of broad social use of such ele-
ments, social resistance might be lowered and some form
of radical evolution might take place – but probably not
before 2100.
This is mine reservation to the typical fantasy about radical
evolution: they do not consider social forces and conﬂicts
that will accompany biotechnological revolution. We can
expect, however, a slow but dramatic change of social struc-
ture and inter-generational relations in the 21st Century as
a result of informational revolution. Already in industrial
civilization, but especially during informational revolution,
together with the change of social role of women, a sig-
niﬁcant change of the social model of a family is taking
place. The traditional model is a large number of children
as an insurance for the old age of parents. Professional
careers of women resulted in delaying the birth of chil-
dren to an older age and generally in a smaller number
of children per family. The insurance for the old age was
expected in the form of a social insurance system; this
system, however, in its classical form does not endure the
growing share of old people in a society. Old people with
a small number of children do not expect from them sig-
niﬁcant material help, they at most limit their respective
help. Nevertheless, the return to the classical model of
family is not possible: educated and professionally active
women will not return to their classical roles. However,
the collapse of traditional social insurance systems implies
a new conﬂict: who should ﬁnance the living of old people?
Therefore, ﬁnancing the beginnings of biotechnological rev-
olution is also questionable – who will ﬁnance it, if not old
people?
One possible answer is so called netocracy (see [5]): only
the new rich that will have both the ﬁnancial and political
power in the networked society will enjoy the possibili-
ties of biotechnologies. However, I do not believe in the
inevitability of destruction of democracy by informational
revolution. Each revolution of such magnitude creates of
course new social divides and new rich; but the indus-
trial revolution did not destroy, only helped to create mod-
ern democracy, and the informational revolution has many
aspects that support further development of democracy.
The conﬂict about the property of knowledge will draw
attention to the necessity of preserving democracy, as
noted already by Thomas Jeﬀerson (1813) [18]: a free ac-
cess to ideas is both a necessary condition of democracy
and helps to strengthen it. I do not believe, neither, that
the new rich will so easily take the risks of testing new
biotechnologies.
There are no deﬁnite answers to such questions. However,
with respect to the new model of family, it is clear that a less
inter-generational integrated model will gradually emerge,
with lesser obligations between generations. This does not
mean a clear cut of such obligations, but elder people will
try to use diverse methods of increasing ﬁnancial security,
including a prolongation of professional activity, taking ad-
vantage of their life-long experience. Clearly, this also will
provoke socio-economic conﬂicts: entrepreneurs might pre-
fer employing only young people, older people might raise
an issue of non-discrimination (not only because of race
or sex, but also because of age) and fundamental rights of
people.
Such problems might have also an impact on the reversal
of the trend of urbanization of the world or the beginnings
of global forest. Already today, the cost of living in vil-
lages and small towns is signiﬁcantly smaller than in large
agglomerations; an escape to the forest might be strongly
motivated economically. In conclusion, the biotechnologi-
cal revolution will be possible when humanity will over-
come ecological threats and if this revolution will help
in achieving a relative (obviously not absolute) ecological
equilibrium.
2.4. Global Governance
The most important challenge, however, facing humanity
before 2050, is in my opinion the issue of creating new
world order or global governance. In fact, this is a direct
consequence of information revolution and resulting glob-
alization: people of the world perceive increasingly more
their responsibility for global issues. Information technol-
ogy and biotechnology will drive the changes of the world,
responding to the broad social needs and demand. How-
ever, if we leave the satisfaction of this demand to big
corporations (not to the free market which, as noted above,
does not exists any more in its classical, ideal form on high
technology markets) then we should expect next big cri-
sis, a successive big bubble of artiﬁcially created demand
motivated by the proﬁts of oligopolistic market, not by solv-
ing the problems tormenting the world. Big corporations
will of course do everything to hinder the emergence of
a global governance – by promoting, e.g., the self-serving
theses that the less government the better, that best brains
require biggest rewards (and biggest compensations in case
of failure), etc. But I hope that the lessons from the last
crisis will show the emptiness of such neoliberal slogans
and arguments.
The vision of the world governed by big corporations is
not acceptable, leads to instability. As long as one big
country – the USA – dominated the world order, dealing
with the excesses of big corporations could be left to it,
even if European Union and other big players often rep-
resented other interests. However, once a larger role in
the world economy will be played by the most populous
countries – China, India, Brasilia – a new world order
and new institutions for global governance, a forum for
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achieving consensus between the biggest players will be
needed.
There are many possible ways of creating new global gov-
ernance, but two are the most probable. One is a renewal
and strengthening of the role of United Nations Organi-
zation. If this organization will not address (because ei-
ther of internal weakness or of lack of commitment of
biggest players) new goals, entitlements and obligations,
then another organization, perhaps between existing today,
will have to ﬁll out this void and help to create a new
order. The tasks of such organization should be partly
political, concerning global security (limiting armaments,
eliminating military conﬂicts, alleviating diverse local and
regional conﬂicts, etc.), partly economic regulatory (con-
trol of oligopolistic collusions and monopolistic aspira-
tions of large corporations, regulation of international
banking, etc.), partly globally developmental (supervision
of global projects such as on the Antarctic or the Moon,
other planets, etc.).
The creation of new global governance is a big challenge,
larger than, e.g., emergence of European Union. But hu-
manity must rise up to this challenge if we want to look to
the future with trust.
3. The Challenges from and for Future
Internet
From the above vision it is clear that the Future Internet
will have fundamental impacts on the socio-economic de-
velopment. The challenges from the Future Internet indi-
cated above include:
– the conﬂict between global corporatization and global
governance;
– the conﬂict about property of knowledge, thus con-
cerning direct and indirect limits to freedom;
– the trend towards elitarism (or netocracy) inher-
ent in current internet development dynamics versus
democracy, with related issue of reform of education
systems;
– the issue of ambient intelligence versus human rights;
– the issue of radical human evolution versus human
sovereignty, with related threat of network and com-
puter domination over people.
The main thesis of this paper is that the solution of and the
challenges for the Future Internet should anticipate and take
account of the predicted challenges from its future social
application; the Future Internet should be based on a vision
how to respond to such challenges. The existing Internet
was also based on such a forward-looking vision: it was
designed to warrant interconnectivity even under severe per-
turbations and to protect rights of every user of the network
(even if these principles resulted from military considera-
tions of warranting interconnections under nuclear attack
and enabling the shift of command to anyplace). This was
naturally achieved at the cost of disregarding its future
commercial applications and has led to known dilemmas
today (e.g., the tussle between peer-to-peer (P2P) and in-
teractive network use, e.g., [19]). However, such design
omissions can be solved technologically rather easily, good
solution proposals already exist (e.g., the trilogy architec-
ture [20]).
Quite diﬀerent issue is a vision taking into account the
challenges listed above. It is not suﬃcient to take into
account some hypothetical scenarios, even if reasonable
(see, e.g., [21]) without a consistent vision of the future
world and a commitment what type of solutions should be
preferred for this world.
Should Future Internet support oligopolization of the future
integrated media, leading to direct or indirect censorship of
ideas expressing the interests of big corporations, or should
it rather promote free exchange of ideas and thus support
global governance based on a direct opinion exchange? An
answer saying that Future Internet solutions must be po-
litically neutral is misleading: no technology is absolutely
politically neutral, it can be used more or less easily in this
or that political interest.
Therefore, we cannot dismiss questions such as:
• Should Future Internet help to exact strict intellec-
tual rights and thus help in further privatization of
knowledge, or should it rather promote open access
to as much public knowledge as possible?
• Should Future Internet take digital divide and the
trend towards netocracy as granted, or should it rather
promote new forms of democracy and help to spread
democracy by supporting educational reforms?
• Should Future Internet (or so unfortunately called
real world Internet, see, e.g., [21]) be based on the
assumption that ambient intelligence will be accepted
by people, because market demand for it will be cre-
ated by the advertisements expressing the interests
of big corporations, or should it rather be based on
the question which ambient intelligence applications
are most likely to be socially accepted because they
respond to true social needs without violating basic
human rights?
• Should Future Internet be based on the assumption
that a total immersion of a human being into a vir-
tual world is desirable because anyway radical hu-
man evolution will occur, including such total immer-
sions, or should it rather respect and support human
sovereignty and dignity?
These are only questions, not answers, but I believe that it
is not suﬃcient to limit socio-economic considerations of
Future Internet to neoliberal convictions that market mech-
anisms would solve all problems. Therefore, such questions
should be asked before constructing Future Internet.
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4. Conclusions
It is diﬃcult to summarize by classical conclusions a paper
devoted mostly to a vision. Instead, I will try here to repeat
here some of most important theses of this paper.
• The theories of a co-evolution of social attitudes
and technological solutions are applicable only to
a near-equilibrium evolution, certainly not applicable
to such events as the beginnings of industrial revo-
lution or beginnings of informational revolution, the
emergence of Internet, or even the construction of
a Future Internet. A technological solution of this
magnitude of social impact was until now – and
should be in future – based on a vision that hope-
fully would meet social expectations at least 40 years
from its conception. Internet was based on such a vi-
sion, even if its success has outgrown the scope of
that vision. Every radically new technology (com-
puters, transistors, mobile telephony, digital televi-
sion) is usually conceived at least 40 years before its
broad social use and is based on a vision, not on
a co-evolution of social attitudes and technological
solutions.
• To construct Future Internet worth its name it is nec-
essary to have a vision of the world in 2050. The
paper presents such a vision – which is optimistic
in the belief that humanity will be able to cope with
most challenges and problems, conservative in the be-
lief that social customs and attitudes do not change
easily and require special reasons for change, ﬁnally
radical in the belief that informational revolution al-
ready has had fundamental socio-economic impacts,
between others invalidating most of neoclassical eco-
nomics when applied to high technology markets.
• The solution of and the challenges for the Future In-
ternet should anticipate and take account of the pre-
dicted challenges from its future social application;
the Future Internet should be based on a vision how
to respond to such challenges. This vision might be
based on the vision of the world in 2050 discussed
in most parts of this paper.
• The challenges from the Future Internet indicated
above include:
– the conﬂict between global corporatization and
global governance;
– the conﬂict about property of knowledge, thus
concerning direct and indirect limits to free-
dom;
– the trend towards elitarism (or netocracy) inher-
ent in current Internet development dynamics
versus democracy, with related issue of reform
of education systems;
– the issue of ambient intelligence versus human
rights;
– the issue of radical human evolution versus hu-
man sovereignty, with related threat of network
and computer domination over people.
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Paper Telecommunications, Universal
Service and Poverty in Mexico: a Public
Policy Assessment (1990–2008)
Cristina Casanueva-Reguart and Antonio Pita S.
Abstract—This article analyzes the design and implementa-
tion of telecommunications service policies targeted at the
poorest regions of Mexico (1990–2008). It begins by defining
universal access and service policies, their economic and social
rationale. Secondly, it discusses the scope of public policies on
universal service provision designed by Mexican authorities to
achieve the goal of universal access. Thirdly, the paper ana-
lyzes the distributive effects of this set of policies among the
poorest sectors of the population. The sources on which this
research was based were two national surveys: the House-
hold Income and Expenditure Survey (2008), and the House-
hold Survey of the Access and Use of Information Technolo-
gies (2007). The additional information on regional economic
development was based on the poverty indexes by the national
population council and economic information given by Mex-
ico’s Census Bureau. Additional use was made of the an-
nual reports prepared by Ministry of Communications, statis-
tics published by the Federal Telecommunications Commission
and official documents prepared by the government agencies.
Finally, a series of in-depth interviews was conducted with the
former representatives of the Office of Rural Telephony. Fi-
nally, the article discusses, in the light of available evidence,
possible explanations for the apparent failure of the universal
service policy that was implemented to bring at least basic
voice services to Mexico’s neediest.
Keywords—development, digital divide, market power, regula-
tory capture, social inclusion, universal service.
1. Introduction
The telecommunications services infrastructure is an im-
portant factor for economic development and social inclu-
sion, and a crucial component leading to greater equality
when services are available to and affordable to any person,
irrespective of levels of income and geographic location.
In developing countries gaps remained in the market mainly
because of regulatory failure, combined with exceptionally
challenging geography and extremely low population den-
sities, isolation and extreme poverty [1]. Government, in-
stitutions and public policy design have been faced with
a situation where authorities had a social obligation to en-
sure that their people had access to basic telecommunica-
tions, but the ability to enforce these obligations entailed
increasing difficulties. Some of these difficulties are related
to the asymmetry between the government regulatory bod-
ies and the power of the operators, particularly in the case
of an incumbent operator with market power in the supply
of almost every telecommunications service1.
This article analyzes the design and implementation of
telecommunications service policies targeted at the poorest
regions of Mexico (1990-2008). It begins by defining uni-
versal access and service policies, as well as their economic
and social rationale. The article then discusses the scope of
public policies on universal service provision designed by
Mexican authorities to achieve the goal of universal access,
namely:
• Monitoring by the regulatory authorities of compli-
ance on the part of the incumbent telecommunica-
tions operator, Teléfonos de México (Telmex), in ful-
filling its social obligations as the dominant operator,
following the company’s privatisation (1990);
• Government policy aimed at providing connectivity –
basic telephony services – to rural communities. This
article presents the main research results, which focus
on basic (voice) telecommunications services, both
land-line and wireless2. This policy was deployed
by private operators, mainly the incumbent. The par-
ticipation of operators was based on a public tender
processes organized by the government, which has
resulted in an additional profitable business for the
incumbent operator, with limited results in terms of
access to these services by the poor.
Thirdly, the paper analyzes the distributive effects of this
set of policies among the poorest sectors of the population.
Finally, the article discusses, in the light of available evi-
dence, possible explanations for the apparent failure of the
universal service or social coverage policies that were im-
plemented to bring at least basic voice services to Mexico’s
neediest, as well as the difficulties faced by the regula-
tory bodies behind the design and implementation of these
policies.
1Almost 20 years after Telmex’s privatization (1990) in 2009, Telmex’s
operated the 84.8% of the total the number of fixed line connec-
tions, and 72.3% of cellular lines. “The Competive Intelligence Unit”
(CIU), http://octavioislas.wordpress.com/2009/07/23/3236-mexico-the-
competitive-intelligence-unit-competencia-en-mexico-%C2%BFque-20-
anos-no-es-nada-telecomunicaciones/
2The results and the discussion, presented in this article, are part of
a larger project on Universal Access and Service which include telecom-
munications services and bandwidth in the provision of Internet, data and
video transmission.
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The sources on which this research was based were two
national surveys: the Household Income and Expenditure
Survey (2008), and the Household Survey of the Access and
Use of Information Technologies (2007). The additional
information on regional economic development reported in
this article was based on the poverty indexes drawn up by
the national population council and economic information
given by Mexico’s Census Bureau National Institute for
Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI), Bank of
Economic Information (BIE), and housing and population
counting, 2005. Additional use was made of the annual re-
ports prepared by the Communications and Transport Sec-
retary (Ministry of Communications), statistics published
by the Federal Telecommunications Commission (COFE-
TEL) and official documents prepared by the government
agencies in charge of designing and monitoring the uni-
versal service telecommunications policies, principally the
Ministry of Communications. Finally, a series of in-depth
interviews was conducted with the former representatives of
the Office of Rural Telephony, who were in charge of mon-
itoring the implementation of social and universal telecom-
munications policies.
2. Access to Telecommunications
Services as a Fundamental Right;
Definitions of Universal Access
and Universal Service:
its Economic and Social Rationale
The recent literature on the universality of telecommunica-
tions services states, as a fundamental principle, that every
citizen has the right to access telecommunications services
with high quality standards. This implies fulfilling three
basic conditions: universality, equality and continuity, de-
fined as follows:
– universality: every citizen has the right to have access
to telecommunications services with a high standard
of quality;
– equality: universal access, irrespective of income lev-
els and geographic location;
– continuity: ensuring that the service continues to
maintain high quality standards, in an uninterrupted
manner.
Regarding universality, the literature on this subject distin-
guishes between universal access and universal service:
• Universal access is when everyone has the right to
use the service somewhere, in a public place. This
service is also defined as communal or shared access.
In general there would be at least one point of access
per settlement over a certain population size, within
a convenient and reasonable distance.
• Universal service is when every individual, house-
hold, business or institution can be provided with
a service, using it privately, either at home or in an
increasingly mobile variant, carried with the individ-
ual through wireless devices [2].
The rationale for a universal access or universal service pol-
icy is both economic and social. The economic rationale
is based on the market’s inability to provide infrastructure,
connectivity and services on a universal basis. Thus, uni-
versal access and service policies are justified in the face of
market gaps, so as to guarantee equality of economic op-
portunities, since telecommunications services are a critical
component in the production of goods and services, as well
as for social inclusion and, increasingly so, for political par-
ticipation.
The social rationale consists of the will of the public policy
makers who, as representatives of the state and its citizens,
must guarantee social inclusion and avoid the exclusion of
parts of the population, irrespective of income levels and
geographic location.
Furthermore, the three defining characteristics of universal
access and universal service are:
– availability: the service is accessible to inhabited
parts of the country through public, community,
shared or personal devices;
– accessibility: all citizens can use the service, regard-
less of location, gender, disabilities and other per-
sonal characteristics;
– affordability: the service is affordable to all citizens.
Thus, the policy of a universal telecommunications ser-
vice consists of an explicit, direct and focused public pol-
icy, aimed at offering telecommunications services at prices
that are affordable to the poorest sector of the population.
The fulfilment of this policy requires a subsidy, since this
sector of the population cannot afford these services at
market prices. The subsidy may be applied on the sup-
ply or demand side of these services. On the supply side,
it is usually applied through development and/or optimisa-
tion of the infrastructure (investment), which allows con-
nectivity and thus takes into account the difficulty of infras-
tructure provision given the level of geographical disper-
sion of these communities, as well as the cost of providing
the service.
On the demand side, the affordability of the provision of
these services must be addressed, because the population
currently without service generally lives in conditions of
poverty, sometimes extreme, and thus their income does
not allow them access to these services at the market price.
Hence, when supplying these services is not profitable for
the service operators, provision depends on various forms
of subsidy [3].
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3. Public Policies on Universal Service
Provision in Mexico under
the Responsibility
of the Telecommunications
Regulatory Bodies
According to the population counting of 2005, there were
184,748 rural communities in Mexico with a population of
fewer than 2,500 inhabitants, and 197,479 communities of
fewer than 5,000. These communities are inhabited by over
30 million men and women, which represented 29.1% of
the Mexican population. In addition, a notable feature of
these communities was their high level of dispersion, with
92.5% having fewer than 500 inhabitants.
Thus, in order to increase the social coverage of telecom-
munications services, a set of policies was drawn up and
implemented. They represented the main public policies
that have been put into practice to provide access and uni-
versal service in Mexico and among them, the most impor-
tant were:
• Monitoring of Teléfonos de México’s (Telmex, the
incumbent operator) compliance with its obligations
to provide a universal service, as set out in Telmex’s
licence of 1990, at the time that the public telecom-
munications operator was privatized. This licence
was granted by the Ministry of Communications and
Transport (Ministry of Communications3), which has
acted as a regulator and has the authority to moni-
tor Telmex’s compliance with its obligations regard-
ing universal service, rural telephony, as well as the
modernization and expansion of the public network,
contained in Telmex’s licence.
• Rural telephony (1995–2007), aimed at offering ser-
vices to communities with fewer than 500 inhabitants,
with a direct subsidy from the Ministry of Commu-
nications.
• The creation of the Social Coverage Fund (Fondo
de Cobertura Social, FONCOS: 2002–2007) by the
Ministry of Communications aimed at increasing the
coverage of rural telephony in communities with
a population of between 400 and 2,499 inhabitants.
For this purpose the regulator organized went out to
public tender, calling for bids from telecommunica-
tions operators. The conditions of the tender included
3In Mexico there are two main regulatory agencies directly involved
with telecommunications, the Subsecretaría de Comunicaciones (Ministry
of Communications), which is part of the Secretary of Communications
and Transports (Ministry of Communications and Transport). The second
regulatory agency is the Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones (Fed-
eral Telecommunications Commission), which is an autonomous govern-
ment agency. In the case of universal service and universal access, the
agency in charge of designing these policies is mainly the Ministry of
Communications. This ministry has performed the major role in the de-
sign of universal telecommunications policy and in the surveillance of the
implementation universal services by the operators.
the provision of non-returnable monetary resources,
which were originally allocated by the Ministry of Fi-
nance. In addition, the regulator allocated frequency
bandwidth resources that were reserved for the pur-
pose of social and universal service coverage, with
a ten year licence (renewable) to use these frequency
bands.
3.1. Telmex Licence: Universal Service Obligations and
Network Growth
The design of the universal service obligations included
in the incumbent operator’s licence should have addressed
the main challenges posed by the gaps in the market,
mainly in small rural communities generally located in re-
mote and isolated areas and where the poorest people of
the country live. This section deals with the context in
which Telmex was privatized, which explains the scope of
the clauses relating to universal service and rural telephony
included in the licence. The scope of both the content and
schedule for its implementation, as well as their impact
on bringing connectivity to the neediest communities, was
shaped to some extent by the context in which the privatiza-
tion of Telmex took place. This section begins by describ-
ing this context, then briefly presents the content of the
clauses relating to universal service obligations, namely,
regarding network expansion, rural telephony and public
telephones. It then presents the main results of an anal-
ysis of the impact of Telmex’s fulfilment of these licence
clauses.
In order to understand the government policy makers’ lim-
ited leverage on the definition of the clauses relating to uni-
versal obligations or social coverage in Telmex’s franchise
agreement(1990), it is useful to analyze the specific junc-
ture at which this process took place. During the 1980s,
with the economy severely indebted, the burden of foreign
debt and fiscal deficit had a major effect on the process of
privatization of public companies and specifically on the
approach adopted in the privatization of Telmex. Between
1965 and 1980 the economy had been growing at an aver-
age rate of 6.7%, but during the 80s this slowed to a yearly
average of 1.8%. In this context, government policy makers
embarked on an aggressive privatization program of pub-
lic companies, with two purposes in mind: to increase the
efficiency of Mexico’s economy and to improve Mexico’s
public finances.
In the case of the public telephone company in Mexico, the
potential revenue gain from this privatization and the public
finance argument prevailed. The decision to privatize the
public telecommunications operator in Mexico took place
in 1989. During the privatization of Telmex, emphasis was
placed on expected revenues. In fact, the privatization pro-
cess was chaired by the Ministry of Finance and not by the
Ministry of Communications and Transport [4]–[6].
To maximize revenues from privatization, the government
sold to a single set of investors a package that included
Telmex and Telnor, in addition to the only nationwide mo-
bile network franchise, as mentioned above, the Federal
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Microwave Network, as well as an ample bandwidth al-
location. Thus, overnight, the emerging company became
a formidable player in the sector. It was allowed to of-
fer all types of telecommunications services with the ex-
ception of television broadcasting services. Thus, Telmex
became a horizontally and vertically integrated telecom-
munications service provider with a nationwide network
for all its services. Furthermore, it was guaranteed lit-
tle or no competition in key services for several years.
The new private owners of Telmex were given a de jure
monopoly over the long distance markets (national and
international) for six years. They inherited the monopoly
over local telephone services. By creating a horizon-
tally and vertically integrated telecommunications com-
pany, the government could receive a higher price for pri-
vatizing the firm and reach a short-term public finance
goal. For potential buyers, the company was very attrac-
tive [4], [5]. They were allowed to buy a stream of ex-
cess profits sustained by a monopoly, more valuable than
a stream of revenue generated under competitive con-
ditions [7].
In the negotiation process that accompanied the privatiza-
tion of Telmex, government policy makers let the collec-
tion of revenues from privatization preside over other goals
such as economic efficiency, well-being and social inclu-
sion. This context explains the lack of leverage or bar-
gaining power of the authorities, specifically on the subject
of social coverage. Although Telmex’s license included
clauses governing universal service obligations, rural tele-
phony and public telephone booths, as well as network ex-
pansion, Telmex’s commitment to these clauses ended in
1994 and the results lagged very much behind the objective
of providing a basic universal telecommunications service
to rural areas.
The following paragraphs give a summary of the main
clauses relating to Telmex’s universal service and network
growth obligations. The result of an empirical analysis is
also presented, showing the outcomes of the implementa-
tion of these policies, reflecting the achievements of net-
work growth, rural telephony and public telephone services
or telephone booths (1990–1998).
From a regulatory perspective, Telmex’s licence made this
company operate as a regulated monopoly. The company
was given a set of operational goals that it was required to
meet:
– to expand the number of basic telephone lines by
a minimum of 12% per annum, until the end of 1994;
– to continually reduce the waiting period for the basic
telephone service in localities with automatic switch-
ing capabilities to a maximum of one month by the
year 2000;
– to provide a public payphone service to every locality
with more than 500 inhabitants by the end of 1994,
and to increase the penetration of public telephone
booths from 0.5 per thousand inhabitants, to five per
thousand by the end of 1998;
– to provide a public payphone service to every lo-
cality with more than 2,500 inhabitants (less than
5,000 inhabitants, according to the definition of rural
community), if there were at least 100 applications
from potential end users, and an up front payment
equivalent to three months’ line rental. “After these
conditions were fulfilled (. . . ) Telmex would deliver
the service within a time frame of not more than
18 months”4;
– to publish a four year (network) expansion and mod-
ernization programme, in accordance with the goals
set by the licence, and to agree with the Ministry of
Communications on programmes for rural telephony
and public telephone booths.
3.1.1. To Expand the Number of Basic Telephone Lines
by a Minimum of 12% per Annum
The 12% telephone line expansion requirement ended only
four years after the 1994 privatization of the sector. Quan-
titative goals for a longer period would have conflicted
with the goal of revenue maximization at the time of pri-
vatization. The results shown in Table 1 tend to support
the view that the quantitative line expansion requirement
set out in the concession or Telmex licence was an ef-
fective regulation. In fact, during the years 1991 to 1994,
Telmex’s average annual line expansion was 11.8%, and
thus close to meeting the 12% requirement. However, once
such an expansion requirement ceased to exist, average
line expansion fell to only 6.8% in the period 1994–2000
(see Table 1).
Table 1
Five year average growth in telephone lines and GDP
(1965–2000)
Period Telephone lines [%] GDP [%]
1965–1970 12.8 6.9
1970–1975 12.9 6.5
1975–1980 10.5 6.7
1980–1985 6.4 1.9
1985–1990 7.6 1.7
1990–1994 11.8 3.6
1994–2000 6.8 3.5
Source: SCT, Anuarios Estadísticos (1965–2000).
3.1.2. Rural Telephony: Basic Telephone Service to
Communities with More than 500 Inhabitants
(1990–1998)
As a result of the negotiations between government pol-
icy makers in the field of telecommunications and the
group of investors, Telmex’s licence freed them from their
obligation to serve communities with fewer than 500 in-
4SCT,Modificación a Tele´fonos de Me´xico, 1990, http://www.cft.gob.mx/
work/sites/Cofetel 2008/resources/LocalContent/3964/1/10ago90.pdf
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Table 2
Telephone service to communities with more than 500 inhabitants
State
Lines per 1,000 Lines per 1,000
Rural
inhabitants inhabitants
communities Total population Total population
GDP
towns 500 to 2,499 towns 500–4,999
communicated towns towns
per capitaby Telmex, 500–2,499 500 to 4,999
1990–1994
Chiapas 1.00 0.44 950 951,521 2,136,825 37.8
Oaxaca 1.24 0.65 1,362 1,095,547 2,102,278 39.8
Tabasco 1.31 0.78 678 517,227 863,855 47.6
Guerrero 1.27 0.63 932 732,388 1,470,855 47.8
Tlaxcala 0.77 0.37 109 141396 294,861 47.9
National 1.35 0.65 16,738 13,339,307 27,937,529 83.2
Campeche 1.43 0.70 135 94653 193,781 121.7
Quintana Roo 1.54 0.74 122 79123 164,691 126.4
Coahuila 1.65 0.70 238 144448 337,934 129.8
Nuevo León 3.30 0.79 232 70211 293,812 173.5
Distrito Federal 0.00 0.00 0 13268 26,550 188.0
Source: SCT, Annual Reports, INEGI, Census 1990.
habitants, which according to the census of 1990 repre-
sented 21.16 million people or 47.2% of the inhabitants in
rural communities in Mexico [8].
An analysis of the impact of Telmex’s rural telephony op-
erations points to very limited results. The impact on tele-
phone density, following Telmex’s compliance with require-
ments on basic telephone service provision in rural towns,
was extremely low, even when telephone density was es-
timated as the number of lines per thousand inhabitants5.
This estimate shows that the country’s average telephone
density was 1.35 lines per 1,000 inhabitants in rural com-
munities (500 to 2,499 inhabitants), and if the definition of
rural communities included “enlarged rural communities”
(from 500 to 4,999 inhabitants), the telephone density es-
timate drops to half the previous figure, or 0.65 lines per
thousand inhabitants. Based on this analysis it is possible
to assert that fulfilment of overall requirements, provision
of rural telephony and the installation of public telephone
booths in rural areas, had very much fallen behind in rela-
tion to the goals set by Telmex’s licence (see Table 2, which
presents the telephone density, according to our definition,
in the five more prosperous states and in the five poorest
states in Mexico).
Thus, in spite of the fact that public telephone booths were
the strategy mostly used by Telmex to fulfil its universal
or social obligations, compliance with the commitment of
providing public access through public telephone booths
was insufficient. At the end of 1998, Telmex admitted that
it had only installed 3.19 public booths per 1,000 inhabi-
tants. Taking into account that Mexico’s population at the
time was 96 million, Telmex would have had to install at
least 480 thousand public booths in order to comply with
the social obligation dictated by its licence. Unfortunately,
5See Caslon analytics, metrics and statistics, http://www.caslon.com.au/
metricsguide8.htm
Fig. 1. Number of rural communities with more than 500 inhab-
itants, communicated by Telmex with at least one telephone line
(1990–2007).
according to the definition of universal service set out in
Telmex’s licence and because of the government’s lack of
leverage at the time of privatization, the universal service
obligation ceased and areas that were served with at least
one public booth increased slightly in 1995 and 1996 and
ceased to grow indefinitely from 1997 (see Figure 1 and
Table 3).
Table 3
Telephone lines provided by Telmex in communities
with a population of 500 or more inhabitants
Acumulated
Annual Annual
[number] [%]
4,350 2,854 190.8
16,542 4,006 32.0
Average annual growth: 1990–1994 93.4253
16,735 193 1.2
16,738 0 0.0
16,738 0 0.0
16,738 0 0.0
Average annual growth: 1994–2007 0.0014
Sources: SCT, Annual Reports (2000 and 2007).
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Table 4
Teledensity and level of development in different states in Mexico, 2008
State
Lines per Non residential Mobile GDP
Poverty index
households [%] lines1 [%] lines2 per capita
National 52.2 12.7 71 96.8
Chiapas 19.1 4.2 41.1 37.8 Very high
Oaxaca 26.4 4.6 39.8 39.8 Very high
Tabasco 28.1 6.7 75 47.6 High
Guerrero 40.6 7 44.8 47.8 Very high
Tlaxcala 40.3 4.4 44.1 47.9 Medium
Campeche 32.7 6.4 71 121.7 High
Quintana Roo 38.0 16.1 95.9 126.4 Low
Coahuila 63.3 12 86.6 129.8 Low
Nuevo León 79.9 22.2 91.8 173.5 Very low
Distrito Federal 104.6 40.5 102.7 188 Very low
1 lines per one thousand employed people, 2 lines per one hundred people.
Sources: Cofetel, 2008; INEGI, 2005 and 2008, National Population Council, 2005.
According to Telmex’s license, the commitment to pro-
vide a basic service under the premise of universal access
through public booths in Mexico is far outweighed by the
challenge of providing services to the poorest communities
Table 5
Average revenue per capita in selected developing
countries, 2007
Latin
Country ARPU
GDP ARPU/GDP
America per capita per capita1
Colombia 131.0 7,400 1.8
Mexico 178.0 12,400 1.4
Brazil 17.2 9,500 0.2
Chile 17.0 14,300 0.1
Argentina 12.2 13,100 0.1
Emerging Hungary 26.5 19,300 0.1
Europe
Czech R. 28.5 24,500 0.1
Poland 17.0 16,200 0.1
Ukraine 7.0 7,000 0.1
Russia 10.0 14,800 0.1
Africa/ Turkey 13.7 12,000.00 0.1
Middle East
Iraq 12.3 3,700.00 0.3
South Africa 20.7 9,700.00 0.2
Egypt 9.7 5,000.00 0.2
Emerging India 8.6 2,600 0.3
Asia
China 10.8 5,400 0.2
Korea 45.0 25,000 0.2
Taiwan 23.0 30,100 0.1
Singapore 348.0 49,900 0.7
Hong Kong 22.5 42,000 0.1
1 ARPU – average revenue per user: the estimation gives
ARPU as a percentage of GDP per capita, in each country.
Sources: Merrill Lynch, 2008, CIA World Factbook, 2008,
and Office of Rurar Telephony, 2009.
of Mexico. This is true more particularly in the context
of a large deficit of telecommunications services in the
country as a whole: on average, there is provision to
only 5 households out of every ten (52.2%) and 12.7 non
residential lines per one thousand employed people (see
Table 4).
Most likely the deficit of connectivity has been compen-
sated for by the use of cellular or mobile services, at mar-
ket prices. A comparative analysis of revenue per minute
from wireless services suggests that Mexico has one of the
highest tariffs for mobile services (see Table 5).
The following section presents information relating to the
“agreements” between Telmex and the Ministry of Commu-
nications, which according to its licence, were supposed to
continue after 1994.
3.1.3. Telmex Agreements with the Ministry of Commu-
nications on Programmes for Network Expansion,
Rural Telephony and Public Telephone Booths
(1995 to date)
In 1995, according to Telmex’s licence, the company
was required every four years to establish a programme
for network expansion and provision of rural telephony
and public telephone booths. However, in spite of the fact
that an exchange of documents took place between Telmex
and the Ministry of Communications in 1995, this ex-
change did not materialize into an action programme.It was
not until 1998 that this took place, when Telmex set up
a rural telephony programme, supposedly in an agreement
with the Ministry of Communications, retroactive to 1995
(1995–1998).
In December 1998 Telmex sent a report on the fulfilment of
the goals of this programme. The main goal achieved was
the additional coverage, compared to 1994, of 4,288 com-
munities, through public telephone lines or public booths.
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However, strictly speaking, the service provided to these
additional communities was part of a rural telephony
project undertaken by the Ministry of Communications.
Telmex was involved as the winner of a public tender in
which they were chosen as the provider, but the project
was financed by the Ministry of Communications (the re-
sults are presented below of the universal service policy
undertaken by the Ministry of Communications).
It was only in July 2006, when Telmex delivered its results
on network expansion and rural telephony for the periods
1995–1998, 1999–2002 and 2003–2006. The documents
handed over by Telmex to the Ministry of Communica-
tions were accompanied by an appeal for confidentiality
and the Ministry of Communications accepted the condi-
tion of confidentiality requested by Telmex. Nevertheless,
the annual reports published by the Ministry of Communi-
cations (2001–2006) showed that since 1994, Telmex made
a very small contribution in this area.
The privatization of Telmex and the attempts to regulate
the monopoly through this company’s license did not bring
a strengthening of the regulatory authority’s monitoring
and enforcement capabilities. This had a severe effect on
achieving the goals set by the universal service or universal
obligations defined in Telmex’s licence following privatiza-
tion. Studies on telecommunications reform suggest that
privatization by itself, without a strong regulator, does not
yield significant performance improvements in the telecom-
munications sector [5], [7], [9].
4. Rural Telecommunications Services
for Communities of Fewer than
500 Inhabitants: Direct Government
Subsidy
This section analyzes the policy directly implemented
by the Ministry of Communications, aimed at providing
telecommunications services to rural communities of be-
tween 100 and 499 inhabitants. These programmes origi-
nally focused on small towns and villages with fewer than
500 inhabitants (1990–2002), but later on, with the estab-
lishment of the Social Coverage Fund (FONCOS), the focus
of these programmes shifted to communities of between
400 and 2,500 inhabitants.
Table 6
Rural telephony supplier
Cellular company Lines %
Telcel 8,358 25.1
Iusacell 11,012 33.1
Telecomm 13,772 41.4
Others 100 0.3
Total 33,242 100.0
Source: Office of Rural Telephony.
The programme was directly financed by the Ministry of
Communication (1995–2006) and was aimed at communi-
ties with fewer than 500 inhabitants. It involved the main
providers of mobile telecommunications services, includ-
ing Telcel, the mobile company part of the same group as
Telmex (25%), and the public satellite company, Telecomm
(41.4%, see Table 6).
The size of these targeted communities confirmed that the
policy successfully focussed on the poorest towns of Mex-
ico and even in cases where regions of higher income were
served, the subsidy focussed on the neediest rural commu-
nities that are generally located in remote and isolated ar-
eas (see Table 3). Nevertheless, telephone density in these
small towns remained extremely low, as was the case of the
services provided by Telmex in larger communities, where
the estimated telephone density is 0.45 lines per 100 in-
habitants when population data for these communities is
taken from the 2000 census and 0.44 with population data
is from 2005 (counting of population and housing, 2005,
see Table 7). It is also likely that the actual telephone
density in these small towns was higher because of the
use of mobile technology, when it was available in these
regions.
An additional source of information consisted of in-depth
interviews with the former representatives of the Office
of Rural Telephony, part of the aforementioned Ministry
of Communications, where data compiled by this office is
based on their fieldwork aimed at verifying the correct oper-
ation of the installed lines. This information complements
that of the previous analysis6.
The information provided by the Office of Rural Telephony
showed that 33,242 lines were installed between 1995 and
2006. An analysis of this information also showed a very
rapid growth in the number of installed lines between 1995
and 2000 (135.42% yearly average growth) and that the
pace of growth declined considerably over the following
years, where the yearly average growth observed between
2001 and 2005 was only 1.16%. There was no evidence of
growth between 2006 and 2009.
The results of the former analysis are even more dramatic
considering the outcome of the fieldwork aimed at veri-
fying the correction operation of the equipment. Here the
data showed that only 41.5% of the installed lines were
in operation and out of these, 58.5% of the lines were
out of service and abandoned. The interviews with the for-
mer representatives of this office suggested that the peo-
ple of these communities were gradually shifting to mo-
bile technology, where this service was available, in spite
of the higher costs involved in the use of mobile commu-
nication.
The former observations raise doubts over the commitment
made by the government for bridging the connectivity gap
in the smallest and poorest communities of Mexico. It also
6Is worth mentioning that there is an inconsistency between the infor-
mation accounted by the Annual Report (2007) and the Office of Rural
Communication, the first source reported 34,676 installed lines, an the
Office of Rural Telephony accounted for 33,242, the difference between
the two sources is 1,434 installed lines.
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Table 7
Rural telephony, lines installed by Secretary of Communications, towns between 100 and 499 inhabitants, 1995–2007
Communities Lines 2007
Teledensity Teledensity
GDP per capita/100, 2000 /100, 2005
Total 184,748 34,676 0.45 0.44 70.88
Chiapas 19,237 3,560 0.48 0.42 28.6
Oaxaca 10,025 2,540 0.41 0.37 32.5
Tlaxcala 1,138 117 0.41 0.41 37.3
Michoacán 8,965 1,861 0.45 0.45 39.9
Chihuahua 12,095 896 0.43 0.53 102.9
Quintana Roo 1,800 177 0.46 0.44 107.5
Campeche 2,595 240 0.49 0.35 121.7
Baja California 3,918 248 0.56 0.56 93.0
Campeche 2,595 240 0.49 0.35 121.7
Nuevo León 5,169 561 0.50 0.57 133.1
Source: INEGI, Censo de Población y Vivienda, 2000; Conteo Población y Vivienda, 2005; Ministry of Communications,
Annual Report (2000–2007) and Bank of Economic Information (BIE), 2007.
raises questions over the nature of the agreements signed
by the Ministry of Communications and the operators un-
dertaking the installation of the telephone lines, specifi-
cally operation and maintenance in accordance with accept-
able quality standards. The personnel interviewed agreed
Table 8
Number of new telephones installed in communities
with less than 500 inhabitants 1995–2008
1995 4,000
1996 9,369
1997 10,545
1998 20,208
1999 23,063
2000 31,083
Average annual growth 1995–2000 135.42
2001 31,083
2002 31,453
2003 31,820
2004 32,326
2005 32,841
2006 33,240
2007 33,242
Average annual growth 2001–2008 1.16
Source: Ministry of Communications, Office of Rural
Telephony.
that the contracts included maintenance and quality clauses,
which pose additional questions on the strength of the min-
istry as a regulator capable of enforcing these clauses.
5. Social Coverage Fund (FONCOS)
In 2002 the Social Coverage Fund (FONCOS) was estab-
lished as a trust fund with an allocation of 75 million
US dollars7 provided by the Ministry of Finance to the
Ministry of Communications. Its main purpose was for the
funding of social telecommunications services, focussed on
serving communities of between 400 to 2,500 inhabitants.
The Ministry of Communications designed two differ-
ent public tender processes. The first, Basic Telephony 1
(STB-1 to use its Spanish acronym), was aimed at installing
public telephone lines in communities of extreme poverty.
The second, Basic Telephony 2 or STB-2, focussed on com-
munities with higher levels of income. For STB-1, the sub-
sidy for the chosen operator consisted of both financial and
bandwidth resources for 10 years (renewable), which were
reserved by the government for social coverage purposes.
The subsidy to the end user included all expenses relating
to the installation and rental of the equipment, so that the
end user had only to pay for call traffic, charged for via
prepaid cards.
For STB-2, the subsidy to the winning operator consisted
of bandwidth resources only. The end user was charged
for installation costs and call traffic, exonerating them from
payment for the rented equipment. In this case, the sub-
sidy for the chosen company consisted only of the licence to
operate bandwidth resources for 10 years (also renewable).
Although in the first round four companies participated,
two of them were Telmex and Telcel. The latter is a mo-
bile service provider belonging to the same consortium as
Telmex. In the second round of the tender process, Telmex
was the only bidder. In both public tenders Telmex, the
incumbent operator, was chosen. The contract with this
incumbent operator was signed on February 2005 with the
target of serving 5,979 communities.
There were two changes to the terms of the contact signed
between Telmex and the Ministry of Communications. The
first was related to the inability to serve 737 communities
7The total sum accounted by 750 million pesos, the exchange rate be-
tween Mexican pesos and US dollars at the time was around 10 Mexican
pesos per US dollar.
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due to the fact that these towns lacked an electricity in-
frastructure or due to difficulties imposed by weather con-
tingencies. The settlement consisted of a time extension
granted to Telmex in order to serve 506 communities.
The second change to the original contract consisted of ex-
changing bandwidth resources reserved by the government
for social coverage purposes for bandwidth with high com-
mercial value for Telmex. This change had severe implica-
tions for both the implementation of the universal service
process and in terms of the dominant control of infras-
tructure on the part of the incumbent operator. This latter
implication had negative consequences due to the lack of
competition in the telecommunications services markets,
thus affecting the economy and society as whole.
In November 2006, a few weeks before the end of the pres-
idential and ministerial administration of 2000–2006, an
exchange of frequency bands took place: its 21 MHz allo-
cation in the 1.5 GHz band, which was originally allocated
by the Ministry of Communications to Telmex as part of
the Social Coverage Fund, was exchanged for 10 MHz in
the 450 MHz band. The Ministry of Communications did
not exercise its power to monitor the use of these frequency
bands.
The exchange of frequency bands turned out to be commer-
cially convenient for Telmex, since the 450 MHz band was
the most appropriate for the provision of wireless services
with technology known as CDMA 450. Among the advan-
tages of the use of frequency resources with this technology
are:
• The ability to digitalize and interleave calls with
a code attached to each one, allowing a large number
of simultaneous calls without interference.
• An additional advantage consisted of having a larger
coverage per cell, which requires a smaller number
of cells, resulting in a more cost-effective technology.
Also, the possibility of supplying a wide variety of
services, such as Internet, telephony, data transmis-
sion, videoconferencing and connectivity between lo-
cal networks.
• This frequency band also makes use of CDMA 2000
1X and CDMA 2000 1xEV-DO technologies, which
allow for high speed data transmission, equivalent to
the digital service line (DSL).
The exchange of bandwidth resources dedicated to social
telephony for resources with ten years of high commercial
value was carried out by the Ministry of Communications
and allowed Telmex access to and use of these resources
without going through an open public tender. This raised
questions over Telmex’s interest in participating in the so-
cial coverage tender process.
Former representatives of the Office of Rural Telephony ar-
gued that Telmex’s true interest was to acquire the use of
the frequency bandwidth resources, with a potentially high
financial return, thus evading the higher transactional and
monetary costs involved in taking part in an open public
tender, which has been the allocation mechanism for radio
bandwidth resources for commercial use drawn up by the
government in accordance with the federal law on telecom-
munications (1995)8.
The former analysis leads us to consider the role of the
government authorities in organizing tender processes and
allocating public financial and bandwidth resources for so-
cial coverage. In this case, the Ministry of Communications
played a different role by granting valuable infrastructure
resources to be used commercially, at a very low cost for
the incumbent operator.
Additionally, and based on fieldwork and remote monitor-
ing performed by the Office of Rural Telephony, the super-
vision of the services offered by Telmex under the Social
Coverage Fund (FONCOS) showed that, out of the pro-
gramme objective of 109,016 telephone lines (75,797 lines
under the STB-1 program and 33,219 under the STB-2 pro-
gram), only 88,791 were actually installed, which implies
that 20,225 lines were never installed.
There was a brief period, after 2006, when the new admin-
istration of the Ministry of Communications verified the
services delivered by Telmex, under the Social Coverage
Fund. The Ministry Office of Rural Telephony identified
numerous irregularities, for example the installation of two
land line connections in the same household, which proved
less costly for Telmex (19,397 lines). A similar discovery
was made of lines that were not connected to any specific
household, which obstructed the verification of their opera-
tion (6,983 lines). In contrast, before 2006, the Ministry of
Communications had punctually paid Telmex, based on the
invoices that the company presented. During a brief period
of time the Ministry of Communications initiated a process
to impose sanctions on Telmex and to suspend payments to
the company. However, this process never transcended the
boundaries of the ministry because different groups within
the ministry restricted the sanctioning process. Further-
more, the group that initiated this process no longer serves
in the Ministry of Communications.
Here again, the analysis reveals the role of the regulator,
firstly in the tender process, and specifically, in the pro-
cess of allocating bandwidth resources with a high poten-
tial return for Telmex. Furthermore, the regulator did not
supervise the use of these resources, which were specifi-
cally allocated for social communications coverage. This
finding suggests regulatory capture and corruption on the
part of the regulator [10], taken to a serious extreme since
the regulator did not exercise its power in preventing the
re-allocation of resources originally targeted at the poor-
est people, which in turn strengthened the market power of
Telmex. Secondly, the regulator did not impose sanctions
on Telmex for its breach of the agreement on social cover-
age. The role of the regulator was eclipsed, most probably
by numerous instances of lobbying, resulting in a failure to
8Federal Telecommunications Law: Article 14. The licenses for the use
of radiofrequency bands for determined uses will be granted through an
open public auction. The Federal Government has the right to receive the
agreed monetary resources; http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/
pdf/118.pdf
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Table 9
Telecommunication services distribution according to households’ income (deciles), 2008
Service Deciles
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Line connection 22.6 45.8 56.4 66.5 76.2 78.5 83.4 87.7 91.7 92.6
Mobile service1 22.1 42.2 52.0 65.2 70.4 77.7 82.1 87.0 91.1 86.7
Cable or satellite TV 5.0 12.7 17.5 26.2 32.6 41.5 50.3 62.3 72.3 75.8
Internet 0.2 1.7 3.4 7.2 11.4 17.4 27.2 41.4 56.1 60.1
1 Mobile services are accounted when at least one member of the household has a mobile line.
Source: INEGI: ENIGH, 2008.
consider the well being and social inclusion of the poorest
sector of the population.
So far the limited achievements of the different public poli-
cies aimed at providing universal service have been pre-
sented as being due firstly to the limited implementation of
the clauses set out in Telmex’s licence and secondly to the
violation of various agreements, including the FONCOS
contract with Telmex.
There are then at least three main findings that can be drawn
from the previous analysis: firstly, that the provision of uni-
versal service or universal access has been extremely lim-
ited in addressing the market gaps in Mexico’s rural areas
and telephone density in the different services continues to
be very low. Twenty years after privatization of the pub-
lic telephone company and 15 years after the liberalization
of the telecommunications markets in Mexico, connectivity
and telephone density remain a major challenge for public
policy in Mexico. The second major finding is the contin-
ual breaching by Telmex of its universal access or service
commitments, not only as was originally stated as part of
its licence, but later as the result of a contract that was
signed with the Ministry of Communications making it the
main supplier of these services. Finally, the third finding is
the limited leverage of the telecommunications authorities
and their difficulty in enforcing contracts and agreements,
as well as in imposing sanctions.
There is an extremely low density telecommunications in-
frastructure in rural areas, with the exception of the mobile
infrastructure existing in some. This has led end users to
rely increasingly on mobile services, which are more costly
than regular services. The following section analyzes the
distributive effects of this set of policies among the poorest
sectors of the population.
6. Access and Expenditure in
Telecommunications Services by the
Poorest Sectors of the Population and
their Relation to Income Distribution
In this section, we analyze the distribution of telecom-
munications services as a function of different levels of
household income. The starting point for this analysis is
the decile distribution of households by level of income
and their expenditure on telecommunications services as
a proportion of their income. The source of informa-
tion is the Household Income and Expenditure Survey for
2008, based on a nationwide representative sample. Each
decile comprises the same number of households, which
are ranked from the lowest to highest income. Compar-
ing the lowest income decile with the highest, the latter is
30 times higher.
6.1. Access to Services
Those households within the lowest income decile (the
poorest) have a significantly lower level of access to
telecommunications services compared with households
with higher income. This finding is consistent with the
results previously presented on universal service provision
and on the low density of infrastructure presented before.
In the lowest decile, only two households in every 10 have
a home telephone line connection, while in the highest in-
come decile, nine out of every 10 have a land line connec-
tion in their homes. Very similar figures can be found for
mobile services (see Table 9).
In the case of cable or satellite TV services, which have
the technical capability for supporting telecommunications
services and are currently used by many countries for that
purpose, including urban areas of Mexico, the distribution
of these services is even more skewed than land line con-
nections or mobile services. Thus, in the lowest decile only
5% of households have access to TV based on this infras-
tructure, while 75% of households in the highest income
decile have access to this service. The most dramatic case
of this unequal distribution is found in relation to Internet
access, where 60.1% of households in the highest income
decile have access to the Internet, while in the lowest, only
0.02% have this service in their homes (see Table 9).
6.2. Expenditure on Telecommunications Services
The expenditure of the poorest households on telecommu-
nications services as a percentage of their total outgoings
is twice as high as the expenditure of the wealthiest house-
holds: 4.2% in the lowest deciles and 1.9% in the highest
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deciles. These results suggest that the demand for telecom-
munications services tends to be inelastic, which means that
people tend to demand and use these services regardless of
their income. The larger proportion of the expenditure of
poorest families is explained by the fact that they live in
remote and isolated areas and depend more on public tele-
phone booths and mobile services, which tend to be more
expensive (see Table 10). As mentioned before, mobile ser-
vices in Mexico have one of the highest prices compared
to other developing countries (see Table 5).
Table 10
Expenditure in telecommunications as a percentage
of total expenses by decil (2006=100)
Decil
Average households Expenditure in telecom-
income per munications as a percentage
quarter MEX pesos of total expenses
1 3,320 4.2
2 7,174 4.1
3 10,042 4.3
4 12,739 4.3
5 15,845 4.4
6 19,506 4.5
7 24,246 4.2
8 31,472 3.8
9 43,796 3.2
10 99,215 1.9
Source: INEGI: ENIGH, 2008.
An additional factor that induces greater expenditure for
the poorest areas is related to the outdated definition of
the areas of local service, which has no technical or eco-
nomic (cost-related) basis and artificially classifies a call as
long distance, incurring higher charge. This particularly af-
fects people in rural areas, where the largest share of their
traffic consists of long distance calls. The higher expen-
diture on telecommunications services has an impact on
the opportunity for the poorest sectors of the population to
spend in other areas like health, nutrition, education, home
maintenance, or make a higher investment in productive
activities.
These results also suggest that the provision of telecom-
munications services under the aegis of “universal access”
or “universal service” is lagging behind the unfulfilled de-
mand for these services. This leaves the poorest sectors of
the population dependent on the supply of services at mar-
ket prices, and mostly wireless services which are more
expensive and difficult for them to afford.
7. Conclusions
Almost 20 years after Mexico’s privatization of the telecom-
munications services by the incumbent operator, Telmex
(Teléfonos de México), the premise of universal service is
far from being fulfilled. Thus on average, only five out of
every 10 households have access to a basic telephone ser-
vice and in some states such as Tabasco and Chiapas only
three, while in Oaxaca only two (1.9) out of 10 households
have access to a telephone line. Similarly, when analyzing
expenditure on telecommunications services, the collected
data has demonstrated that in contrast to what has been
the goal of the universal service policy in Mexico, namely
social inclusion and overcoming poverty, the telecommuni-
cations policies have become a regressive tax for Mexico’s
poorest. These dramatic results are in direct contradiction
with the fact that Telmex cheaply acquired radio bandwidth
for social services by continually winning their public ten-
ders, because regrettably, they later used them exclusively
for commercial purposes.
In explaining the reasons for these poor results, the paper
has also pointed out the shortcomings of the regulation in
place and of the implementation of this regulation by the
authorities, who are directly responsible for the failure to
comply with the telecommunications service policies orig-
inally targeted at the poorest regions of Mexico. These
shortcomings consist essentially of:
– restricting the application of services to communities
with more than 500 inhabitants;
– allowing Telmex to choose between serving rural
communities either by a public telephone booth or
by a land line connection to households;
– allowing a policy far below the standard provided by
the International Telecommunication Union;
– providing insufficient direct government subsidies for
rural telecommunications services for communities
with fewer than 500 inhabitants located in the poorest
states in Mexico, who not only lack a basic telecom-
munications infrastructure but also present the lowest
telephone density, seriously jeopardizing their right
to use adult distant learning education;
– imposing strong limits on competition by establishing
high barriers of entry for competitors in the mobile
services market, which has allowed very high prices
to be set for the end user and some of the highest
among developing countries (as shown in Table 5
above).
These shortcomings show that universal access to telecom-
munications services in Mexico is a representative case of
“regulatory capture” [10], [11], where the regulators and
government authorities have been ”captured” by the incum-
bent operator and have subordinated their regulatory power
to a monopoly-based profit-seeking behavior.
Finally, although it is impossible to go back to the time of
privatization, there is a long list of different regulations that
have already been implemented by both developed and de-
veloping countries, which were created before the described
policies for efficient universal access and service were im-
posed upon the incumbent operator’s licence permit. These
policies have achieved a larger density and better distribu-
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tion of services and some of the following regulations could
thus now be applied with greater chances of success:
• An obligation to provide interconnection on a non-
discriminatory basis, according to high quality stan-
dards and establishing charge estimates on the basis
of long term incremental cost. This applies particu-
larly to those networks with market power: Telmex
and Telcel.
• Unbundling the local loop, thus allowing non-
discriminatory access to sections of the incumbent
operator’s network infrastructure.
• To guarantee a free flow of information on network
capabilities, specifically on the points of presence and
network architecture. This also applies particularly to
Telmex and Telcel. This will contribute to creating
incentives for new investment and the participation
of new players, increasing coverage in regions previ-
ously lacking provision.
• To provide services across networks on a non-
discriminatory basis, to high quality standards. It
is known that international networks get better roam-
ing services from Mexican networks than the cross-
network services that national networks get between
one another. This has been a barrier to entry for new
players that have prevented investment and coverage
in regions lacking coverage. It is worth reiterating
that Telcel is the operator holding control of 75% of
lines and operating the largest mobile infrastructure.
• To allow mobile virtual network operators (MVNO),
which enable new players in the market to provide
mobile phone services without necessarily having
their own licensed bandwidth allocation, nor does it
necessarily require them to have the entire infrastruc-
ture required to provide mobile telephone services.
• Re-defining the domain of local services, whose def-
inition currently incurs an artificial increase in prices
for so-called long distance calls. Without a techni-
cal basis for such a definition, this particularly affects
those rural areas whose traffic is mainly long-distance
based.
• Enforcing the declaration of Telmex as an operator
with (monopolistic) market power and imposing upon
it special requirements regarding quality, prices and
information, so as to level the playing field by allow-
ing other operators to enter the market and promote
healthy competition.
• Closely monitoring Telmex and Telcel, in order to
guarantee the proper delivery of telecommunications
services to the poorer areas of Mexico.
• To ensure accountability and transparency in all legal
processes relating to telecommunications services,
regulation and competition. This not only provides
legal certainty, but is a potential antidote for regula-
tory capture and corruption.
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Paper Rural Telecommunications
Infrastructure Selection Using
the Analytic Network Process
Yousef Gasiea, Margaret Emsley, and Ludmil Mikhailov
Abstract—The decisions involved in rural settings are of com-
plex nature, with some aspects compounded by the presence
of intangible criteria. Hence, a suitable approach is needed
that can produce effective solutions. This paper describes
the applicability of a multicriteria decision-making method,
specifically the analytic network process (ANP), to model the
selection of an appropriate telecommunications infrastruc-
ture technology, capable of deploying e-services in rural areas
of developing countries. It aims to raise awareness among
telecommunication planners about the availability of ANP,
and to demonstrate its suitability to enhance the selection
process. The proposed model is constructed based on con-
cerned experts’ views of relevant selection criteria and poten-
tial technology alternatives. Its network structure caters for
all possible dependencies and interactions among criteria and
alternatives.
Keywords—analytic hierarchy process, analytic network process,
multicriteria decision making, rural telecommunications, tech-
nology selection.
1. Introduction
Telecommunications technology is evolving rapidly and of-
fers information links between urban and rural areas that
can overcome distance barriers and provide e-services to
these hardly accessible areas. Recent technological ad-
vances in transmission systems like fiber optics, wireless
and satellite can now supply services to these locations at
affordable prices. However, with different criteria for tech-
nology evaluation and various telecommunications infras-
tructure alternatives available nowadays, the selection pro-
cess becomes complicated; there is uncertainty and multi-
ple conflicting objectives with sociological, demographical,
environmental, political, cultural, economic and technical
aspects. This raises the need for some kind of structure or
model, based on a suitable multicriteria decision making
(MCDM) method.
Some relevant papers cited in literature tackling problems
from rural telecommunications field using such methods,
with particular focus on the application of analytic hier-
archy process (AHP) to rural telecommunications include:
Nazem et al. [1] use the AHP, to develop a two-phased deci-
sion support system to aid the design of rural area telecom-
munication networks and in [2] examines ways of building
an effective rural telecommunications network to facilitate
rural development in an information-intensive society. Lee
and Kim [3] present a methodology using analytic network
process and zero-one goal programming (ZOGP) for infor-
mation systems projects selection problems that have mul-
tiple criteria and interdependence property. In another pa-
per, Nazem et al. [4] develops a specific multicriteria deci-
sion support mathematical programming model for dealing
with the definition of a “hub structure” that is the selection
of a number of “nucleus cities” in the context of a rural
network planning process. Chemane et al. [5] use De-
cidelT tool based on MCDM to improve the quality of de-
cisions in selecting internet access technologies. Sasidhar
and Min [6] use AHP to select the optimal access tech-
nology for a rural community under a multiple number
of criteria such as cost quality and speed. Nepal [7] ap-
plies AHP to the evaluation of rural telecommunications
infrastructure. Finally, Andrew et al. [8] present a model
regarding the applicability of using the AHP for enhanc-
ing the selection of communication technologies for rural
areas.
While significant decision models are being presented in
these papers, but, very few studies have considered all cri-
teria relevant to rural telecommunications, and most of
them obviously apply no factor interactions. For exam-
ple, if a model’s emphasis is mainly technical, then the
economic, social, regulatory and environmental criteria are
probably not adequately addressed. Basically, the AHP is
a suitable method when optimization is not pursued, re-
sources are not restricted, and interdependencies between
factors do not exist [9]. However, such models do not
consider important issues such as interaction among and
between decision making levels/clusters as well as depen-
dency among qualitative factors. These are important issues
in rural telecommunications decision problems which can-
not not be structured hierarchically because they involve
many interactions and dependencies requiring a MCDM
method to holistically deal with qualitative and quantita-
tive data, with different conflicting objectives, to arrive at
a consensus decision in relation to the choice of a suitable
rural telecommunication technology.
To the best knowledge of the authors, applications of the
analytic network process (ANP) to the selection of ru-
ral telecommunications infrastructure technologies have not
been cited in the published literature. This paper therefore
attempts to fill this gap in the literature to particularly allow
for the explicit consideration of dependencies and interac-
tions in the decision making process and still maintains the
acknowledged advantages of the AHP method. The ANP
is chosen in this paper because of its several advantages
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over the AHP and other MCDM methods, such as its holis-
tic approach, in which all the factors and criteria involved
are laid out in advance in a network system that allows
for dependency. Its power lies in its use of special ratio
scales to capture interactions for making accurate predic-
tions and reach better decisions [10]. Moreover, its suitabil-
ity in offering solutions in a complex multicriteria decision
environment, together with the availability of software sup-
porting its functions, further acknowledge its applicability
to tackle such a problem. It has also proved to be success-
ful in utilizing expert knowledge to tackle several selection
problems, e.g., [3] and [11].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 articulates the selection of rural telecommunications
infrastructure problem. The underlying methodology of the
proposed approach, the ANP, is briefly introduced in Sec-
tion 3. The development of the proposed model is explained
in Section 4. The pairwise comparisons are described in
Section 5. The results are discussed in Section 6 and the
paper ends with conclusions in Section 7.
2. The Choice of Technology for Rural
Telecommunication Infrastructure
There is a need to provide access to the main telecommuni-
cations network and expand connectivity to such areas, thus
enabling the rollout of the appropriate telecommunication
services. However, the choice of appropriate telecommu-
nications infrastructure technology that will provide the re-
quired e-services within various constraints is a challenge.
Typically, technology selection is based on a mixture of
different criteria, one of which is the remoteness of a vil-
lage. If the village is within 35 km of the nearest local
exchange, telecommunication services can be provided to
that village using a one-hop last-mile link. However, if the
village is further away, at least two transmission hops must
be established [12]. Hence, two types of telecommunica-
tions infrastructure technologies are needed to provide ru-
ral telecommunication services, namely backbone network
(core) and access network (last mile).
The backbone network provides the long-haul signal trans-
mission from the country’s main telecommunication centre
to the remote access network, i.e., trunking services [12].
This network may be wireless or wireline, including ana-
logue and digital transmission technology over fiber optic,
wireless or satellite transmission media [5]. The access
network provides the connectivity between the end-user
and the backbone network and may be based on wireless
or wireline technologies, e.g., copper wires or wireless,
connected to network nodes at the edge of the backbone
network. Technologies in both networks can be circuit-
switched or packet-switched. Any decision made for each
of these two segments must take into account the charac-
teristics of rural settlements.
The primary focus of this paper is mainly on the backbone
network by attempting to provide a structure of the deci-
sion problem and proposing a technology selection model
of such an infrastructure. The telecommunications back-
bone is, in general, a key problem for rural information
infrastructure, as low population density is linked to high
cost of service for any communications technology, espe-
cially for wireline services. It poses the greatest challenge
to bringing affordable telecommunication services to ru-
ral residents. However, once it is in place and running,
it will be possible to connect other nearby rural villages
with a wide range of telecommunication technologies and
needed services. The infrastructure technology selection
process, especially in the case of rural telecommunications
in developing countries, is a multi-faceted, multi-criteria
decision making problem, requiring consideration of some
wide-ranging qualitative factors related to socio-economic
and political issues. These are hard to quantify and will
have great impact on the selection process, in respect of
the social, environmental, regulatory and demographical
concerns, etc.
Furthermore, in order to incorporate other tangible fac-
tors, in the absence of past statistical data to analyze, such
as technical and economic related factors, etc., it is nec-
essary to use a suitable multicriteria method for analysis
and synthesis by a group of experts rather than an individ-
ual. A telecommunication operator usually receives several
technology solutions from external vendors. The challenge
of matching the parameters of an engineering problem to
the available solutions becomes a challenge to the telecom-
munications engineer in this particular selection phase [8].
A typical conceptual rural telecommunications infrastruc-
ture selection model is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. A conceptual model for the selection of rural telecom-
munication infrastructure (revised and adapted from [13]).
The obvious significant implication of this conceptual
model is that the technical factors are only one subset
among others when selecting rural telecommunication tech-
nologies, albeit a necessary part. The other factors, such as
the sociological, environmental, economic, regulatory and
the infrastructure-related are regarded as essential factors
that also need to be considered. This can be envisaged as
a holistic approach in which the outcome of the selection
process is not only dependent on the technical factors, but
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arises out of the interactions among the various factors. An
ANP-based decision model is therefore proposed as a suit-
able methodology because “decisions obtained from a net-
work can be significantly different from those obtained from
a more complex hierarchy” [14]. It is constructed to include
an in-depth and comprehensive examination of all pertinent
factors and will be dependent on the perceptual weightings,
provided by telecommunications experts.
3. The Analytic Network Process
The ANP is a multi-attribute decision making approach
developed by Thomas L. Saaty and was originally called
the supermatrix technique [15]. It is a generalization of
the AHP decision methodology where hierarchies are re-
placed by networks, allowing the capturing of the outcome
of dependence and feedback within and among the clusters
of elements. Its network structure differs from a hierar-
chy as illustrated in Fig. 2 [10]. The hierarchy has a goal,
levels of elements and connections between the elements.
Fig. 2. Examples of a hierarchy (a) and a network (b).
It has no inner dependence and no feedback from lower to
higher levels. Unlike the hierarchy, the network structure
has no levels but clusters of elements where every element
can depend on any other element. The influence is trans-
mitted from one cluster to another (outer dependence) and
back, either directly from the second cluster, or, by transit-
ing through intermediate clusters along a path which some-
times can return to the original cluster forming a cycle [10].
The existence of feedback indicates there is mutual outer
dependence of criteria in two different clusters, which pre-
vents the problem from being modeled hierarchically due
to the difficulty in deciding which cluster is higher/lower
than the other. Also, because of inner dependence, the re-
lationships between same level criteria are not represented
hierarchically.
The specific ANP model is based on the reasoning, knowl-
edge and experience of experts in the field and relies on the
process of eliciting managerial inputs, allowing for a struc-
tured communication among decision makers, so that it can
act as a qualitative tool for strategic decision-making prob-
lems. “It is a relatively new methodology that is still not
well-known to the operations research community and prac-
titioners” [9]. With its capability to deal with dependence
and feedback, it is the most general framework for a detailed
analysis of societal, governmental and corporate decisions
that is available today to the decision-maker [15]. There-
fore, in recent years, there has been an increased use of the
ANP in a variety of decision making problems and numer-
ous applications have been published in literature [16].
The ANP is a coupling of two parts. The first part con-
sists of a control network of criteria that controls the in-
teractions in which the criteria should be identified, orga-
nized and prioritized in the framework of a control network.
The second part is to derive a network of influences among
the factors and clusters, i.e., the influence of elements in
the feedback system with respect to each of these criteria.
Paired comparison judgments of homogeneous elements are
performed and synthesized to obtain the priorities of these
criteria. The ANP then joins all possible outcomes together
in its structures and both judgement and logic are used to
estimate the relative influence from which the overall an-
swer is to be derived [15]. The SuperDecisions software
can be used to perform matrices computation and solve
AHP/ANP problems [17].
4. The Development of the Decision
Model
In this section, we introduce an ANP model and its de-
velopment to show how the ANP can be used in the rural
telecommunications environment. As each telecommunica-
tion infrastructure provider will have its own set of criteria.
The attempt here is to present a generalized model based
on factors and alternatives identified from the published lit-
erature, best practices and telecommunications experts that
could then be adapted or extended to support a particular
context or a situation of a developing country.
4.1. Setting Selection Criteria
To adapt the ANP methodology for such a technology se-
lection process, it is the foremost activity of the researcher
to examine the relevant issues involved. Hence, the first
task is the definition of the criteria that will be used for
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the selection of the appropriate technology for rural con-
nectivity. The activities used to consolidate the final list of
the selection criteria, were:
– an intensive literature survey of past studies on sim-
ilar problems, including: [5], [6], [8], [12] and [18];
the outcome of this activity was the consolidation
of an initial list of criteria that comprises the most
important factors for the problem at hand;
– interactions with telecommunication experts both
from industry and academia from all over the world,
who were contacted through e-mail to provide feed-
back on the initial list of criteria; from the aforemen-
tioned activities, a consolidated list of 31 selection
criteria, deemed to affect the planners’ decision in
the choice of rural telecommunications backbone in-
frastructure, can be observed in Table 1.
Table 1
Ordering and clustering of criteria according to relevance
and importance
Cluster Criteria Mean
(A) Technical
(A1) Reliability 4.00
(A2) Ease of maintenance 3.94
(A3) Remote network management 3.88
(A4) Compatibility 3.81
(A5) Ease of installation 3.72
(A6) Scalability 3.54
(A7) Bandwidth 3.53
(A8) Flexibility 3.52
(A9) Latency 3.30
(B) Infrastructure
(B1) Coverage range 3.80
(B2) Security of physical 3.73
infrastructure
(B3) Proposed usage 3.40
(B4) Availability of skilled 3.34
technicians
(B5) Access to existing telecoms 3.32
infrastructure
(B6) Remoteness of area 3.26
(B7) Rollout time 3.11
(B8) Parallel infrastructure 2.97
(C) Economic
(C1) Operating cost 4.13
(C2) Funding sources 4.11
(C3) Capital cost 3.98
(C4) Return on investment 3.63
(C5) Economic development of area 3.32
(D1) Demand 3.77
(D) Social
(D2) Affordability 3.73
(D3) Population density 3.48
(D4) Community of interest 3.42
(E1) Spectrum availability 3.74
(E) Regulatory (E2) Licensing constraints 3.52
(E3) Rights of way 3.30
(F) Environmental
(F1) Terrain topography 3.24
(F2) Climatic conditions 3.00
4.2. The Online Survey
In order to rank the selection criteria according to their
relative importance, an online questionnaire was designed.
Telecommunication experts were asked to rate the im-
portance of each factor using a five-point Likert-type
scale, ranging from: not important = 1, moderately impor-
tant = 2, strongly important = 3, very strongly impor-
tant = 4 and extremely important = 5. A pilot survey
was conducted before posting the questionnaire online
and subsequently the questionnaire was slightly modified.
Fig. 3. Categorization of respondents by their professional back-
ground.
Fig. 4. A graphical representation of the online survey results in
percentages.
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Table 2
Comparisons of some features of potential alternatives
Alternative Advantages Disadvantages
High speed High cost
(G1) Fiber optic cable More reliability Long rollout time
High flexibility Most difficult to deploy
Simplicity Less reliability
(G2) Power line communication Low cost Data signal disruption
Use of power lines Noise and interference
High speed Low reach and line of sight
(G3) Microwave link Low cost equipment Licensing constraints
Fast deployment Less bandwidth and flexibility
Wide coverage High latency
(G4) Satellite communication Ease of deployment High cost
Overcomes topography Limited bandwidth
The obtained responses effectively reached 62 responses,
which is considered adequate because the purpose of the
survey was mainly to obtain a range of diversified ex-
pert opinions with respect to each particular selection
factor.
The respondents’ profiles showed that all of them are
generally involved in telecommunications field, where
some of them are particularly dealing with rural telecom-
munications projects. They can be categorized by their
professional backgrounds into three categories as shown
in Fig. 3: of the 62 respondents 20 (32.3%) of them work
as telecommunication engineers, 33 (53.2%) as consultants
and 9 (14.5%) as academics. This mix up of the respon-
dents’ expertise confirms their familiarity with the selection
factors and also indicates that they were very well placed
to provide useful data for such a survey.
The results were then analyzed using SPSS (SPSS Inc.,
2006), and univariate descriptive statistics were generated,
including the relative importance index for each factor.
Figure 4 summarizes the obtained results and shows that all
proposed criteria are mostly within the strongly important
and very strongly important categories, the only exception
being the results of the “operating cost” criterion which is
inclined more towards the extremely important grade.
4.3. Grouping of Criteria into Clusters
The mean rating values were used to group the criteria into
six clusters coded A through F according to relevance, in
this order: (A) Technical, (B) Infrastructure, (C) Economic,
(D) Social, (E) Regulatory, and (F) Environmental. Each
cluster only includes criteria that are comparable or do not
differ by orders of magnitude [10]. Table 1 shows the
coding and the ordering of criteria for all clusters.
4.4. Alternatives Identification
The activities abovementioned in Subsection 4.1 were re-
peated in order to identify potential technology alternatives.
The published literature, e.g., [19], identified four techno-
logical solutions to provide rural backbone infrastructure to
promote e-services in rural areas of developing countries
that include two wireline technologies: fiber optic cable and
power line communication, and two wireless technologies:
fixed wireless and satellite, which were initially highlighted
as candidate decision alternatives for this research. After
consultation with telecommunication experts, the alterna-
tives finally selected for this research are (G1) fiber op-
tic cable, (G2) power line communication, (G3) microwave
link and (G4) satellite communication. Table 2 briefly sum-
marizes some characteristics of alternatives.
4.5. Assessing Dependencies
After structuring the decision problem, the next step is to
examine the dominance of influence among criteria. In
order to fulfil this task, a new survey questionnaire was
distributed to experts who had an overview of the research,
were interested and actually involved in the field of ru-
ral telecommunications, who were asked to identify the
dependencies among criteria. Seven completed question-
naires were collected. The majority rule was then used to
aggregate the responses into a single matrix, which was
developed using a zero-one matrix of criteria against crite-
ria using a binary value of 1 to signify dependence of one
criterion on another, and zero otherwise [20]. A majority
condition of 4 out of 7 (4/7) experts’ consensus (i.e., 57%)
was considered as a minimum requirement for any entry
that indicates the existence of a direct relationship between
any pair of criteria.
Table 3 shows all possible connections, where the entries
can take the following values:
0 indicates no relationship exists based on 7 experts’
consensus;
0 indicates the entries have obtained < 4 experts’ con-
sensus;
1 indicates the entries have obtained ≥ 4 experts’ con-
sensus.
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Table 3
The aggregated dependency matrix showing connections among all elements
As a result, the entries represented by 1 indicate the exis-
tence of a direct relationship from criterion i to criterion j
based on the consensus of at least 4 experts, i.e., if cri-
terion i depends on criterion j, the entry ai j will take 1.
The criteria in the rows are evaluated with respect to the
criteria in the columns, i.e., the 1 in the columns will deter-
mine which criteria in the rows are to be pairwise compared
with respect to that column. Subsequently, a pairwise com-
parison matrix will be constructed only for the dependent
criteria. Using the Design module of the SuperDecisions
software [17], the network model was constructed accord-
ing to Table 3, the connections between clusters are illus-
trated in Fig. 5. A cluster is connected to another cluster
when at least one element in it is connected to at least two
elements in another cluster. It should be noted that two-way
arrows connecting the clusters represent interdependencies
among elements, where an arrow direction signify depen-
dence and starts from an element to another that may in-
fluence it [17].
Figure 5 contains the entire inner dependence – the parent
element and the elements to be compared are in the same
cluster so that the cluster is linked to itself and a loop
link appears – among elements within each cluster except
in the environmental and alternative clusters. It indicates
that the connections between the elements are in the same
cluster. For example, column A8 means A2, A4, A5, A6
are interrelated with respect to A8.
The proposed model also contains outer dependence which
is the relationship between elements in one cluster with
others in other clusters [15]. For example, in Table 3,
when considering A8, the elements G1, G2 G3 and G4
in the (G) Alternative cluster are interconnected and pair-
wise compared with respect to A8 in the (A) Technical
cluster. The exception is the regulatory and environmental
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Fig. 5. The ANP network model with connections among elements/clusters.
clusters, i.e., none of the elements in both clusters depend
on elements from other clusters with respect to a com-
mon attribute within a cluster. Also, the technical and so-
cial clusters have no outer dependence on the economic
cluster.
Feedback links in which one compares the alternatives with
respect to criteria, as in a hierarchy, and also compares the
dominance of one criterion versus another for each alterna-
tive exist in this structure. Table 3 illustrates that there is
mutual outer dependence of criteria in two different clusters
as can be seen between the alternative cluster and all other
clusters; technical and social clusters and infrastructure and
economic clusters. For example, G1 is the parent element
and all elements in other clusters except in cluster G are
its children elements, which indicates that criteria may be
compared with respect to an alternative. This is the strength
of the ANP approach because dependence and feedback
are incorporated in real life problems, in which a deci-
sion process not only compares alternatives with respect to
criteria but also vice versa. For instance, in addition to
separately comparing G1, G2, G3 and G4 with respect to
A1 and A7, A1 and A7 must also be compared with respect
to G1. A pairwise question to be asked is: what is a more
dominant characteristic of fiber optic cable technology, its
reliability or its bandwidth? However, since feedback in-
volves cycles, and cycling can be an infinite process, the
operations needed to derive the priorities become more de-
manding than with hierarchies [20].
Based on the above analysis, it is obvious that the de-
veloped inner and outer dependence and feedback among
the network structure shown in Table 3 excludes the
hierarchy form and calls for the network form to model
the selection of rural telecommunications infrastructure
technology.
5. Pairwise Comparisons
After constructing the ANP network, the next phase is
the measurement and data collection stage which involves
compiling a list of experts to provide judgements for pair-
wise comparisons. Both the AHP/ANP derive ratio scale
priorities by making paired comparison of elements on
common elements. The subjective judgements are to be
entered and assigned a numerical value based on the nine-
point scale suggested by Saaty [21] to obtain the corre-
sponding pairwise judgment matrices. A score of 1 in-
dicates the equality between the two elements whereas
score 9 represents the dominance of the row element in
the matrix over the column element. A reciprocal value
is automatically assigned in the opposite position in the
matrix, i.e., ai j = 1/ai j.
In this model, pairwise comparisons are identified accord-
ing to the connections developed in Table 3 and then rele-
vant pairwise comparison matrices are created accordingly.
The columns in the table present the parent elements, while
the rows present the children elements in the structure. For
example, G1 is a parent element and A1 through F2 are
its children elements. The elements that are to be pair-
wise compared are always all in the same cluster. They are
compared with respect to their parent element, the element
from which they are connected.
There are a number of comparison matrices for every par-
ent element, and one comparison matrix for elements in
the same cluster originating from the same parent element.
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Fig. 6. An example of SuperDecisions pairwise comparison process.
For example, there are four comparison matrices for crite-
rion B6, one for each of clusters A, B, C and G. Elements
within D cluster cannot be compared with respect to B6
because there should be at least two entries of 1 available
within any cluster to perform pairwise comparisons. There-
fore, A1, A2, and A5 through A9 are pairwise compared
with respect to B6; B1 through B5, B7 and B8 are pairwise
compared with respect to B6; C1 and C5 are pairwise com-
pared with respect to B6; and G1 through G4 are pairwise
compared with respect to B6. This results in local priorities
of the children elements with respect to the parent element.
It is only necessary to make n(n− 1)/2 comparisons to
establish the full set of pairwise judgements, where n de-
notes the number of elements (nodes). For example, six
pairwise comparison questions are required for A1 because
n = 4 for the alternatives outer dependence on A1, while
for A8, twelve pairwise comparison questions are needed
because n = 4 for the inner dependence within the technical
cluster, and also n = 4 for the alternatives outer dependence
on A8.
In this developed structure; there are a total of 92 judge-
ment matrices which include 674 pairwise comparison
questions for both inner and outer dependences developed
within the network. It is obvious that the task of ask-
ing such a large number of questions would be very enor-
mous and would require intensive efforts and extended
time. Hence, in order to establish a more rational approach
to collect pairwise comparison judgements from qualified
telecommunication experts, and also to economize efforts,
it was decided to design and use several online question-
naires to gather data from experts. The questionnaires
included all required pairwise questions to assess expert
judgments in relation to the relative influence of affecting
elements on the affected ones.
An example of such pairwise question is: “In selecting
an appropriate backbone infrastructure technology in rural
areas of developing countries, which influences fiber optic
cable technology more, ease of installation or ease of main-
tenance? Conversely, given the ease of installation, which
of these technologies are more dominant, fiber optic cable
or satellite?”
Since the clusters in this network are not equally impor-
tant, their weights in the cluster matrix are obtained by
pairwise comparisons. Each cluster is taken in turn as
a parent cluster, and the other clusters connected to it are
pairwise compared for importance with respect to their in-
fluence on it [17]. It should be noted that the pairwise
comparisons to assess the influence of some cluster on all
other clusters is actually what distinguishes the ANP from
the AHP.
For example, one of the cluster comparison questions
addressed to the experts is: “Which influences the se-
lection of rural telecommunications backbone infrastruc-
ture more, economic or technical issues?” The obtained
cluster weights are used in a later stage to weight all
the elements in the unweighted supermatrix. The indi-
vidual expert pairwise comparisons are aggregated into
a representative group judgment, by applying geometric
means.
A score corresponding to the group judgment regarding
this question is then clicked to highlight the technology
providing more reliability relative to the technology pro-
viding less reliability. While, a score of 1 indicates the
equality between the two technologies, the blue scores rep-
resent the dominance of the row element in the matrix
(e.g., G1) over the column element (e.g., G2) and the red
scores are vice versa. A reciprocal value is automatically
assigned in the opposite position in the matrix.
An example of the comparison process used in SuperDeci-
sions is shown in Fig. 6. It presents the pairwise compar-
isons between alternatives G1 and G2, regarding the reli-
ability factor. The question being asked is “With respect
to reliability, which technology is more reliable: fiber op-
tic technology or power line communication?” The group
judgment was that G1 is between very strongly and ex-
tremely more reliable than G2, therefore the comparison
value of 8 is entered.
The comparison between all other alternatives regarding
different criteria is done in the same way.
The next stage of the process includes the computations
of the relative importance of the elements. For each com-
parison matrix a local priority vector (also referred as an
eigenvector) is computed, by applying the eigenvector ap-
proach [14], provided that the inconsistency ratio (IR) of
this matrix is less than 0.1.
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Table 4
Comparison matrix of alternatives with respect to reliability, IR = 0.0958
Alternative G1 G2 G3 G4 Eigenvector
(G1) Fiber optic cable 1.000 8.240 3.350 5.730 0.580
(G2) Power line communication 0.121 1.000 0.178 0.217 0.044
(G3) Microwave link 0.299 5.630 1.000 3.830 0.262
(G4) Satellite communication 0.175 4.610 0.261 1.000 0.114
Table 5
Ordering and clustering of criteria according to relevance and importance
Cluster Criteria
Priorities [%]
Normalized Limiting
(A) Technical
(A1) Reliability 18.73 2.42
(A2) Ease of maintenance 21.70 2.81
(A3) Remote network management 17.05 2.21
(A4) Compatibility 2.62 0.33
(A5) Ease of installation 2.80 0.36
(A6) Scalability 11.98 1.55
(A7) Bandwidth 13.42 1.74
(A8) Flexibility 3.50 0.45
(A9) Latency 8.21 1.06
(B) Infrastructure
(B1) Coverage range 58.32 7.96
(B2) Security of physical infrastructure 5.04 0.69
(B3) Proposed usage 12.07 1.65
(B4) Availability of skilled technicians 3.24 0.44
(B5) Access to existing telecoms infrastructure 4.74 0.65
(B6) Remoteness of area 3.22 0.44
(B7) Rollout time 5.84 0.80
(B8) Parallel infrastructure 7.53 1.03
(C) Economic
(C1) Operating cost 16.39 7.53
(C2) Funding sources 34.70 15.94
(C3) Capital cost 7.84 3.60
(C4) Return on investment 37.32 17.15
(C5) Economic development of area 3.75 1.72
(D1) Demand 64.96 1.74
(D) Social
(D2) Affordability 20.49 0.55
(D3) Population density 9.91 0.27
(D4) Community of interest 4.65 0.12
(E1) Spectrum availability 56.99 0.67
(E) Regulatory (E2) Licensing constraints 27.45 0.32
(E3) Rights of way 15.56 0.18
(F) Environmental
(F1) Terrain topography 56.81 0.71
(F2) Climatic conditions 43.19 0.54
The SuperDecisions can also deal with the issue of improv-
ing consistency of the matrices, by identifying the most
inconsistent judgments. The matrix consistency can then
be improved by providing more consistent judgements
by the decision makers so that IR≤ 0.12. For further ex-
planation of inconsistency and how to calculate it, one can
refer to [22].
An example of an aggregated comparison matrix within
the alternative cluster (G) with respect to reliability (A1),
and the corresponding values of the eigenvector, is shown
in Table 4.
From this table we can see that in terms of reliability, the
fiber optic cable technology has the highest priority (0.580)
followed by microwave links and satellite with (0.262)
and (0.1244), respectively. The less reliable technology is
the power line communication (0.044). Since IR is less
than 0.12, this matrix is considered of acceptable con-
sistency.
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The eigenvector derived in this way is then entered as a part
of some column of a supermatrix. It represents the im-
pact of a given set of elements in a component on another
element in the system, where a component in a superma-
trix is the block, defined by a cluster name at the left and
a cluster name at the top. If an element has no influence on
another element, its influence priority is assigned zero [20].
The formation of a supermatrix in the ANP allows for the
resolution of the effects of the interdependence that exists
between the elements of the system.
The SuperDecisions performs necessary matrix operations
for structuring of the three supermatrices, associated with
this model, as shown in the Appendix. Table A1 illustrates
the unweighted supermatrix that contains the local prior-
ities derived from pairwise comparisons throughout the
network; they can be read directly from this matrix. The
weighted supermatrix shown in Table A2; is obtained by
multiplying all the elements in a component of the un-
weighted supermatrix by the corresponding cluster weight,
i.e., each block of column eigenvectors belonging to a com-
ponent is weighted by the priority of influence of that com-
ponent. This makes the entire columns sum to unity ex-
actly, i.e., the weighted supermatrix is said to be “column
stochastic”. Finally, the limit supermatrix is obtained by
raising the weighted supermatrix to the power k, where k
is an arbitrarily large number, to allow for convergence of
the interdependent relationships.
The final values of priorities of all the elements are obtained
by normalising each block, so that the columns of the limit
supermatrix become identical. The values of the priorities
of all elements can be read from any column [15] as can
be seen in Table A3.
The SuperDecisions has also been used to produce the pri-
orities shown in Table 5. It contains the relative importance
of all criteria considered in the model. For example, un-
der the limiting priorities’ column, one can observe that
the most important factors among all are the Return on in-
vestment criterion with a priority of 17.15% followed by
the Funding sources criterion with 15.94%. According to
the Normalized priorities column, the most important cri-
terion is the Demand with a priority of 64.96%, followed
by the Coverage range with 58.32%. Among the technical
criteria; the Ease of maintenance, Reliability and Remote
network management criteria have the highest priorities
of 21.71%, 18.73% and 17.05%, respectively. The Spec-
trum availability and Terrain topography factors are re-
garded as the most important within regulatory and envi-
ronmental clusters, with priorities of 56.99% and 56.81%,
respectively.
The relative importance of all other criteria considered in
the model can be seen in Table 5.
6. Conclusions
This research paper reports on the applicability of using
a MCDM method to enhance the selection process of an
essential rural infrastructure technology. An ANP model
incorporates both qualitative and quantitative approaches
to a decision problem. The qualitative part includes:
– identification of the decision problem;
– ensuring the suitability of ANP to solve the problem;
– decomposing the unstructured problem to a set of
manageable and measurable levels;
– compiling a list of experts to provide judgements for
making the decision.
The quantitative part includes:
– designing a questionnaire to collect input data
through pairwise comparison;
– estimating the relative importance between any two
elements in each matrix and calculating the relevant
eigenvectors;
– measuring the inconsistency of each matrix by em-
ploying the consistency ratio;
– eventually constructing the supermatrix using the
eigenvectors of the individual matrices.
Based on the performed analysis, it is shown that the prob-
lem has inner and outer dependences and feedback among
the elements, which excludes the hierarchy form (AHP)
and requires a network form to model the selection pro-
cess. The paper illustrates the use of the ANP method, but
no real life conclusions should be drawn from it, as each
telecommunication infrastructure provider will have its own
set of criteria. The attempt here is to present a generic
model based on factors and alternatives identified from the
published literature, best practices and telecommunications
experts that could then be adapted or extended to support
a particular context or a situation of a developing country.
Planners may therefore augment this model with their own
company-specific factors that might change the priorities.
The obtained results reflect the preferences of experts who
made the judgments, therefore, they cannot be considered
as an objective assessment of the relative suitability of the
four technologies as backbone infrastructure in rural areas.
Final alternatives scores should, therefore, be thought of as
an input to the decision-making process rather than its end.
This process would be refined with experience, optimising
the accuracy and time taken to reach proper decisions re-
garding the choice of telecommunication infrastructure in
rural surroundings.
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Appendix
Table A1
The unweighted supermatrix
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Table A2
The weighted supermatrix
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Table A3
The limit supermatrix
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Paper Stochastic Models
in Techno-Economic Analysis
of Broadband Access Networks
Paweł Olender
Abstract—Development of networks, specially access net-
works, is very important and urgent task nowadays. However,
it turns out that this segment of telecommunication networks
is the most expensive and complicated part of this undertak-
ing. Therefore, the thorough analyses are carried out to de-
termine the best solution under specific circumstances before
any decisions are made. This paper presents techno-economic
model, which was implemented and used to carry out analyses
for one of the biggest city in Poland. To take uncertainty into
consideration the stochastic approach was applied providing
more robust solution, therefore, improving the safety of invest-
ment. Analyses concern FTTH (fibre to the home) technology,
type of generic FTTx network architecture. It uses optical fi-
bre in local telecommunication loop, what is becoming more
and more popular. Presented results show the usefulness of
techno-economic surveys in planning access networks devel-
opment. The appropriate choice of network parameters, such
as the aggregation ratio, is essential and could significantly
influence the investment profitability.
Keywords—broadband, decision support, FTTH, network plan-
ning, stochastic programming.
1. Introduction
Demand for network bandwidth has been rapidly growing
for several years and telecommunication networks become
basic information exchange channel for information society
and knowledge-based economy. If majority of backbone
network has been upgraded already, then access networks
are usually based on old infrastructure and are a bottleneck
in subscriber connections. Therefore, development of this
segment became crucial in improving broadband accessi-
bility. On the other hand, however, it is the most expensive
network layer, hence detailed analyses are carried out be-
fore any decisions are made. It allows decision-makers
to ﬁnd out possible future results of network development
venture. To perform such surveys in reasonable time and
comparable way it is necessary to use dedicated tools.
Projects were conducted to develop a methodology for
such analyses. One of them was Tool for Introduction Sce-
nario and Techno-Economic Evaluation of Access Network
(TITAN) executed within the Research in Advance Com-
munications in Europe Programme (RACE). It addressed
diﬀerent aspects of the access networks’ development: ge-
ometrical models for the distribution, evolution of compo-
nent price in time or operational cost approach [1]. The
methodology was implemented basing on Excel spread-
sheet software. Excel was also used in implementation of
worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX)
model created in National Institute of Telecommunications
(Warsaw). This model consists of 3 parts: demand, tech-
nological and economic. It is thoroughly described in [2].
There were also diﬀerent cost analyses, concerning ﬁber
networks either [3], [4].
Observing situation on the market it seems there is still
a need to develop such applications for open access, for
example, in case of public tender to verify and compare re-
ceived proposals. Private companies do not usually make
their tools available or it is very expensive. They would
rather oﬀer execution of the analysis and provide results.
There is a risk of subjectivity. For example, some equip-
ment can be favoured in respect of marketing connections.
Surveys show the nature of network planning process is
strongly aﬀected by uncertainty. Presented idea tries taking
this aspects into consideration within analysis. Inclusion
of random elements in techno-economic model ensures re-
ﬂecting real circumstances in a better way and leads to more
robust solution. Analysis of diﬀerent scenarios is also help-
ful in making the decision maker aware of potential threats.
Furthermore, mentioned research are mainly based on sim-
ulation. Here an optimization approach is partly suggested
to obtain the best possible solution.
As network technology ﬁbre to the home (FTTH) was as-
sumed, which meets all demands of the newest services
(video on demand, video conference, online games, etc.).
Although it seems the most expensive technology it could
turn out the most proﬁtable and safest solution in time per-
spective. It results from laborious and costly installation
of passive telecommunication infrastructure and its long
depreciation period. For this reason hybrid ﬁber/copper
network could become investment trap because of insuﬃ-
cient bandwidth in few years, what will forced operators to
replace copper cables with ﬁbres [5].
The characteristic of network development process and gen-
eral conception of uncertainty modeling are described in
Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to FTTH technology. Struc-
ture of the model and its particular modules are presented
in Section 4, and Section 5 discusses experiments that were
carried out and their results. Summary and potential future
research are outlined in Section 6.
2. Dynamics and Uncertainty
The development of access network is usually a large-scale
process and lasts several of years. In view of this speci-
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ﬁcity presented model takes into consideration long-lasting
investment character, where the time period is discrete. For
that reason some of future data have to be assumed, what
of course may bring inaccuracy. It is even more obvious
when one considers what kind of data is used in model. For
example, demand which determine how many users will be
eager to be connected to the network. It is very diﬃcult to
precisely forecast such data with regard to the subjective in-
dividual potential subscribers’ decisions. This uncertainty
should be considered to receive more appropriate results.
To address the above-mentioned issues multistage stochas-
tic programming was used. It is a generalized form of
more popular two stage approach, where in ﬁrst stage deci-
sion is made before, and in second stage after an outcome
of the random process. The second stage decision can be
treated as a response to the realization of the stochastic
process aimed at minimizing possible losses, caused by
ﬁrst stage decision. Multistage problem is similar, but the
outcomes are revealed and decisions are made sequentially
(Fig. 1). The general explanation of stochastic program-
ming is in [6]. More detailed and extensive description can
be found in [7], [8].
Fig. 1. Decision process in multistage stochastic programming.
As random variable, in the presented model, the take up rate
was assumed (which, as mentioned before, seems the most
unpredictable). The stochastic process was expressed as a
ﬁnite set of diﬀerent scenarios. To formulate the problem
as typical mathematical programming a scenario tree was
applied. It is a standard tree with a single root, where each
node has unique predecessor (except the root) and possibly
several successors (leaves have not successors). The nodes
at the same level correspond to various scenarios in one
period of time. Assuming that the root corresponds to 0
period and venture lasts T periods, there are T + 1 levels
in the scenario tree.
Construction of scenario tree. In the presented model
transition-based approach is used to build the scenario tree.
This method was described in detail in [9], so here main
concept will be explained and a way to use it in assessing
the demand.
This approach is based on transitions (branches) between
nodes from diﬀerent levels. A number of branches and
their probability are speciﬁed to determine the possible re-
alizations of the stochastic process. Starting from the root
node this information allows to deﬁne the nodes at further
levels. To simplify, a symmetrical tree was assumed, what
results in the same number and probability distribution of
transitions for the nodes at the same level.
To formally deﬁne the transitions between t and t + 1
stages the following functions are deﬁned:
– f (t): the number of transitions from each node at
stage t;
– p(t, i): the probability of transition i ∈ {1, . . . , f (t)}
from each node at stage t;
– d(t, i): the change of take up rate corresponding to
transition i ∈ {1, . . . , f (t)} at stage t.
Giving the above values explicit for 0 ≤ t < T and
i ∈ {1, . . . , f (t)} is suﬃcient to build the scenario tree.
Each node can be unambiguously determine by a pair (t,n),
where t is a number of the stage and n is a number of
the node in this particular stage. Moreover, because any
node has a unique predecessor it is possible to determine
a whole path from the root node to the speciﬁc (t,n) node.
To navigate through the tree some auxiliary functions have
to be deﬁned, like a number of the nodes in the given
period, predecessor function, which for (t,n) node gives the
number of the predecessor node in t−1 period or a number
of the last transition from the predecessor to the actual
node. To give some idea about the nature of these functions,
one of them is explained below. Let us consider the ﬁrst
mentioned function, the number of the nodes in the given
period. According to prior assumption that the scenario
tree is symmetrical and its consequences, the number of
the nodes in period t equals a product of f (t−1) and the
number of the nodes in period t−1. Bearing in mind that
there is single root node the function can be deﬁned as
N(t) =
{
1 for t = 0
N(t−1) f (t−1) for 0 < t ≤ T. (1)
Finally, there are two the most important values corre-
sponding to each node: take up rate D(t,n) and uncon-
ditional probability P(t,n). D(t,n) is a possible value of
total take up rate, which can occur with P(t,n) probabil-
ity in period t. D(t,n) is a simple sum of the changes
of take up rate d(t, i), which belong to the path from the
root to node (t,n) and initial take up rate in period 0. The
probability P(t,n) can be computed by multiplication the
probability of predecessor and the probability of transition,
which leads from predecessor to current node (t,n). These
two parameters determine all possible scenarios in a given
time horizon.
44
Stochastic Models in Techno-Economic Analysis of Broadband Access Networks
Of course in reality, construction of accurate scenario tree,
or more general demand model, which takes into consider-
ation all possible scenarios, is hard problem itself. There-
fore, author is aware of some simpliﬁcations in the above
scenario representation. However, presented approach al-
lows to model in a simpliﬁed way diﬀerent demand forecast
evolutions, both total in whole time horizon and dynamics
in particular stages.
3. The Outline of FTTH Technology
Fibre technology is getting more and more popular in ac-
cess networks. There are various types of FTTx networks
depending on ﬁbre saturation of connection between cen-
tral oﬃce and subscriber [10]. FTTH is characterized by
bringing the ﬁbre medium directly to the end-user and for
this reason is considered to be the most future-proof access
technology and hence also as the target for evolutionary
path of access networks. This expectation is supported
by unlimited bandwidth of passive infrastructure, because
bandwidth of such network is limited only by active equip-
ment like transmitters and receivers [11].
Types of architectures. Two main diﬀerent FTTH archi-
tectures can be distinguished: point-to-point and star. In
point-to-point architecture there is a dedicated ﬁbre to each
subscriber, which connects him directly to the central of-
ﬁce. It is the simplest FTTH network to design and main-
tain. Star architecture, on the other hand, is characterized
by sharing one ﬁbre by many customers through a remote
node, which is located between subscriber’s household and
the central oﬃce. This node aggregates/splits network traf-
ﬁc from/to diﬀerent customers. Star architecture can be
active, when the remote node is powered, or passive, in
other case. Further, the passive star can be divided into
single wavelength system (all subscribers use a common
wavelength) and wavelength division multiplexed (WDM)
system (each subscriber uses a diﬀerent wavelength).
Main components of FTTH connection are: optical line ter-
mination (OLT), optical network unit (ONU) and obviously
optical ﬁbres. OLT is a device with optical transceiver and
it is usually located in the central oﬃce. In point-to-point
architecture one OLT port is dedicated to single subscriber,
when in star case it is used by group of subscribers. ONU,
called also optical network termination (ONT), is situated
on the customer premises. This device converts optical sig-
nal from the central oﬃce to subscriber into its electronic
form and electronic signal into optical in the opposite di-
rection. Optical path is composed of ﬁbres and is usually
divided into 3 sections:
– feeder cable: ﬁrst section of connection from the of-
ﬁce center, ends in the remote node in the star net-
work;
– distribution cable: links the remote node with net-
work access point;
– drop cable: direct connection between the subscriber
and the access point.
In point-to-point network these are all main components
and division of the path is obviously quite artiﬁcial, because
of dedicated ﬁbre to each customer.
The star architecture apart from above mentioned compo-
nents needs also a few more devices. Mainly it concerns
the remote node equipment and specially switches/splitters.
In the active star case in the aggregation node there are
switches and temperature stabilization system, therefore,
the node have to be powered. In the passive star in the
remote node splitters are used to distribute optical signal
among subscribers.
Presented model assumes the passive star architecture. It is
the most popular FTTH architecture today what may result
from no need to power the remote nodes and therefore,
economic character of such network. Furthermore, the star
network has more complex structure in view of feeder cable
sharing and for that reason is more complicated to model
in comparison to dedicated architecture.
4. Model Speciﬁcation
4.1. General Structure
Analysis of research, which were carried out so far, led
to some assumptions, which had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
presented model structure. Apart from dealing with un-
certainty there were also two others important premises:
optimization character and linearity. The former assures
the best solution in speciﬁc circumstances, in contrast to
simulation, which only gives answers to ﬁxed inputs, caus-
ing searching process of satisfactory solution very arduous.
What even more important it is not known if calculated
solution can be improved. The latter was assumed in order
to simplify computation, because stochastic problems are
usually quite big, and to use freely available software to
solve linear and integer programming problems.
Based on the above assumptions, to reﬂect characteristic
of the passive optical network (PON), a compromise was
Fig. 2. General structure of model.
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made, which resulted in module-based architecture of the
model (Fig. 2). There are 3 basic modules:
– nonlinear simulation module: calculates the optimal
aggregation rate in the remote node;
– optimization module: computes how many and
which customers should be connected to maximize
objective function (net present value – NPV, was cho-
sen), using optimal aggregation rate;
– economic module: the simplest part, which calcu-
lates additional economic parameters helpful in as-
sessing investments, using cash ﬂows from optimiza-
tion module.
4.2. Network Dimensioning
Before particular modules are described some information
will be given about geometric model used for network di-
mensioning. One should realize that cost of passive infras-
tructure, specially for cable networks, constitutes a quite
big part of total costs, specially when trenches have to be
dug. Thus it is important to determine basic measurements
of access network.
Presented model has a hierarchical structure with four levels
(to simplify square areas on each level were assumed) and
is an extended approach, which has been proposed in [3]:
– access region,
– access area,
– aggregation area,
– connection zone.
The access region is a whole geographic region, where ac-
cess network is built. Roughly in the middle there is the
central oﬃce connected to the backbone network. The ac-
cess region is composed of the access areas, which in reality
correspond to districts, estates or small rural regions and
are characterized by a given area, household density, dis-
tance to the central oﬃce and numbers of diﬀerent kinds of
potential subscribers. Uniform distribution of subscribers
density within individual kind of the customers in the ac-
cess areas was assumed.
Each access area is divided into the same size aggregation
areas exact to multiple size of this aggregation area. In the
middle there is the remote node which aggregates network
traﬃc from subscribers and links them to the central oﬃce.
Next the aggregation area is divided into connection zones,
where single building with potential subscribers was as-
sumed. In the building there might be diﬀerent number of
the subscribers depending on their kind and type of access
area (precisely on its population density).
According to above it is possible to determine basic mea-
surements of the network. Trenches schema is shown in
Fig. 3(a). When u stands for length of connection zone
side, a for length of aggregation area side (in u unit)
Fig. 3. Schema of aggregation area: (a) trenches; (b) ﬁbres.
and n is a number of the buildings in this aggregation area,
length of the trenches LD can be calculated as
LD = (n−1)u, (2)
where n = a2. Next, for speciﬁc network topology, i.e., star
topology (Fig. 3(b)), length of the ﬁbre used to connect
customers to the remote node can be calculated. Assuming
initially single ﬁbre to each building and even value of a it
could be done as
L f =
(
n
3
2
/2
)
u. (3)
Keeping in mind that in one building there can be several
customers, above simple dependency should be modiﬁed to
take into account bringing several ﬁbres to single building.
Denoting set of customers types as K, it is possible to ex-
press total number of customers in the given access area
as C = ∑k∈K ck. Assuming gk as an average number of k-
type customers per building, total number of buildings can
be calculated as B = ∑k∈K bk, where bk represents a num-
ber of buildings occupied by k-type customers bk = ck/gk.
Further, determining ca as a number of customers in the
aggregation area the number of buildings in the aggrega-
tion area ba can be calculated as ba = caC B. These lead
to complete formula determining length of the ﬁbre in the
aggregation area:
L f =
(ba)
3
2
2
u
(
∑
k∈K
bk
B
gk
)
, (4)
what can be simpliﬁed to
L f =
(ba)
3
2
2
u
(
∑
k∈K
ck
B
)
, (5)
where u =
√
A
B and A is an area of the access area.
4.3. Simulation Module
The aim of the simulation is to calculate the optimal ag-
gregation rate in the remote node. It is aggregation rate
which minimize expected infrastructure cost for the given
scenario tree in the access area. In other words it has to be
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decided how many subscribers should be connected to one
aggregation node, therefore, how many splitters should be
installed. Because this decision has to be made ultimately
at the beginning of investment but it should minimize ﬁnal
network, the total take up rate in diﬀerent scenarios at the
last stage are considered only.
As it was considered in [4], there are two opposite aims
which determine the optimal aggregation ratio. It results
from the cost of optical ﬁbres, splitters and OLT ports.
On the one hand the less splitters in the remote node, the
smaller aggregation area, therefore shorter distance from
the node to the subscriber and lower cost of ﬁbres. On the
other hand, however, the less splitters in the remote node,
the greater number of nodes and the higher probability of
using greater total number of splitters in the access area.
Obviously it is true only for take up rate less than 100%. To
better understand the second dependency one can imagine
small access area which is divided into two aggregation
areas, each with the remote node with single splitter. In
such situation each splitter has to be installed even if there
are only two subscribers, each in diﬀerent aggregation area.
If these two remote nodes are replaced by one node with
two splitters, the second splitter will be used only if there
are at least r+1 subscribers, where r is the split ratio. The
number of splitters determines also the number of OLT port
in the central oﬃce, thus higher aggregation ratio decreases
cost of splitters and OLT ports.
Assuming m as the aggregation ratio (it means that there
would be installed m splitters in the remote node if take
up rate was 100%) and r as the split ratio, there will be
mr customers in the aggregation area. Assuming further bi-
nomial distribution of customers take up rate, what means
each customer takes a decision independently, keeping in
mind uniform distribution of customers density, and us-
ing dependency (Eq. 5), length of the ﬁbre can be calcu-
lated as
L fm,n =
1
2
(mr
C
) 3
2 √A
(
∑
k∈K
ckhk,n
)
, (6)
where hk,n is a fraction of k-type customers, which want to
be connected to the network, when n scenario occurs.
It is left to calculate the real number of splitters, which are
used in the remote node, at hk,n take up rate for k ∈ K
and n scenario. Because there are mr customers in the
aggregation area and fraction of k-type customers equals
ck/C, the number of subscribers is
NConSubm,n = mr
(
∑
k∈K
ck
C
hk,n
)
. (7)
Hence keeping in mind r as the split ratio, the number of
splitters in the remote node can be expressed as
Nsplm,n =
⌈
m
(
∑
k∈K
ck
C
hk,n
)⌉
, (8)
where ⌈x⌉ is the smallest integer not less than x. To be
precisely it should be add there will be
⌈ C
mr
⌉
aggregation
areas, when the aggregation ratio is m.
To ﬁnd the optimal aggregation ratio the average infrastruc-
ture cost per connected subscriber is calculated. Assuming
that COLT , Cspl , C f are, respectively, costs of OLT port,
splitter and ﬁber (length unit, e.g., 1 km) this can be
done as
Cm,n =
(
COLT +Cspl
)
Nsplm,n +C f L fm,n
NConSubm,n
. (9)
Calculating this cost for each scenario n in the last period,
it is possible to determine its expected value for the given
scenario tree and aggregation ratio m:
E (Cm) = ∑
n
Cm,nPn , (10)
where Pn is probability of scenario n.
Assuming Mmax as maximal number of splitters that can
be installed in the remote node, module computes expected
cost E (Cm) for aggregation ratio 1≤m≤Mmax and returns
one which minimizes it.
4.4. Optimization Module
The most important and complicated part of the presented
model is optimization module, which merges technologi-
cal and economic aspects. All details of this module was
described thoroughly in [12], thus here some basic assump-
tions and general structure will be only explained.
Module on the basis of given demand calculates the nec-
essary amount of equipment, its cost and possible rev-
enue. Users demand is estimated using the scenario tree,
which was described in Section 2. Further, the geometric
model and the optimal aggregation rate value from simula-
tion module are used. As decision variables the number of
connected and non-connected customers of each type were
assumed. The objective function is net present value at the
end of assumed time horizon
NPV = ∑
t
CF (t)
(1 + r)t
, (11)
where r is the depreciation value and CF(t) is the cash ﬂow
in period t (all costs and revenues between t and t + 1).
For the sake of linear assumption, what was mentioned
earlier in the model structure description, amount of all
network components, which have nonlinear dependency on
the number of subscribers, are calculated to satisfy total
demand (to connect all eager customers). Model takes into
account both, capital (CAPEX) and operational (OPEX)
expenditure. CAPEX includes costs of:
– trenches and ducts,
– ﬁbres,
– central oﬃce,
– remote nodes,
– customer premises equipment.
OPEX is calculated proportional to CAPEX, according to
classes suggested in TITAN methodology [1]. Revenue
comes from customers connection and monthly fees.
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4.5. Economic Module
In third module selected economic factors are computed
on the basis of cash ﬂows from optimization module. Pre-
sented model takes into consideration two additional values:
– balance,
– modiﬁed internal rate of return (MIRR).
Balance is a simple sum of revenues and costs. Due to this
simplicity it is a very common economic factor to assess
various ventures. It could be treated as down limitation
of investment proﬁtability – if balance is less than zero,
all values, which take into consideration discount aspect
(i.e., NPV), will also show unproﬁtability of such under-
taking (typical investment is the most costly at the begin-
ning). Moreover, the balance is objective in contrast to
discounted values, which depend on depreciation rate. For
these reasons it is probably the most universal measure to
compare diﬀerent investments, specially those with similar
time horizon.
The second measure is modiﬁed internal rate of return,
which as IRR is relative value of venture eﬃciency, unlike
absolute values as balance or NPV, which reﬂect size dif-
ferences between various investments. MIRR in contrast
to IRR assumes the positive cash ﬂows from a project are
reinvested at the rate equates usually to cost of capital (de-
preciation rate used in NPV calculation). In case of IRR
the positive cash ﬂows are reinvested at the internal return
rate. For that reason MIRR more accurately reﬂects the
nature of access network development project. As it was
described before development of network is a long-lasting
undertaking, speciﬁc rather repeatable, what explains use of
diﬀerent reinvested rate instead of common internal return
rate.
In other words MIRR is the deprecation rate for which dis-
counted total future value of all positive cash ﬂows equals
total present value of all negative cash ﬂows reached from
investment. Formally this can be expressed as
T
∑
t=0
CFIt
(1 + r)t
=
T
∑
t=0
CFOt (1 + r)T−t
(1 + MIRR)T
(12)
and therefore
MIRR = T
√√√√√√√
T
∑
t=0
CFOt (1 + r)T−t
T
∑
t=0
CFIt
(1+r)t
− 1, (13)
where CFIt is the negative cash ﬂow in period t, CFOt is
the positive cash ﬂow in period t, r is the depreciation rate
(cost of capital) and T is the time horizon of investment.
As it can be seen MIRR is not only more appropriate to
network development investment in due to its speciﬁcity
but is also simpler to compute in comparison to IRR, for
which it is necessary to use reverse-simulation method.
Decision is made by analogy with IRR, therefore the in-
vestment is proﬁtable when MIRR is greater than cost of
capital and obviously the greater it is, the better.
5. Techno-Economic Analysis
Described model was applied to perform techno-economic
analysis for the city Łódź (Poland) and surroundings. The
region was chosen with regard to available data, which
were obtained thanks to [2] authors’ kindness. That study
also concerns development of the access network but for
WiMAX technology, thus it was possible to compare some
of the results in order to general veriﬁcation. Moreover, the
region of Łódź varies widely in population density, there-
fore it is good for analysis. Three types of the access areas
were distinguished: urban, suburban and rural.
Time horizon of the investment was assumed to be 6 years.
It was subjective decision on the basis of telecommunica-
tions market proﬁle. On the one hand it should be horizon
long enough to develop the access network but on the other
hand short enough to make economic and demand forecasts
reliable as much as possible and to convince investors to
wait for proﬁts. All presented below experiments were car-
ried out using the hypothetical scenario tree with 24 sce-
narios in the last period, where take up rate varies from
10% to 22% for individual and business customers (public
customers like schools and municipality oﬃces were con-
nected in 100%). This simple estimation was a result of
study various demand forecasts and experience from FTTH
project in other countries, which were obtained mainly from
the Internet.
5.1. Aggregation Ratio
Results from the simulation module will be discussed at
ﬁrst. Optimal aggregation ratio for 3 selected access ar-
eas with diﬀerent population density were calculated. For
each access area expected cost was computed for 3 diﬀerent
demand cases:
– set of possible scenarios with their probability in the
last period;
– the lowest take up rate (pessimistic scenario);
– the highest take up rate (optimistic scenario).
In the second and third cases there was assumed only one
possible scenario with 100% probability. In Fig. 4 results
for low population density area are illustrated.
Fig. 4. Simulation module results for low population density
area.
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First, one can see that single splitter in the remote node
is the worst solution, giving signiﬁcant higher costs than
higher aggregation ratio in all aggregation areas, although
it could seem intuitively that installing splitters the closest
as possible to the subscribers to reduce the use of ﬁbres
would be the best approach.
Further, it turns out that generally the aggregation ratio for
pessimistic scenario is greater than its equivalent for opti-
mistic one. Therefore, it seems the lower the take up rate,
the higher aggregation ratio is more proﬁtable. Because
the aggregation ratio is increasing with the reduction of the
subscribers number, this means the costs of ﬁbres have less
impact than the costs in the remote nodes and central of-
ﬁce. It is diﬀerent when changes of the population density
are considered. In rural areas the optimal aggregation ra-
tio is lower than in areas with greater population density.
Therefore, one can come to a conclusion the main factor,
which aﬀects the costs this time, is the distance between
the subscribers and the remote node.
Moreover, growth of population density, as well as take up
rate, decreases the costs per subscriber, thus the higher pay-
back from investment can be expected. To sum up it seems
FTTH access network investment is positive correlated with
the number of subscribers.
5.2. Economic Analysis
On the basis of optimal aggregation ratio from simulation
module further experiments were carried out. Some eco-
nomic values were calculated to assess investment prof-
itability for various cases.
At the beginning diﬀerent population density access areas
were compared (Fig. 5). As it was mentioned before 3 types
of areas were considered: low population density rural area,
average population density suburban area and high popu-
lation density urban area. As it can be seen in Table 1
only urban area is economically proﬁtable, what is con-
ﬁrmed by both NPV greater than 0 and MIRR greater than
assumed 15% discount rate (cost of capital). However, bal-
ance is positive for all areas what can mean that in longer
time horizon each of these investments can be proﬁtable,
especially as maintain costs of ﬁbre network are lower in
comparison to copper one.
It is also interesting to compare suburban and rural areas.
Although NPV is about 2.5 times lower for suburban area,
MIRR are very similar and balance is much greater than
for rural area. It results mainly from diﬀerent scale of
investment, because in suburban area initial expenditures
are much higher. For this reason it seems that for longer
time horizon the suburban area will be more proﬁtable.
All these observations lead to the conclusion that invest-
ment in FTTH access network is positive correlated with
the number and density of subscribers.
Similar analysis was carried out for the case when all in-
terested customers were connected to the access network
(additional constraint on the unsatisﬁed demand). Such
requirement seems rational for example when a public or-
ganization subsidizes access network investment in non-
Fig. 5. Economic factors for diﬀerent population density areas:
(a) high density; (b) medium density; (c) low density.
proﬁtable areas. In this particular situation such assumption
aggravated economic results only slightly. It also allowed
to estimate the value of subsidy required to make invest-
ment proﬁtable in suburban and rural areas. It equals about
80 and 30 millions PLN, respectively.
Table 1
Economic factors for diﬀerent population density areas
Area
Balance NPV MIRR
[103 PLN] [103 PLN] [%]
Rural 8481.9 –30347.8 7.14
Suburban 35205.7 –80540.6 7.08
Urban 319654.7 33828.8 16.80
Another experiment concerned duct system. Because
trenching primary duct system is very expensive and the
city Łódź keeps control of the sewage system, the possibil-
ity to use it was considered to reduce capital expenditure. It
was assumed the sewage system exists in suburban and ur-
ban areas. As it is shown in Fig. 6 this approach improves
signiﬁcantly eﬃciency of investments and makes the access
network development proﬁtable also in medium population
density area. Payback period (time for which NPV = 0) is
about 4 years long in suburban area and shortens to about
3.5 years in urban area.
The City Hall of Łódź had a clear vision of network own-
ership and management, where the city was an owner of
the network infrastructure but direct customers services
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Fig. 6. Economic factors using the sewage system: (a) high
density; (b) medium density.
were oﬀered by the service operators [2]. Due to this
business model of investment, there was a need to de-
cide how to share income between the network owner and
the service providers. In previous experiments it was as-
sumed 20% of income goes to the service operators. Here
(Table 2) results for two other values, 35% and 50%, are
presented. In case of 35% value investment is still rela-
tively proﬁtable, but when proﬁt margin reaches 50% un-
dertaken will cross the proﬁtability limit. Presented results
concern high population density area with the primary duct
system.
Table 2
Economic factors for high population density area and
diﬀerent service operators proﬁt margin
Proﬁt margin Balance NPV MIRR
[%] [103 PLN] [103 PLN] [%]
35 269781.1 62105.1 19.64
50 101031.6 –21429.0 12.64
Income division ratio plays an important role in business
model, thus in reality it should be subject of thorough ne-
gotiations, taking into account various aspects, for example,
competition.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
Presented results have shown the usefulness of techno-
economic analyses in planning access networks develop-
ment. The appropriate choice of network parameters, such
as the aggregation ratio, is essential and could signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuence the investment proﬁtability. Additionally
stochastic approach, which takes uncertainty into consider-
ation, provides for a more robust solution due to changes in
the volume of customer demand. Suggested decisions are
optimal in sense of expected value of NPV. Such method
improves the safety of investment as opposed to the formu-
lation in which random variables are replaced by expected
values what may lead to infeasible solution. Analysis of
diﬀerent scenarios can also make the decision maker aware
of potential threats.
One of the biggest problem in creating the model was lim-
ited availability of speciﬁc data. It caused some simpliﬁ-
cations and common sense assumptions. As it turned out,
detailed demographic data were not freely available and as
it was mentioned before, they were provided by [2] authors.
Information about the cost of components was hard to ob-
tain as well, what could be a consequence of quite new
FTTH technology.
The most important ﬁndings from experiments are not ab-
solute exact value of individual factors, which in view of
assumptions and diﬃculties could be questioned, but the
general dependencies and characteristics follow from re-
ceived results. From economic point of view, it seems the
ﬁbre access networks are more appropriate, when there is
a signiﬁcant number of subscribers. It results mainly from
high initial investments, which are necessary to provide re-
quired infrastructure to cover the given access area, and
this is related to costly civil work and trenching. For this
reason, the FTTH network is unproﬁtable in low population
density area and needs subsidy under such circumstances.
On the other hand, there is an interesting opportunity for the
areas where there is some kind of ducts system which can
be easily adopted to distribute ﬁbre cables. In this case, the
development of the FTTH network is much less expensive,
shortening signiﬁcantly the payback period. From decision
maker point of view, such property is also a guidance to
develop the passive infrastructure within other investments
like road construction, although one has to realize it re-
quires a long-term planning period.
Apart from data availability diﬃculties it is necessary to
mention other shortcomings and possible improvements to
deal with. First is the computational complexity. One
should realize the number of scenarios grows exponen-
tially with the number of periods. Presented experiments
were carried out using small scenario tree, what in view of
small range of take up rate parameter was not the problem,
but in general it poses the computational limits when the
parameters vary greatly. To overcome this limitation the
decomposition method should be considered. Secondly it
should be also remembered about some simpliﬁcations in
the scenario tree building method. It is the important issue
which requires further detailed research. Some algorithms
to build the scenario tree should be work out to ensure the
most appropriate representation of the possible trends of
events.
The issue of robustness in such applications may be
also an interesting subject of further studies. It concerns,
e.g., the choice of objectives. Some measure of risk could
be applied as decision maker might be interested in the
variability of returns associated with a plan. It may lead
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to multicriteria optimization and more complex utility
function.
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Paper A Framework for Evaluation
of Communication Bandwidth
Market Models
Wojciech Stańczuk, Piotr Pałka, Józef Lubacz, and Eugeniusz Toczyłowski
Abstract—The article presents a method of analysis of market-
based models for resource allocation in communication net-
works. It consists of several stages: classiﬁcation of a market
model, generation of input data, data adaptation to a tested
model, test calculations and, ﬁnally, presentation and inter-
pretation of results. A set of general criteria to assess vari-
ous models has been proposed. Tests are run using dedicated
computer applications, data is stored in open XML-based for-
mat originated in the multicommodity market model. Network
topologies are derived from the SNDlib library.
Keywords—auctions, bandwidth trading, resource allocation.
1. Introduction
A dominant form of trading on the market of resources in
telecommunications networks is bilateral contracting. Time
of negotiations is undesirably long in relation to high dy-
namics of business processes in the telecommunications
market. In addition, the bilateral nature of negotiations re-
duces the transparency of trade rules. This often enables
network operators or service providers with signiﬁcant mar-
ket power to obtain better trading conditions than it is jus-
tiﬁed. Therefore, the research is conducted on innovative
mechanisms for trading of transport resources in networks
to enhance the eﬃciency of their usage and the quality of
conditions of competing for them, particularly in the form
of auctions and exchanges. Potential beneﬁts of the intro-
duction of such multilateral trading patterns on the mar-
ket for telecommunications network capacity are discussed
in [1], problems of the organization of network bandwidth
exchanges are presented in [2].
The variety of possible models and their variants creates
a problem of objective evaluation and the feasibility of
mutual comparison. The models may implement many
diﬀerent resource allocation algorithms and apply multi-
ple optimization criteria taking into account economic and
technical constraints. The chances of a simple quantitative
assessment of one model in comparison to others and indi-
cating its advantages and disadvantages are hindered. This
paper is an attempt to develop a methodological approach
to testing and comparing models of market-based allocation
of capacity in communication networks. The method can
be helpful in choosing trade models adequate to speciﬁc
markets segments in the telecommunications sector.
The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy
describes the survivable network design library (SNDlib)
and the multicommodity market model (M3 ). Section 3
shows the successive stages of testing. Section 4 presents
a set of comparative criteria. Section 5 shows an example
of the application of the proposed framework for a selected
bandwidth trading model. Section 6 summarizes the results
of the research.
2. A Method of Analysis
of Market-Based Models
The proposed approach to evaluating market models results
in a multi-stage framework. The stages, shown in Fig. 1,
are as follows:
– model classiﬁcation,
– test data generation,
– data adaptation for a model,
– running tests,
– output data analysis.
Each step can be performed independently, using separate
tools. Data passed between the successive stages is stored
in text ﬁles saved in a extensible markup language (XML)-
based format.
Fig. 1. Schema of the bandwidth model testing framework.
The proposed methodology integrates the results of other
research: the data of the SNDlib and the model of a mul-
ticommodity market process (M3 ).
2.1. The SNDlib Library
The survivable ﬁxed telecommunication network design
library [3] is a scientiﬁc library sharing exemplary data
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for problems of the design/dimensioning of communication
transport networks.
Examples stored in the library reﬂect the topology of real
networks. All of them are saved in a standardized XML
dialect. The main purpose of the library is to collect ac-
tual data on research problems and create a platform for
exchange of information between scientists and engineers
involved in network design. The library comprises network
topologies with the structure of network links and band-
width demands, best solutions and their dual bounds, an
up-to-date bibliography and a list of conferences on the
subject. The scope of solving methods is broad and in-
cludes models of linear/integer programming, branch-and-
bound algorithms, column generation, a Lagrangian relax-
ation and meta-heuristics such as evolutionary algorithms,
simulated annealing or taboo search.
2.2. The M3 Model
Consistent description of a broad scope of potential trade
processes on the bandwidth market needs an application of
an adequately ﬂexible information model. Such ﬂexibility
and a high degree of openness can be obtained by using
an information model based on the M3 [4]. The M3 is a set
of formal models that describe data and communication
messages on multi-commodity infrastructure markets. The
M3model has been adopted in our research for a market of
transport resources in telecommunication networks.
The M3model enables a generic description of the trad-
ing information exchanged between market participants.
The data is stored in a special M3-XML dialect allow-
ing the expression of: the existing network infrastructure,
the time scale in which the trade is accomplished, the en-
tity structure (sellers, buyers, brokers, leaseholders, etc.),
the trade object structure (description of traded goods) and
the oﬀers submitted by individual market participants. It
contains, in particular, descriptions of market oﬀers: ele-
mentary (singlecommodity), integrated (multicommodity),
and also grouping: describing more complex relations be-
tween elementary commodities or integrated oﬀers with
common conditions or resource constraints. The introduc-
tion of the mechanism of grouping of the oﬀers facilitates
the formulation of non-trivial constraints for each indi-
vidual market participant, and proper valuation/quoting of
the oﬀers.
In practical applications one may use all or just selected
elements of the M3 data model. It is worth noting that the
M3model and its M3-XML data format do not specify how
the trade itself and the allocation of resources are realized.
3. Stages of Preparing and Running
Tests
This section presents the sequential stages of preparation
and runnig tests of bandwidth market models.
3.1. Classification of the Model
The properties of models originate in economics, game the-
ory principles of mechanism design and in technical fea-
tures of traded bandwidth. Selecting distinctive features
of the models creates a space for their classiﬁcation and
grouping. The set of the classifying features have been
developed upon analysis of the network resource structure
and the organization of trade processes. The categories of
the network design problems from [3] have also been taken
into account.
Type of commodities. The number of types of resources
in telecommunication networks is signiﬁcant: there are
many technologies used in transmission systems (switch-
ing and multipexing techniques). The resources can have
a physical or a virtual nature and their detailed speciﬁcation
depends on a layered architecture of modern networks.
Our research is focused on transport communication net-
works and in this context the general elementary commod-
ity is a bandwidth of a point-to-point connection between
a pair of nodes in a speciﬁed network layer. It is deﬁned as
a network capacity enabling transmission of speciﬁed data
amount from a source node to a destination node during
speciﬁed quantum of time.
The bandwidth of a network link can be oﬀered for sell.
The bandwidth needed to serve a traﬃc demand can be
purchased – the existence of a direct connection between
the pair of nodes of the demand is not necessary, the de-
mand can be realized with one or more paths (consisting
of sequences of links).
The trade models can take into account many of character-
istic features of bandwidth commodities. The most signiﬁ-
cant ones are following:
– direction of bandwidth: bandwidth commodities can
be directed, undirected (data ﬂow is possible in both
directions) or asymmetric (capacity depends on the
direction of data ﬂow); bidirectional bandwidth com-
modities can be modeled with two oppositely directed
commodities;
– divisibility of bandwidth: bandwidth can be fully
divisible, modular (divisible with the accuracy of
units), unit (a particular case of modular bandwidth
modeled in combinatorial auctions), predeﬁned (di-
visible only within speciﬁed volumes);
– commodity structure: some trade models omit struc-
tural relations between commodities and concern
trading only separate elementary commodities; other
models enable trading complex structures of com-
modities, particularly on the demand side: the struc-
tures can refer to a set of predeﬁned network paths,
a speciﬁed set of network links or whole subnetworks
(e.g., for purposes of building virtual private net-
works).
Relations between oﬀers and commodities. The models
can take into account diﬀerent kinds of assignment between
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traded commodities and related trade oﬀers. One can dis-
tinguish:
– elementary oﬀers: a single oﬀer concerns a single
elementary commodity;
– bundled oﬀers: a single oﬀer concerns a bundle of
elementary commodities, the commodities can be
sold/bought in equal or diﬀerent amounts.
Market participants. The models can describe many or-
ganizational forms of trade. The basic division takes into
consideration the number and the roles of market partici-
pants. One can distinguish:
– single-side models: a market operator sell bandwidth
capacity to its clients, or a single client buys services
from many competing network operators;
– double-sided models: there are many buyers and sel-
lers.
The important role in trade models is a market operator –
the entity that balances the market: allocates resources and
sets prices. In centralized models there is one market op-
erator. In distributed models there can be many of them.
Quality of service constraints. Market contracts concern-
ing telecommunication resources usually deﬁne a set of pa-
rameters describing the quality of service (QoS). The trade
models can take those constraints into account, e.g., spec-
ifying the maximal length of a path or the maximal delay
of a packet.
Resource allocation rule. The network resources are al-
located by means of a deﬁned algorithm operating on the
available market oﬀers. In the context of transport network
resources one can distinguish the basic allocation rules:
– path setting: the required point-to-point bandwidth
connections are served with paths consisting of a se-
quence of communication links;
– allocation of single resources: buy oﬀers concern
separate resources that is not bundled without any
explicitly expressed relation.
Pricing rule. Market models set contract prices according
to a speciﬁed rule. Some popular examples of such rules
are: English auction, second-price auction, Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves auction, dual pricing, etc.
Exchanged messages. The essential feature of a trade
model is the type of signals exchanged between market
participants and a market operator. The signals can have
various forms:
– point characteristics: a traditional market oﬀer indi-
cating commodities, their amounts and oﬀer prices;
– partial characteristics of preferences, e.g., a set of
points from utility function or a stepwise oﬀer;
– full characteristics of preferences, e.g., in the form of
an utility function.
Market balancing dynamics. The models can be divided
according to the time schedule of the market balancing
process. One can distinguish two basic classes:
– one-time auctions: market participants submit their
oﬀers and then a market operator allocates resources
and sets prices taking into account all submitted of-
fers;
– iterated auctions: the ﬁnal market balance is achieved
in a sequence of steps, in which market participants
can modify their signals submitted to a market.
Implementation. The models can be implemented with
many diﬀerent techniques and tools originated in opera-
tions research, computer programming and mathematics.
Examples of the implementation types are following: linear
programming, mathematical programming, dynamic pro-
gramming, parametric equations, heuristics, etc.
3.2. Input Data Generation
One of the purposes of the research presented in this pa-
per is to create a library of test examples for the scientiﬁc
community involved in the design of market algorithms and
models for communication transport networks. Input data
for test cases should reﬂect the size of demand and supply
observable in the real network bandwidth market. The test
data used for the research may come from the following
sources:
– examples of network design problems;
– economic models of supply and demand;
– real data from the telecommunications market.
Trade patterns for transport resources of networks and bal-
ancing market oﬀers are conceptually similar to the prob-
lems of network design – the relationship between trade
mechanisms and designing the network have been discussed
in [5]: the demand for network bandwidth and communi-
cation links between nodes can be interpreted as a market
oﬀer to buy/sell network resources. In order to generate
a test network topology and market oﬀers one can therefore
use the data from the SNDlib library. The examples from
the database cannot be used directly due to their important
constraints. Firstly, there is only one link between pairs of
nodes in a network topology, while the market models as-
sume the existence of multiple oﬀers on the bandwidth seg-
ment between a pair of nodes (a similar requirement applies
also to buy oﬀers). Secondly, any pricing information in
the examples of the SNDlib is only expressed by determin-
ing the cost of installation and expansion of links, while in
the trade models one requires the price of bids submitted by
buyers and sellers. All the missing elements can be added
to the original network design examples, e.g., by means
of the pseudo-random generation adjusted to the speciﬁc
test case.
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The second source of the data on the potential oﬀers on the
bandwidth market is the use of economic models of sup-
ply and demand. Such models in the context of resources
in telecommunication networks are under research, espe-
cially in the ﬁeld of modeling network traﬃc and demand
for services. Some analysis of supply and demand can be
transferred to the ground of telecommunications from other
infrastructure markets such as energy or transportation.
The test data can also come from the analysis of the actual
data on transactions accomplished in the real telecommuni-
cations market. Acquiring such data is diﬃcult in practice
because there are not any network bandwidth exchanges op-
erating on a larger scale, and the information about bilateral
contracts between telecommunications companies is gener-
ally private and not publicly available. However, there are
some internet sites showing examples of bandwidth prices
in certain local markets, e.g., the U.S., and reports on global
trends in the development of the telecommunications mar-
ket, such as the work [6].
3.3. Data Adaptation – Conversion to M3 Format
The adopted information model for the framework is the
M3 – any data of test cases should be saved in the M3-
XML format. This can be achieved in two ways.
The ﬁrst one is the direct generation of input data in the
desired format. This requires dedicated computer tools al-
lowing editing or automatic generation of the test data.
The second approach assumes the use of examples con-
tained in the SNDlib library enriched with the entity struc-
ture, the object structure and trade oﬀers. Choosing an
XML dialect as a data format results in the opportunity
to use widely available read/write software libraries for
many programming languages, which facilitate the develop-
ment of new tools for test data generation. The natural way
to transform XML data into another format is the use of
a extensible stylesheed language transformation (XSLT) [7].
One can also use the query language XQuery [8].
For the purpose of this research a mixed approached has
been adopted. A dedicated computer program with a graph-
ical user interface has been designed and implemented. It
has been used to enrich the SNDlib examples with lacking
elements and save them in the simple dedicated bandwidth
market XML (BM-XML) format describing the network
nodes and the oﬀers for sale and purchase of network ca-
pacity. A series of XSLT transformations processing the
BM-XML format into M3-XML format have been used. In
this way we have obtained a convenient set of computer
tools used for importing and converting examples of net-
work topology to the new library of complete test cases for
bandwidth market models.
3.4. Running Tests
The next step is to run required calculations of network
capacity allocation and pricing for a tested model with
the prepared data. It is assumed that all the input data
is stored in the M3-XML format. Therefore any market
mechanism, which is a subject to the tests, should be able
to read input data and generate output data compatible with
the M3 information model. The ﬂow of data during the ex-
ecution of the tests is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. M3-XML format data ﬂow in running tests.
The concept of a universal decisional-computational pro-
cessor has been developed [9] and the initial implementa-
tion has been made: it solves the tasks described by the data
stored in M3-XML format. The corresponding XSLT trans-
formation converts the data to the internal representation of
the appropriate model. The processor returns the data in the
M3-XML format. Such modular architecture allows inde-
pendent implementation of the trade models from the eval-
uation framework: compatibility with the M3 information
model can be achieved by the input and output interfaces.
The XSLT transformations can be applied to convert the in-
put data into the format required by the particular comput-
ing processor, e.g., a standard mathematical programming
solver or a dedicated implementation of the algorithm of
a trade model. Examples of such transformations have al-
ready been created [4] and they are further extended in our
research on new trading models. They convert the data in
M3-XML format into GMPL format (gnumath program-
ming language) [10], which can be used by optimization
solvers, e.g., GlpSol and AMPL (a mathematical program-
ming language). Linear models can also be easily con-
verted to other LP (linear programming) formats, e.g., the
one used by the CPLEX solver.
3.5. Analysis of Output Data
The next step to take after having completed series of com-
putational experiments is to analyze the obtained results.
The application of the M3 information model to describe
the output of the tested models facilitates the analysis. If
one had diﬀerent data formats for various trade models the
comparison of the results would be much more diﬃcult and
time-consuming. The adopted XML-based format allows
for simple data conversion to other formats for presentation
purposes, such as exporting to spreadsheets or graphical
visualization applications.
4. Comparative Criteria
A fundamental part of the evaluation framework is the
proper selection of indicators. Trade models are often de-
signed for a speciﬁc market context and deﬁned aspects
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of resource allocation, so the comparative criteria should
be general enough to be applicable to most of them. We
propose a set of such indicators, they represent measures
originating in economics, game theory and technical eﬃ-
ciency.
A properly designed trade model should strive to meet sev-
eral desirable properties that make it attractive for a wide
range of market participants (traders, decision makers, reg-
ulators). These properties can be used as evaluation criteria
providing information about the ”quality” of a given model.
The set of criteria is divided into three categories: global,
individual and technical. The division into the individual
and global ones expresses the natural market game between
individual participants’ interests and global interests. The
third category aims in evaluation of the models in terms of
their technical eﬃciency.
4.1. Global Criteria
Economic eﬃciency. The main measure of economic ef-
ﬁciency is the market surplus. It is deﬁned as the aggre-
gated economic beneﬁts derived from the market exchange
of goods. If the market mechanism encourages participants
to submit truthful bids, then economic prosperity could be
determined accurately using actual bids. If the market oﬀer
does not comply with the participant’s preference proﬁle, it
can be used only as an imprecise measure known as eco-
nomic beneﬁts. It is the diﬀerence between total value of
goods purchased and the total value of goods sold on the
market, as follows:
Q = ∑
m∈B
dmem −∑
l∈S
plsl , (1)
where em is the unit oﬀer price of buy oﬀer m, dm is realized
bandwidth of buy oﬀer m, sl is the unit oﬀer price of sell
oﬀer l, and pl is realized bandwidth of sell oﬀer l.
Incentive compatibility. The incentive compatibility prop-
erty holds if no market participant has incentives to report
signal diﬀerent from its type/preferences: no agent has in-
centives to report an untruthful oﬀer.
Incentive compatible mechanism prevents strategic actions
of the participants. The measure of the eﬀectiveness of
the mechanism against strategic players is the allocative
ineﬃciency (AI) deﬁned as follows:
AI =
Q0−Q
Q0 100% , (2)
where Q0 is the economic surplus if every market partici-
pant submits a truthful bid, Q is the actual (achieved) value
of the economic welfare, where participants can submit bids
incompatible with their preferences. It should be noted that
the participants may submit bids incompatible with their
proﬁle of preferences in order to achieve higher proﬁts.
Budget balance. A trade model has balanced budget if sum
of sellers’ expenses is equal to sum of buyers’ incomes:
there is no need to surcharge the trading mechanism, and
the mechanism does not earn additional proﬁts.
The ﬁrst quantitative measure describing this criterion is
the value of the diﬀerence between total sellers’ income SI
and total buyers’ expense BE related to the total market
value. This measure has got the term budget imbalance in
relation to total turnover (RBIT ):
RBIT =
SI−BE
SI + BE
100% . (3)
The second measure describing the budget balance criterion
is the value of the diﬀerence between total sellers’ income
and total buyers’ expense related to the market surplus.
This measure has got the term budget imbalance in relation
to market surplus (RBIS):
RBIS = SI−BEQ 100% . (4)
Pareto-eﬃciency. The results given by the trading model
are Pareto-eﬃcient, if one can not improve the result for one
market participant without making some other participants
worse oﬀ: the results are Pareto-eﬃcient if such results are
not Pareto-dominated by other results.
4.2. Individual Criteria
Individual economic beneﬁts. From the perspective of an
individual market participant the trading model should al-
low to obtain the highest possible value of the individual
economic beneﬁts. The measure is deﬁned as the value of
the individual utility function for each market participant.
Absolute individual fairness – individual rationality.
A trade model is individually rational, if no market partici-
pant loses from the participation in the trade. This property
is also called the voluntary participation (if it may lose then
it can choose not to participate in the trade).
Relative individual fairness. A trade model is fair in a rel-
ative sense, when from the perspective of each participant
no other oﬀer is favored in relation to its oﬀer.
Other criteria related to fairness have been outlined below:
– anonymity: a participant remains anonymous if
renumbering of participants does not aﬀect the ob-
tained outcome;
– symmetry: two participants with the same parame-
ters, in the same market situation (the same utility
functions) should obtain the same individual results;
– an equal price: each participant receives the same
volume of a commodity for the same unit price.
4.3. Technical Efficiency
The possibility of a practical technical implementation of
the trade model is evaluated with technical eﬃciency indi-
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cators dependent on the computational complexity of the
model and on its reliability. Exemplary measures are:
– duration of single market balancing;
– total duration of the market balancing (for iterative
mechanisms);
– a number of exchanged messages (total, average).
5. Example
The evaluation framework has been applied to test the bal-
ancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) model dis-
cussed in [5]. It is a multicommodity trade model for the
market of network transport resources with many buyers
and many sellers. The model assumes complete divisi-
bility of oﬀered bandwidth (sell oﬀers) and the ability to
allocate any fraction of bandwidth to any bandwidth de-
mand (buy oﬀers). The market balancing process consists
of setting the paths serving buy oﬀers with a combination
of sell oﬀers. The formal format of the model is a linear
programming problem representing a double auction with
the maximization of market welfare.
The evaluation of the properties of the BCBT model has
been carried out according to the framework principles out-
lined in the paper. Below a brief description of this test
case is presented.
5.1. Classification of the Model
Type of commodities. The BCBT model assumes that
both links (sell oﬀers) and paths (buy oﬀers) concern uni-
directional network capacity. The division model of the
oﬀered bandwidth is continuous: the seller and buyer may
indicate bandwidth amount of their bids with any positive
real number. The bandwidth can be traded in the range
from 0 to a maximal admissible volume speciﬁed for the
oﬀers.
Relations between oﬀers and commodities. All market
oﬀers in the model are elementary oﬀers concerning ele-
mentary point-to-point bandwidth connections in the net-
work.
Market participants. The model represents a double auc-
tion: there are many buyers and many sellers. It is a cen-
tralized trading model – a single market operator balances
the market.
Quality of service constraints. There are not any QoS
parameters included in the model (e.g., there is no limit on
the maximum length of paths).
Resource allocation rule. The balancing mechanism can
freely allocate bandwidth in the network, in particular a sin-
gle sell oﬀer can be used to serve multiple buy oﬀers, a sin-
gle buy oﬀer can be realized with many paths. There are
no restrictions on the possibility of setting paths in the net-
work: there are no predeﬁned paths, they are set during
the market balancing process taking into account of all
available oﬀers.
Pricing rule. The pricing rule adopted is the dual pricing
rule – it is based on dual prices of the balance constraints.
In the BCBT model the balance constraints exist only for
the links – so the prices are determined directly for the
sell oﬀers only. The prices for demands (buy oﬀers) are
determined as a sum of the values of bandwidth bought on
links in the related paths.
Exchanged messages. The messages exchanged in the
model are point characteristics of market participants’ pref-
erences in the form of a traditional oﬀer expressing the
amount of commodities and their unit prices.
Market balancing dynamics. The model is an example of
a one-time double auction – the market participants sub-
mit oﬀers and then the market is balanced – resources are
allocated and prices are calculated.
Implementation. The model has been implemented as
a linear program maximizing total market welfare. The
linear program is written in GMPL and AMPL.
5.2. Input Data
The network topology is derived from the example of the
NOBEL-EU network from the SNDlib developed in the
IST NOBEL project “Next Generation Optical Networks
for Broadband European Leadership” [11]. The nodes of
the network are located in 28 major European cities. The
network topology (nodes and potential links) is illustrated
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Pan-European network of EU project IST NOBEL [11].
Bandwidth buy oﬀers are independent from the traﬃc de-
mands included in the original SNDlib example. It is as-
sumed that the oﬀered prices rise along with the geo-
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graphical distance between a pair of nodes, and oﬀered
bandwidth capacity decreases with the distance. 150 buy
oﬀers have been generated by the following algorithm:
1. Draw randomly a source and a destination network
node (diﬀerent from each other).
2. Set pseudo-randomly oﬀer price according to the ex-
pression (5) with dependency on the geographical
distance between the nodes:
Gauss
(
AvgP ·Dist, AvgP3Dist
)
. (5)
3. Set pseudo-randomly oﬀer bandwidth capacity ac-
cording to the expression (6) with dependency on
the geographical distance between the nodes:
Uniform
(
0.5AvgC, 1.5AvgC
)(
1− Dist
Distmax
)
(6)
with the following denotation:
– Gauss(a,b): Gaussian distribution with the expected
value a and the standard deviation b;
– Uniform(a,b): uniform distribution in the range
[a,b];
– AvgP: average unit bandwidth price related to a unit
distance;
– AvgC: average bandwidth capacity for adjacent
nodes (distance equals 0);
– Dist: distance between nodes;
– Distmax: the maximal distance between the nodes in
the network.
Following parameter values has been used for buy oﬀer
generation: AvgP = 1, AvgC = 15.
Sell oﬀers have been also generated randomly (they have
replaced links in the original SNDlib example: the pri-
mary links have been interpreted as bandwidth segments
on which sell oﬀers are submitted). The assumption made
is similar to the case of buy oﬀers: the oﬀered prices
rise along with the geographical distance between a pair
of nodes, and oﬀered bandwidth capacity decreases with
the distance. 5 separate sell oﬀers have been generated
on every bandwidth segment using the same mathematical
expression for setting prices and capacities as for the buy
oﬀers (with the following parameter values: AvgP = 0.5,
AvgC = 10) according to the algorithm:
1. Set pseudo-randomly the direction of the oﬀer (the
probability of each direction equals 0.5).
2. Set pseudo-randomly oﬀer price according to the ex-
pression (5) with dependency on the geographical
distance between the nodes.
3. Set pseudo-randomly oﬀer bandwidth capacity ac-
cording to the expression (6) with dependency on
the geographical distance between the nodes.
The test data generated for the Nobel-EU network including
150 buy oﬀers and 205 sell oﬀers has been saved in a BM-
XML format ﬁle. The data sat is a simple but complete
test case, and it can be used also for testing the properties
of other models than the BCBT.
5.3. Adaptation and Running Tests
A single test procedure consists of three phases. The ﬁrst
one is the adaptation of the data stored in BM-XML format
to the M3-XML format. The second phase is the solution
of the problem in accordance with a given mathematical
model of the BCBT. The third phase is the collection of
the results and their analysis. The detailed description of
each step is as follows:
• The data in the BM-XML format has been converted
to the M3 information model using several XSLT
transformations. The result of this procedure is a set
of ﬁles in the M3-XML format.
• The obtained data set is then passed to the decisional-
computational processor performing the following
steps: the data is converted to a GMPL model imple-
menting the BCBT allocation model using an XSLT
transformation; the complete GMPL model with nu-
meric data is passed to a linear programming solver
(e.g., AMPL, GlpSol) returning results.
• The results are parsed to the M3-XML format.
Calculations have been performed on a PC (Intel Core 2
Duo 2.60 GHz, 2 GB RAM).
5.4. Output Data Analysis
The numerical data and short comments for the framework
indicators have been presented below.
Economic eﬃciency. From a global perspective the BCBT
model is economically eﬃcient in the sense that it maxi-
mizes the global economic welfere. Thus, for given market
oﬀers, no better allocation of bandwidth resources is possi-
ble. The market welfare achieved in the test case is 13861.
Incentive compatibility. The obtained value of the alloca-
tive ineﬃciency equals 0.026. It is a very good outcome –
it indicates that the possibility for speculation on the market
is limited.
Budget balance. The RBIT and RBIS benchmarks are 0, so
the model fulﬁlls the requirements for the budget balance
property.
Pareto-eﬃciency. The Pareto-eﬃciency property holds for
the family of BCBT models. Pareto-eﬃciency is ensured if
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the aggregation function of the individual objective func-
tions is strictly increasing. The family of BCBT models
uses objective function as the sum of individual objective
functions, which is strictly increasing with respect to ev-
ery coordinate, so the whole BCBT family is Pareto-ef-
ﬁcient.
Individual economic beneﬁts. The calculated contract
prices have been used to determine the individual bene-
ﬁts of the market participants. The list of their values has
not been included here because of the limited space of the
paper.
Absolute individual fairness – individual rationality. The
individual beneﬁts for those market participants, whose of-
fers have been successfully traded, are positive. So the
requirements of the individual rationality property are ful-
ﬁlled.
Relative individual fairness. The requirements for re-
lative fairness of individual market participants are par-
tially met in the test case. In general their fulﬁlment de-
pends on the implementation of solvers (e.g., the order of
identical market oﬀers may have impact on the volume of
their realization). The BCBT model itself does not have
any additional constraints for complying with these require-
ments.
Duration of market balancing. The total time of the mar-
ket balancing has been very short: 0.95 s. There have not
been any additional computation for resource pricing be-
cause the prices have been derived from the parameters of
the linear program solution. The LP formulation of the
BCBT model does not comprise integer variables, to it is
feasible even for large networks.
Number of exchanged messages. The market participants
have submitted 150 buy and 205 sell oﬀers – there are total
355 bid messages (the same number of messages covers
announcing the results of the trade).
6. Summary
The paper presents an attempt to develop a methodological
approach to the problem of comparing diﬀerent models for
trading capacity in the communication transport networks.
Several stages of test preparation and running computations
have been distinguished and described. The use of stan-
dardized data format is essential: the task of comparison
of results becomes easier and the same test cases can be
reused for many models. The proposed framework will be
used to study and compare the properties of diﬀerent trade
models, such as c-SeBiDA (combinatorial sellers’ bid dou-
ble auction) [12], MIDAS [13], BCBT [5], NSP (network
service provider) [14], and other new models developed
by the authors in their research. The described framework
and its tools can be a part of a broader research platform
forming an advanced computing environment for testing
the market models of resource allocation in communication
networks.
The evaluation framework is in its early stage and still there
is a need to reﬁne many of its elements. The most important
areas perceived for improvement include:
• The development and extension of economic mod-
els to describe the bandwidth demand and supply
enabling generation of test data reﬂecting the real
market conditions.
• Reﬁne the set of criteria enabling to study and
compare speciﬁc characteristics of trading models,
e.g., resulting from the market game between trade
participants.
These and other extensions of the basic methodology pro-
posed in this paper will be presented in the authors’ future
papers.
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Paper Pricing Rules Comparison
in the Context of Bandwidth Trade
Piotr Pałka and Eugeniusz Toczyłowski
Abstract—In this paper we compare two pricing rules in the
context of bandwidth trade. Allocation and pricing rules, to-
gether with a set of signals received from independent agents,
constitute a market mechanism. In the paper we analyze two
pricing rules: well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves rule (VCG)
and the parametric pricing rule (PPR). We apply these pricing
rules to the allocation rule specified by the balancing commu-
nication bandwidth trade model (BCBT).
Keywords—communication bandwidth trade, mechanism de-
sign, pricing rule.
1. Introduction
Bandwidth market, in the context of independent traders
(in this paper we will call them agents), determines a game
among these agents. The ﬁnite group of agents interacts.
The set of agents is denoted I = {1,2, . . . ,n} and generic
agent is represented as i. Every agent tries to maximize her
individual proﬁts. Thus, the aims of particular agents are
inconsistent. However, the market designer can inﬂuence
the behavior of particular agents by applying speciﬁc rules
to the game. Thus, the market designer tries to achieve
the overriding goals. In the context of market games, such
rules are allocation and pricing rules. Applying this speciﬁc
rules to the game among independent agents results in the
market mechanism.
Every agent is characterized by her preferences. We call
this preferences the agent’s type Ti. We usually assume
that the agent knows only her type, but not those of other
agents. The mechanism designer also does not know
agents’ types. We call such mechanism informationally de-
centralized [1].
Agent reports the signal θi to the mechanism. The signal,
in the context of market mechanism, can be understood as
a buying/selling oﬀer. Signal is reported on the basis of
the strategy function. The strategy function depends on the
agent’s type, behavior of the other agents and on the mech-
anism rules. Thus, the signal reported by the particular
agent, can diﬀers from this agent’s type.
The allocation rule determines the allocation of the of-
fers. It divides the oﬀers for the accepted (also partially
accepted) and rejected. Pricing rule sets a vector of prices
for traded commodities. The mechanism receives the sig-
nals from particular agents and performs the allocation of
commodities and determines their valuation – in accordance
with the allocation and pricing rules.
2. Desired Mechanisms Properties
Mechanism is constructed in order to fulﬁll the desired
results. Particular agents try to achieve their maximal indi-
vidual proﬁts, thus their goals are inconsistent. Moreover,
goals of particular agents are also inconsistent with global
goals, desired by the mechanism designer. Mechanism the-
ory considers the set of the most desired properties.The
most important mechanism properties are: incentive com-
patibility, individual rationality, Pareto-eﬃciency and bud-
get balance [2].
Incentive compatibility property holds if no agent has
incentives to report signal diﬀerent from her type. In the
other words, the incentive compatibility property holds,
if no agent has incentives to report untruthful oﬀer. Mech-
anism is individually rational, if no agent loses from
participation in such mechanism. Such property is also
called the voluntary participation property. The voluntary
participation property means that if agent loses she can
choose not to participate in given mechanism. Results of
the mechanism are Pareto-eﬃcient, if we can not improve
results (i.e., payment) for one agent without making re-
sults for some other agents worse oﬀ. In the other words,
mechanism results are Pareto-eﬃcient if such a results
are not Pareto-dominated by other results. Mechanism has
balanced budget if sum of sellers expenses is equal to
sum of buyers incomes. In the other words, mechanism is
budget balanced, if there is no need to surcharge mech-
anism, and the mechanism does not give us additional
proﬁts.
The most desired mechanism should fulﬁll all listed prop-
erties. However, several theorems [3]–[5] (so called im-
possibility theorems) states, that it is impossible that single
mechanism holds all properties. Therefore, we need to de-
cide for the subset of desired mechanism properties, which
should hold for considered mechanisms.
In the following parts of the paper, we introduce and com-
pare two mechanisms for the bandwidth trade problems.
These mechanisms are Pareto-eﬃcient, individually ratio-
nal and incentive compatible. However, we allow for the
lack of budget balance.
3. Mechanisms Review
Many papers deal with the bandwidth trade problems. We
will describe a number of them using the mechanism theory
terminology.
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In this section we review the variety of bandwidth trading
mechanisms presented in the literature. There are three
classes of such approaches:
– simultaneous, single link auctions [6], [7] – here we
discuss the most recent mechanism MIDAS [6];
– combinatorial auctions [8], [9], with the c-SeBiDA
combinatorial double auction as a good representa-
tive;
– the family of multicommodity market models (M3 ),
with basic BCBT market model [10].
3.1. Simultaneous, Single Link Auctions
In the simultaneous, separate auctions for individual links
an agent that wants to buy a certain path must put simul-
taneous bids at all relevant auctions. Then special, itera-
tive mechanisms are required to coordinate individual links.
This aspect, as well as possible suboptimality are the main
roots of our criticisms for these methods. The review of
the auction mechanisms dealing with the problem of coor-
dination of simultaneous, single link auctions is presented
in [6]. Authors point out several drawbacks of already pro-
posed mechanism, such as the convergence problem and
lack of incentive for submitting truthful bids. In the [6]
the simultaneous multi-unit Dutch auction one for each
link mechanism (MIDAS) is proposed. The allocation rule
of the MIDAS derives from the generalized Vickrey auc-
tion [11], but is carried out by the simultaneous Dutch auc-
tions. The payment rule of the mechanism is equivalent to
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment rule. However, we have to
remember that incentive compatibility property is satisﬁed
only when allocation rule is eﬃcient, which is not always
true in the case of MIDAS mechanism. Thus, even thought
the mechanism may seem to be simple and scalable, the
complicated synchronization, that requires full information
makes it impractical in our opinion.
3.2. Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions are designed for trading on depen-
dent commodities. One particular auction model that ap-
pears in the context of bandwidth market is the combi-
natorial seller’s bid double auctions (c-SeBiDA) [8]. The
c-SeBiDA considers two types of commodities: inter-node
links and paths consisting of particular links. Agents may
bid a single link or a bundle of links constituting spe-
ciﬁc path. Allocation rule ensures that the same indivis-
ible amount of bandwidth is assigned to all links consti-
tuting buyers path, thus a buyer has no risk of buying dif-
ferent amount of bandwidth on some required links. The
c-SeBiDA auction has several valuable properties, such as
the maximization of the global economic wealth. How-
ever, similarly to the approaches concerning on simultane-
ous auctions, buyers bids must specify the particular links
that constitute a desired path. This may lead to welfare in-
eﬃciency. Welfare ineﬃciency corresponds to a situation
where the social welfare obtained is not maximum possi-
ble to reach – we can imagine the allocation rule, which
allocates resources in a better way.
The c-SeBiDA mechanism is individually rational. Its re-
sults are Pareto-eﬃcient and it has balanced budget. How-
ever, such a mechanism does not hold incentive compati-
bility property – particular agents can derive unreasonable
proﬁts from this mechanism.
3.3. Multicommodity Market Models
In the multicommodity auction models, the eﬃcient mar-
ket balance is obtained in the eﬀect of joint optimization
of many elementary buy and sell oﬀers. Multicommodity
means that market entities can trade with bundles (pack-
ages) of diﬀerent commodities. The balancing communi-
cation bandwidth trade (BCBT) model proposed in [10]
allows bidders to place buy oﬀers not only for bundled
links, but rather for end-to-end connections. Therefore, no
buyer does not have to know which links to choose to best
allocate the demanded capacity. It is the decision model
that allocates the most eﬃcient links to paths.
We assume that the communication network consists of
nodes connected by links. The inter-node link represents
a network resource (bandwidth), that can be an elementary
commodity oﬀered for sale on the bandwidth market. How-
ever, network resources being traded can be more complex
and can be composed of many parallel links, or end-to-end
node connections represented by paths or subnetworks.
Each buy oﬀer concerns a point-to-point bandwidth con-
nection between a pair of speciﬁed locations in a commu-
nication network. The locations form the set of network
nodes V . The connections (and links) are unidirectional,
i.e., they have source and sink nodes.
The objective of BCBT model is the maximization of total
economic welfare Eq. (1), which is the total surplus of all
buyers and sellers. Constraints (2) and (3) set upper and
lower bounds on particular network links (xe) and partic-
ular end-to-end network demands (xd). The non-negative
variable xed constraint (4) is interpreted as a bandwidth
capacity allocated to network link e to serve end-to-end
demand d. Also, the sum of capacities allocated to all
network demands ∑d∈D xed served by particular network
link e, should not exceed the realization xe of the link con-
straint (5). Finally, the sum of all capacities, provided with
incidence matrix ave, allocated to all network links, serving
particular network demand, should not exceed the realiza-
tion of the end-to-end demand xd Eq. (6):
ˆQ = max
(
∑
d∈D
Edxd − ∑
e∈E
Sexe
)
, (1)
subject to:
0 ≤ xd ≤ hd , ∀d ∈D , (2)
0 ≤ xe ≤ ye, ∀e ∈ E , (3)
∑
d∈D
xed ≤ xe, ∀e ∈ E , (4)
0 ≤ xed , ∀e ∈ E , ∀d ∈D , (5)
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∑
e∈E
avexed =


xd v = sd
0 v 6= sd ,td
−xd v = td
,∀v ∈ V ,∀d ∈D , (6)
where:
indices:
d ∈D buy oﬀers – demands for bandwidth,
v ∈ V network nodes,
e ∈ E sell oﬀers – network resources;
parameters:
ave = 1 if link e originates in node v,
=−1 if e terminates in node v,
= 0 otherwise,
sd source node for demand d,
td sink node for demand d,
hd required capacity of demand d,
Ed oﬀered unit price for demand d,
ye oﬀered capacity of network link e,
Se oﬀered unit price for network link e;
variables:
xed bandwidth ﬂow serving demand d allocated to net-
work link e,
xd contracted bandwidth capacity for demand d,
xe contracted bandwidth capacity for network link e.
The xe and xd are, respectively, values of realized band-
width on the link e and on the demand d. They are also
the accepted oﬀers for link e and demand d – in the BCBT
model sell oﬀers correspond network links and buy oﬀers
correspond demand paths resulting in a multigraph.
As stated before, we will identify oﬀerers with agents, and
the submitted oﬀers with signals send to mechanism. Be-
cause single oﬀer relates to single link or single path, we
can identify the oﬀers with the network resources. Thus,
let us deﬁne the set of agents as the sum of the sets
I = E ∪D . Also let us deﬁne the signal θi sent by the
ith agent as the tuple: oﬀered price and oﬀered capacity.
When ith agent represents bandwidth seller, such tuple is
equal to θi =< Si,yi >, otherwise such tuple is equal to
θi =< Ei,hi >. Also the allocation results we will denote
as x = (x1, · · · ,xi, · · · ,xn).
Let us note that the BCBT model does not deﬁne any pric-
ing rule, it deﬁnes only allocation rule. So we will treat
the BCBT model as the allocation rule. This also applies
to other bandwidth trade models from the BCBT family.
Therefore, we need to propose the pricing rules to the base
BCBT allocation rule. As the result we obtain two market
mechanisms presented in the next sections.
4. Analyzed Pricing Rules
As we stated before, we analyze and compare two pricing
rules in the context of bandwidth trade. These rules are the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) rule (mechanism) and the
parametric pricing rule (PPR).
4.1. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Pricing Rule
VCG pricing rule – or rather VCG mechanism was intro-
duced in the papers [12]–[14]. VCG mechanism does not
deﬁne allocation rule, it only states that applying VCG pric-
ing rule to eﬃcient allocation rule creates VCG mechanism.
An allocation rule is said to be eﬃcient if it maximizes
“social welfare”, treated as the aggregation of particular
agents’ utility functions. Thus, the BCBT is an eﬃcient
allocation rule.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume, that every agent
submits one oﬀer. VCG pricing rule sets payoﬀ for every
agent. Payoﬀ for ith agent is deﬁned as the opportunity
cost that the presence of ith agent introduces to all other
agents.
Set of agents sends a vector of signals θ = (θ1, · · · ,θn)
to the mechanism. Let us deﬁne vector θ−i =(θ1, · · · ,θi−1,
θi+1, · · · ,θn), which contains the set of all signals but sig-
nal θi. The Q(θ ) is the economic welfare obtained by the
allocation rule with all the signals θ . The Q(θ−i) is the
economic welfare, obtained by the allocation rule without
ith signal. So, the payment for ith agent is equal to:
Ii = Q(θ )−Q(θ−i) (7)
We can determine prices for each agent (if her oﬀer is
accepted). If the agent i submitted the selling oﬀer, the
price for her is equal to Eq. (8), otherwise, the buying
price for ith agent is equal to Eq. (9). Prices for agents
which oﬀers were rejected are negligible.
piSi =
Sixi + Ii
xi
, (8)
piKi =
Eixi− Ii
xi
. (9)
Applying the VCG pricing rule to the BCBT allocation
rule results in the VCG mechanism. Properties of such
mechanism are as follows: it fulﬁlls incentive compatibil-
ity property, results of the mechanism are Pareto-eﬃcient,
individual rationality is also fulﬁlled. Unfortunately, there
is a lack of budget balance.
4.2. Parametric Pricing Rule
Second considered pricing rule is the parametric pricing
rule [15]. This rule sets prices accordingly to modiﬁed
Vickrey double auction (MVDA) [16]. The MVDA mecha-
nism was designed for double auction with indivisible com-
modities. It sets the diﬀerentiated buying and selling prices
in such a way, that there is no agent, which has incentives
to deviate from her type.
Parametric pricing rule uses parametric analysis performed
in the respect to the mathematical model of the allocation
rule. Parametric analysis is based on repeatedly performed
sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis also is performed
in the respect to the mathematical model of the allocation
rule. Sensitivity analysis provides us with results, which
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tell us how much the ith oﬀer price can be changed without
changing the commodities allocation. Let us denote results
performed in step κ of parametric analysis as s(κ),+ for the
selling prices, and as e(κ),− for the buying prices.
Given ith price (for the sake of simplicity let us assume
that it is selling price) is increased of the value s(κ),+i + ε
(where 0 < ε ≪ 1). Afterwards, the allocation model is
solved again and the allocation of the commodities changes.
Particular steps of parametric analysis set more beneﬁcial
price for ith oﬀer, nevertheless accepted volume of ith oﬀer
decreases. The analysis is performed until given ith oﬀer is
rejected. On the basis of ith oﬀer price in the last step (let
us denote the number of the last step by κ∗) the individual
price (piSi or pi
K
i ) for such oﬀer is set.
Parametric pricing rule sets individual prices for each of-
fer. Combined with the BCBT allocation rule constitutes
a mechanism. This mechanism fulﬁlls incentive compat-
ibility property, its results are Pareto-eﬃcient, individual
rationality is also fulﬁlled.
Selling prices set by the parametric pricing rule are not
lesser than buying prices. Thus the budget balance property
does not hold for mechanisms with the parametric pricing
rule.
4.3. Imbalance Reduction
We propose the algorithm to reduce the budget imbalance.
The main idea of this algorithm is to change the stop cri-
terion of the parametric pricing rule. Stop criterion of the
parametric rule generally implies that the parametric anal-
ysis will be carried out until the rejection of given oﬀer.
We propose change of the stop criterion – the analysis will
be carried out until given oﬀer is proﬁtable:
Ii = xi(piSi −S0i ) ∀i∈E , (10)
Ii = xi(E0i −pi
K
i ) ∀i∈D. (11)
However, to perform such algorithm modiﬁcation, we have
to calculate proﬁt for every agent. Equations (10) and (11)
represent the proﬁt of agents. Let us notice, that the rules to
calculate the proﬁts, need to know agents’ types. However,
in the previous sections we have assumed that types are
private knowledge of particular agents. Nevertheless, we
can assume that required value of S0i or E0i (prices that
correspond to the agents’ types) belongs to certain intervals.
Such intervals can be determined on the basis of expert and
common knowledge, historical data, etc. Therefore, let us
assume that these values belong to the following intervals
S0i ∈< S0i ,S
0
i > and E0i ∈< E0i ,E
0
i >.
The main idea of the algorithm for improve the budget
balance is to limit price for particular participants. Lim-
itation of price shall be made by reducing the number of
steps of the parametric analysis. The algorithm retains good
mechanism properties: incentive compatibility, individual
rationality and Pareto-eﬃciency, and reduces the budget
imbalance.
5. Experimental Studies
First, on the simple case study, we show diﬀerences and
similarities between the VCG and the PPR pricing rules.
Next, we present a series of experiments. Such experi-
ments focus on three networks from the SNDlib [17] repos-
itory. On such experiments we compare the imbalance
measure.
5.1. Simple Case Study
The simple case study was performed on the exemplary
four-node network (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Four-node network. Solid lines represent links, dotted
lines represent demands. The notation is following: o:v/p, where
o means oﬀer ID, v means oﬀered bandwidth volume and p means
oﬀer price for unit of the bandwidth.
In Table 1 we can see prices, set by the mechanisms ap-
plying parametric rule and the VCG pricing rule, to particu-
lar agents. We can also see results of allocation rule. Some
of prices are the same for VCG and PPR, some prices are
greater for VCG, some are greater for PPR, nevertheless all
the prices are very similar.
Both mechanisms (applying the parametric pricing rule and
applying the VCG pricing rule) do not meet the budget bal-
ance property. To compare such mechanisms, we propose
the measure – relative budget imbalance ratio Eq. (12).
Proposed measure reﬂects the degree of non-compliance
with budget balance property. The SI is the total seller’s
incomes SI = ∑i∈E Sixi, the BE is the total buyer’s expenses
BE = ∑i∈D Eixi:
RBUT =
SI−BE
SI + BE
. (12)
Relative budget imbalance ratio for the mechanism applying
the parametric pricing rule is equal RBUT = 3.79%, and
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Table 1
Prices comparison for mechanisms applying the parametric pricing rule and VCG pricing rule
Oﬀer Oﬀered vol. Acc. vol. Oﬀer price VCG
Comp.
PPR
Nodes e Se ye xe piSe piSe
– [Mbit/s] [Euro/Mbit/s]
s1 5 2 21 22 = 22
A-B s2 7 7 19 21.57 > 21
s3 4 4 14 21.25 > 21
A-D s4 6 6 20 32.50 > 32
s5 3 3 22 32 = 32
B-D s6 10 6 11 13.33 < 14
B-C s7 7 7 29 30.54 < 31
s8 8 0 32 – –
s9 7 7 17 19.57 < 20
D-C s10 8 8 13 19.75 < 20
s11 5 0 21 – -
d Ed hd xd piKd piKd
– [Mbit/s] [Euro/Mbit/s]
b1 10 10 60 49.80 < 50
A-C b2 15 7 50 47.17 > 47
b3 5 5 70 50 = 50
b4 10 0 40 – –
Fig. 2. Network instances [17]: (a) Polska; (b) dfn-bwin; (c) nobel-us.
for the mechanism applying the VCG pricing rule is equal
to RBUT = 3.64% (see Table 1). We can see, that the
measure is slightly better for mechanism applying the VCG
pricing rule.
5.2. Series of Experiments
Three series of experiments were performed, each con-
tained ten experiments. The experiments concern band-
width trading performed on the networks taken from the
SNDlib library [17]. We analyzed following network in-
stances: Polska, dfn-bwin and nobel-us (Fig. 2). We gen-
erated oﬀers for particular network resources (links and
demands). Oﬀer prices for particular links and demands
was generated on the basis of absolute value of normal
distribution, where mean of the distribution was equal to
distance between end-to-end nodes. The maximal accepted
Table 2
Aggregated relative budget imbalance for the series of
experiments performed on the three backbone networks
Agg. measure VCG PPR
Polska
min 0.28 0.37
RBUT mean 0.33 0.45
max 0.44 0.53
dfn-bwin
min 0.35 0.59
RBUT mean 0.43 0.65
max 0.47 0.73
nobel-us
min 0.34 0.46
RBUT mean 0.38 0.52
max 0.40 0.61
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trade volumes were generated from absolute value of nor-
mal distribution.
In Table 2 we can see aggregated results of the experi-
ments. As we can see, for analyzed cases, the mean value
of the relative budget imbalance is lesser for the VCG pric-
ing rule. Thus, we can state, that the VCG pricing rule
is better than the parametric pricing rule in terms of the
imbalance measure.
6. Summary
In the paper we have analyzed two pricing rules in the
context of the balancing communication bandwidth trade
allocation rule. These pricing rules are the VCG pric-
ing rule and the parametric pricing rule. Both rules have
good properties for multicommodity exchange with infras-
tructure constraints, speciﬁcally for the bandwidth trade.
Both pricing rules have cost for adopting, which results
from budget imbalance. The experiments show, that for
the given data, budget imbalance measure is better for the
VCG pricing rule.
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Paper Bandwidth Trading:
A Comparison of the Combinatorial
and Multicommodity Approach
Kamil Kołtyś, Piotr Pałka, Eugeniusz Toczyłowski, and Izabela Żółtowska
Abstract—Since the telecommunication market becomes more
complex and dynamic, a strong need for a new, eﬃcient and
ﬂexible bandwidth trading mechanisms appears. We believe
that good mechanisms, that allow eﬀective and fair allocation
of bandwidth between market participants will help to de-
velop the real competitive bandwidth market. In this paper we
compare two diﬀerent double-sided bandwidth auction mech-
anisms, that seem to be well suited approaches for trading in-
divisible units of bandwidth: combinatorial auction c-SeBiDA
and multicommodity mechanism BACBR-I. The c-SeBiDA
mechanism considers two types of commodities: inter-node
links and paths consisting of particular links. Market partici-
pants may bid a single link, or a bundle of links, constituting
a speciﬁc path. The BACBR-I mechanism is a multicommod-
ity exchange model, that allows bidders to place buy oﬀers not
only for individual or bundled links, but rather for end-to-end
connections. Therefore, it is the decision model that allocates
the most eﬃcient links to connections. We run a large set of
experiments to test the allocation and computational eﬃciency
obtained under both approaches.
Keywords—bandwidth allocation, combinatorial auction, com-
putational efficiency, indivisible resources, multicommodity
trade.
1. Introduction
We consider a multilateral network resources market. The
market is supplied by many participants such as compa-
nies laying cables, network providers and other telecom-
munication link owners. The customers of the market are
service providers (ISP, ASP, etc.), geographically spread or-
ganization and also network providers who want to expand
their network coverage. We assume that sellers oﬀer sin-
gle telecommunication links and buyers want to purchase
bandwidth between two nodes that may not necessarily be
directly connected by single link. Requirement of trading
end-to-end connections makes the allocation problem com-
binatorial, because bandwidth demand can be realized by
several network links.
After the debacle of Enron Broadband Services in fall
2001 the development of organized market for bandwidth
slowed down. Currently, the dominating form of band-
width trading are bilateral agreements in which two par-
ticipants negotiate the contract terms. The negotiations are
complex, nontransparent and time consuming. This form
of bandwidth trading requires a business relationships and
often it is ineﬃcient both globally and individually (espe-
cially for participants that have not relevant business rela-
tionships). The buyer that wants to purchase bandwidth be-
tween two nodes connected by a sequence of links owned
by diﬀerent providers must independently negotiate with
all of them. If the negotiation fails with one of them
(whereas agreements with other sellers would be drawn
up and signed), the buyer will get useless bandwidth as
it will not ensure the connection between selected nodes.
Also even if the buyer manage to purchase bandwidth along
some path connecting chosen nodes, there is a risk that
this path would not be the cheapest one from all existing
paths between this nodes. Thus there is a need of designing
more sophisticated market mechanisms that will not have
such severe drawbacks that are involved with bilateral
agreements. Lately analysis of bandwidth market collapse
in 2001 gives promise of emerging new forms of band-
width trading in the future thanks to especially technologies
like global managed private line (GMPLS) and automatic
switched optical network/automatic switched transport
network (ASON/ASTN) [1], [2].
In this paper we focus on auction based market mecha-
nisms. We analyze two bandwidth auctions: combinatorial
sellers’ bid double auction (c-SeBiDA) [3] and model for
balancing aggregated communication bandwidth resources
with indivisible constraint (BACBR-I) that is an exten-
sion of balancing aggregated communication bandwidth re-
sources (BACBR) model [4]. Our aim is to compare the
allocation and computational eﬃciency of aforementioned
mechanisms. In Section 2 we present considered mecha-
nisms in terms of general properties of auction and the ap-
plied approach of supporting end-to-end connection trad-
ing. In Section 3 we formulate mathematical models of
c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I. Section 4 contains experimental
results. Section 5 summarizes our ﬁndings.
2. Bandwidth Auction Properties
2.1. General Properties
There are diﬀerent types of auctions. The c-SeBiDA and
BACBR-I mechanisms can be classiﬁed according to the
auction taxonomy presented in [5] as single-round, socially
eﬃcient and double-sided auction of indivisible goods.
Single-round auction are conducted in a single step. Band-
width market participants submit their oﬀers and the auc-
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Fig. 1. Diﬀerent types of supporting end-to-end connection trading: (a) network topology; (b) explicit single path speciﬁcation;
(c) explicit set of admissible paths speciﬁcation; (d) implicit all possible path speciﬁcation.
tion mechanism determine an allocation. Other type of
auction is progressive one that is carried out in rounds.
Progressive auction of bandwidth is proposed in [6].
Double-sided auction concerns multilateral exchange. It
can be applied on the bandwidth market where there are
many sellers and many buyers. Models for one-sided band-
width auction (with one seller and many buyers) can be
found in [5]–[7].
Auction is socially eﬃcient when it aims at maximizing
social welfare. Social eﬃciency is usually a goal of market
mechanisms for bandwidth trading, especially for double-
sided auctions. In case of one-sided bandwidth auction
also other goals are taken into account, i.e. maximization
of seller’s revenue [5], [6].
Indivisible goods are integral and cannot be exchanged par-
tially. Bandwidth may be treated as indivisible (modular)
commodity. In real networks links often consist of modules
that refer to speciﬁc transmission and encoding or framing
schemes. This modules have determined capacity, i.e., T1 –
1.52 Mbit/s, E1 – 2.04 Mbit/s, OC-3 – 155.52 Mbit/s [8].
Above data transfer standards tend to form standardized
contracts on bandwidth market that also use pre-speciﬁed
amounts of bandwidth [9]. However there are market mech-
anisms that assume that bandwidth is available in any real
fraction of Mbit/s [7], [10].
2.2. Supporting End-to-End Connection Trading
In case of bandwidth auction the essential property is how
it supports end-to-end connections trading. We can distin-
guish three approaches: explicit single path speciﬁcation,
explicit set of admissible paths speciﬁcation, implicit all
possible path speciﬁcation. All this approaches are illus-
trated in Fig. 1. Consider network presented in Fig. 1(a)
and suppose that buyer wants to purchase bandwidth be-
tween nodes A and C. This end-to-end connection has three
possible realizations by following sequences of links: L1–
L3, L2–L4 and L1–L5–L4.
The ﬁrst way of supporting end-to-end connection trading
relies on explicitly specifying a single path that connects
selected nodes. In considered example it can be a path
L1–L3 (see Fig. 1(b)). The mechanism should guarantee
that the same amount of bandwidth will be allocated at
link L1 and L2. This approach is employed by the
c-SeBiDA that enables the buyer to submit oﬀer concerning
bundle of links constituting particular path. Thus c-SeBiDA
is a combinatorial auction. However, explicit single path
speciﬁcation can be also implemented in diﬀerent manner,
i.e., by simultaneous multi-unit dutch auctions [6].
The second approach is more ﬂexible than the ﬁrst one be-
cause it enables to specify a set of admissible paths that
can be used to realize end-to-end connection. In consid-
ered example buyer may stipulate two paths L1–L3 and
L2–L4 (see Fig. 1(c)). The mechanism may allocate dif-
ferent amount of bandwidth at each path, i.e., 90% of de-
manded bandwidth at path L1–L3 and the rest 10% at path
L2–L4, but the summary bandwidth allocated at all paths
must be not greater than the buyer’s demand. This way
of supporting end-to-end connection trading is proposed
in [5], [7].
The last approach is the most ﬂexible from the buyer point
of view as it enables implicitly speciﬁcation of all possible
paths by submitting oﬀer directly at pair of nodes posing
the source and target of end-to-end connection. In con-
sidered example, buyer speciﬁes in the oﬀer only source
and target of end-to-end connection – appropriately nodes
A and C (see Fig. 1(d)). The mechanism itself decides
which links are used for realizing this demand. The end-
to-end connection between nodes A and C may be realized
by several sequence of links, i.e., 40% of demanded band-
width is served by L1–L3, 50% by L2–L4 and 10% by
L1–L5–L4. The BACBR-I applies this approach. It deﬁnes
two types of commodities: links that are oﬀered for sale and
end-to-end connections which are the subject of demand.
The buyer that submits an oﬀer for end-to-end connection
gets bandwidth at links that generally pose a ﬂow between
two selected nodes.
2.3. Auction Rules
Auction mechanism speciﬁes information that market par-
ticipants must include in their oﬀers. This information is
leveraged by two rules of mechanism: allocation rule and
pricing rule. Allocation rule decides which oﬀers are ac-
cepted. Pricing rule deﬁnes the buyers’ charges and sellers’
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incomes. Both this rules are necessary for clearing the
market.
The c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I are single-round, socially ef-
ﬁcient and double-sided auction of bandwidth considered
as indivisible good. The essential diﬀerence between this
two mechanisms is in the way of supporting trading end-
to-end connections. Our goal is to study how this diﬀerent
approaches aﬀects allocation and computational eﬃciency
of this mechanism. Thus further we analyze only allocation
rule of considered mechanisms because it is the one that im-
plements the method of end-to-end connection trading and
responds for determining optimal value of the social wel-
fare. Nonetheless, it is worth to mention that pricing rule
also aﬀects mechanism eﬃciency as it decides if mecha-
nism gives incentives for truthful bidding. Here we assume
that market participants are truthful, so the allocation rule
is maximizing substantial social welfare.
3. Mathematical Models
3.1. Notation
The c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I allocation rules can be formu-
lated as mixed integer linear problems. Below we present
notation used in both mathematical programming models:
sets:
B buy oﬀers,
S sell oﬀers,
E network links,
S(e) sell oﬀers concerning link e ∈ E , S(e)⊆ S,
D end-to-end connections1,
B(d) buy oﬀers concerning end-to-end connection d ∈D,
B(d)⊆ B1,
V network nodes1
parameters:
zmaxm maximum units of bandwidth oﬀered for purchase
according to buy oﬀer m ∈ B,
Em unit price of buy oﬀer m ∈ B,
zmaxl maximum units of bandwidth oﬀered for sale ac-
cording to sell oﬀer l ∈ S,
Sl unit price of sell oﬀer l ∈ S,
bem = 1 if link e ∈ E belongs to bundle for which buy
oﬀer m ∈ B is submitted,
= 0 otherwise2,
Md indivisible unit size of end-to-end connection
d ∈D1,
Me indivisible unit size of link e ∈ E1,
ave = 1 if node v ∈V is source of link e ∈ E ,
=−1 if node v ∈V is target of e ∈ E ,
= 0 otherwise1,
sd source of end-to-end connection d ∈ D1,
td target of end-to-end connection d ∈ D1;
1 Only relevant to BACBR-I model.
2 Only relevant to c-SeBiDA model.
variables:
zm realization of buy oﬀer m ∈ B,
zl realization of sell oﬀer l ∈ S,
xed bandwidth ﬂow serving end-to-end connection
d ∈ D allocated to network link e ∈ E1.
Both c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I collect all buy (B) and sell
(S) oﬀers. They require that each buy oﬀer m ∈ B con-
tains the maximum buy unit price Em and the maximum
units of bandwidth oﬀered for purchase zmaxm . Similarly
each sell oﬀer l ∈ S has to include the minimum sell unit
price Sl and the maximum units of bandwidth oﬀered for
sale zmaxl . According to this two parameters of submitted
oﬀers considered mechanisms determine the optimal allo-
cation speciﬁed by variables zm and zl .
3.2. The c-SeBiDA Model
The c-SeBiDA model assumes that sell and buy oﬀers con-
cern network links (E). Sell oﬀer regards single link. For
each link many sell oﬀers can be submitted (S(e)). Buy of-
fer is combinatorial and it regards bundle of links (deﬁned
by parameters bem).
The mathematical model of the c-SeBiDA is following:
ˆQ = max
(
∑
m∈B
Emzm−∑
l∈S
Slzl
)
, (1)
0≤ zm ≤ zmaxm , ∀m∈B , (2)
0≤ zl ≤ zmaxl , ∀l∈S , (3)
zm ∈ Z, ∀m∈B , (4)
∑
m∈B
bemzm ≤ ∑
l∈S(e)
zl , ∀e∈E . (5)
The aim of c-SeBiDA is maximizing social welfare. Thus
objective function is deﬁned by Eq. (1), where ˆQ denotes
optimal value of social welfare. First two constraints (2)
and (3) set lower and upper bounds of buy and sell oﬀers
realizations, respectively. Next constraint (4) ensures that
buy oﬀer realization is integral. Sell oﬀers realization will
be integral due to constraint (5) which assure that aggre-
gated demand for link is not greater than aggregated supply
of bandwidth for that link. More details about c-SeBiDA
can be found in [3].
3.3. The BACBR-I Model
The BACBR-I model considers two types of commodities:
network links (E) and end-to-end connections (D). Each
link and end-to-end connection has predeﬁned module size
in which its bandwidth can be traded (respectively, Me and
Md parameters). Sell oﬀer regards single link and for each
link many sell oﬀers can be submitted (S(e)). Buy oﬀer
concerns single end-to-end connection and for each con-
nection many buy oﬀers can be submitted (B(d)). Because
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Fig. 2. Network topologies [11]: (a) network sun; (b) network janos-us; (c) network giul39.
BACBR-I itself chooses the links that realize particular end-
to-end connection (xed), it must have an information about
network topology. Thus, a set of network nodes (V ) and
incidence matrix elements (ave) are given. Also for end-
to-end connections source (sd) and target (td) nodes are
speciﬁed.
The mathematical model of the BACBR-I is following:
ˆQ = max
(
∑
m∈B
Emzm−∑
l∈S
Slzl
)
, (6)
0≤ zm ≤ zmaxm , ∀m∈B , (7)
0≤ zl ≤ zmaxl , ∀l∈S , (8)
zm ∈ Z, ∀m∈B , (9)
zl ∈ Z, ∀l∈S , (10)
∑
d∈D
xed ≤ ∑
l∈S(e)
Mezl , ∀e∈E (11)
0 ≤ xed , ∀e∈E,d∈D (12)
∑
e∈E
avexed =


∑
m∈B(d)
Mdzm v = sd
0 v 6= sd ,td
− ∑
m∈B(d)
Mdzm v = td
, ∀v∈V,d∈D (13)
First four equations in BACBR-I model Eqs. (6)–(9) are
the same as in the c-SeBiDA. It stems from the fact that
BACBR-I also maximizes social welfare and restricts oﬀers
realizations according to their maximum volumes. Con-
straint (10) imposes that sell oﬀer realization is integral.
Next two constraints ensure that total bandwidth ﬂow at
particular link will not be greater than aggregated realiza-
tions of sell oﬀers concerning this link, constraint (11) and
that bandwidth ﬂow at all links will be non-negative, con-
straint (12). Equation (12) is a ﬂow conservation constraint
that must be met for each end-to-end connection.
Comparing above models, both of them maximize social
welfare on the basis of submitted oﬀers that contain unit
price and maximum volume. Both models treat bandwidth
as indivisible good and support trading end-to-end connec-
tions. The BACBR-I and c-SeBiDA diﬀers in the way of
supporting end-to-end connection trading. Moreover, the
BACBR-I is more comprehensive than c-SeBiDA, as it en-
ables trading network resources consisting of modules with
diﬀerent size.
4. Experimental Studies
4.1. Test Instances
Experimental studies have been conducted on several
test instances which are based on data from survivable
network design library (SNDlib) available on the web
site [11]. Although the SNDlib is a set of survivable ﬁxed
telecommunication network design problems, it provides
information that is very important in bandwidth trading
problems: network topology and a set of end-to-end con-
nections. We consider three networks from SNDlib: sun,
janos-us and giul39. Topologies of this networks are pre-
sented in Fig. 2. Table 1 contains the number of nodes,
links and end-to-end connections for each considered
network.
Table 1
Information about size of considered networks
Network Nodes Links
End-to-end
connections
sun 27 102 67
janos-us 26 84 650
giul39 39 172 1471
Bandwidth allocation test instance besides aforementioned
data requires speciﬁcation of oﬀers that are submitted for
network resources. Oﬀers have been generated according
to the following rules:
– summarized bandwidth oﬀered for sale (purchase) at
link (end-to-end connection) equals the link capac-
ity (end-to-end connection demand value) given by
SNDlib;
– unit price of oﬀer concerning link (end-to-end con-
nection) is determined on the basis of the distance
between nodes connected by this link (end-to-end
connection) and some random factor that is used to
diﬀerentiate prices of oﬀers regarding the same link
(end-to-end connection).
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So also some other data from SNDlib such as nodes co-
ordinates (used to calculate distance between nodes), links
capacities, end-to-end connections demands come in use-
ful for preparing test instances of bandwidth allocation
problem.
For each network three oﬀer variants have been gener-
ated with diﬀerent average number of oﬀers submitted for
single link or end-to-end connection, respectively, 2, 4
and 6 oﬀers per link or end-to-end connection. In all, nine
test instances of bandwidth allocation problem have been
prepared. All of them have been adjusted to the c-SeBiDA
mechanism in which buy oﬀers are submitted not for end-
to-end connections, but for bundles of links. For each buy
oﬀer a sequence of links has to be speciﬁed that realizes
suitable end-to-end connection. As a realization of end-to-
end connection we choose randomly one of the three least
expensive path realizations. Because end-to-end connec-
tion realization aﬀects the social welfare obtained by the
c-SeBiDA, we consider ﬁve variations of each test instance
in which buy oﬀers are submitted for diﬀerent sequence of
links realizing particular end-to-end connection. All test in-
stances have been implemented in multicommodity market
data model (M3 ) [12].
4.2. Allocation Efficiency
The comparison of allocation eﬃciency obtained by both
c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I mechanisms in all test instances
is given in Table 2. Test instance is identiﬁed by network
name and average number of oﬀers submitted for single
link or end-to-end connection. Table 2 does not contain
Table 2
Comparison of c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I allocation
eﬃciency
Network Oﬀers BACBR-I
c-SeBiDA
max avg. min
sun
2 1 0.77 0.75 0.73
4 1 0.77 0.72 0.65
6 1 0.83 0.81 0.81
janos-us
2 1 0.84 0.8 0.77
4 1 0.85 0.82 0.79
6 1 0.86 0.84 0.81
giul39
2 1 0.8 0.79 0.79
4 1 0.78 0.78 0.77
6 1 0.82 0.81 0.81
the numerical values of social welfare achieved by both
mechanisms, but only the relation between them assum-
ing that social welfare determined by BACBR-I equals 1.
Because in case of the c-SeBiDA mechanism we analyze
ﬁve diﬀerent variations of bundles of links generated for
buy oﬀers the maximium, average and minimum social wel-
fare obtained by this mechanism in proportion to BACBR-I
optimal allocation is presented.
Allocation eﬃciency of the c-SeBiDA is on average about
80% of BACBR-I allocation eﬃciency. In the best case
social welfare achieved by c-SeBiDA accounts for 86% of
social welfare determined BACBR-I. In case of network
sun with 4 oﬀers per single link or end-to-end connection
on average the c-SeBiDA obtains only 65% of social wel-
fare provided by BACBR-I.
4.3. Computational Efficiency
Table 3 presents information about number of variables and
constraints of mathematical models related to particular
mechanism and test instance identiﬁed by network name
and average number of oﬀers submitted for single link or
Table 3
Number of variables (var.) and constraints (con.) in
c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I mathematical models
Network Oﬀers
BACBR-I c-SeBiDA
var. con. var. con.
sun
2 7169 2581 335 772
4 7515 3273 681 1464
6 7864 3971 1030 2162
janos-us
2 56052 19888 1452 2988
4 57606 22996 3006 6096
6 59016 25816 4416 8916
giul39
2 256280 64077 3268 6708
4 259589 70695 6577 13326
6 262858 77233 9846 19864
end-to-end connection. The BACBR-I mathematical model
has more variables and constraints than the c-SeBiDA
model. The diﬀerence is substantial for the largest network
giul39 with average 2 oﬀers per link or end-to-end connec-
tion. In this test instance the BACBR-I model has about
80 and 10 times more variables and constraints, respec-
tively, than the c-SeBiDA model.
The comparison of computational eﬃciency of c-SeBiDA
and BACBR-I is given in Table 4. The table presents the
time of solving mixed-integer linear programming prob-
Table 4
Comparison of c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I
allocation time [s]
Network Oﬀers BACBR-I c-SeBiDA
sun
2 0.7 0.02
4 0.89 0.02
6 0.92 0.02
janos-us
2 15.8 0.05
4 15.93 0.03
6 14.19 0.07
giul39
2 499.01 0.05
4 526.39 0.09
6 512.71 0.17
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lems related to considered test instances. Optimization has
been performed by CPLEX 9.1 on computer with processor
Intel Core2 Duo T8100 2.1 GHz, main memory 3 GB and
32-bit operating system MS Vista.
The BACBR-I mechanism requires more time than
c-SeBiDA to determine optimal allocation. It is meaningful
in case of the largest network giul39, for which BACBR-I
model must ﬁnd optimal allocation of links bandwidth for
great number of end-to-end connections. Complexity of
this task is reﬂected by the large number of variables and
constraints of the BACBR-I model. It is worth noting that
the allocation time of both mechanism is not rising a lot
with increase of average number of oﬀers submitted for
single link or end-to-end connection.
5. Summary
This paper compares two single-round, socially eﬃcient
and double-sided auctions of indivisible network resources
that represents diﬀerent approaches of supporting end-to-
end connection trading. The c-SeBiDA is a combinatorial
auction that requires explicit single path speciﬁcation pos-
ing realization of particular end-to-end connection. The
BACBR-I enables submitting buy oﬀers for pair of nodes
that are the source and target of end-to-end connection.
The former mechanism requires that buyer knows a network
topology and chooses appropriate links. Explicit bundle of
links speciﬁcation in buy oﬀers aﬀects allocation eﬃciency
of the c-SeBiDA which provides on average 20% less so-
cial welfare than the BACBR-I mechanism. The BACBR-I
itself allocates the bandwidth links to the buyer assuring
connections between selected nodes. It provides highest
allocation eﬃciency, however, it requires more time to de-
termine optimal allocation than the c-SeBiDA.
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Paper Price Method and Network
Congestion Control
Krzysztof Malinowski, Ewa Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz, and Przemysław Jaskóła
Abstract—Price instruments are useful in achieving market
balance conditions in various markets. Those instruments can
be also used for control of other composite systems. The for-
mulation and basic properties of the Price Method are re-
viewed and then the congestion control by price instruments
in a computer network is described and tested.
Keywords—computer network, congestion control, coordination
strategy, price, price instruments, retail pricing problem.
1. Introduction
In this paper the objective is to present emerging, opportu-
nities to use price mechanisms for management of computer
networks. In recent years it was observed that the use of
the price instruments could be made both to propose the
new techniques for congestion control in data networks,
in particular for Internet congestion control (ICC), and to
better explain the existing congestion control mechanisms
(the current TCP (transmission control protocol) conges-
tion control protocols). It is useful to note at this point
that Internet pricing is essential not only for better pos-
sible understanding of the network operation but it may
also provide means to achieve rational behavior of the net-
work users, who otherwise may “overgraze” the existing
resources. Proper pricing of the network services is also
necessary for many other purposes, not only for congestion
control [1], [2]. Dynamic pricing may be useful, in partic-
ular, for balancing demand for access to application servers
and for proper valuation of diﬀerent classes and qualities
of service [3].
2. Price Method; General Formulation
and the Basic Facts
The Price Method, also known under the name of the
Interaction Balance Method [4]–[7] represents a versatile
approach to modeling, optimization and management of
complex systems. This follows the natural role played by
prices on various markets – to achieve the balance between
the demand and the supply. The method allows for various
problem formulations and price adjustment (price coordi-
nation) strategies. Problem formulation may either result
from a formal partitioning (decomposition) of a large-scale
optimization problem or it may result from more practical,
application case-oriented, considerations. Price adjustment
strategies can be derived from dual function optimization,
from solving sets of the coordinating conditions or from
practical possibilities existing in a particular application.
Consider the following, fairly general, deterministic prob-
lem related to complex system optimization:
max
x,u,y ∑i Ui(xi,ui,yi) , (1)
subject to xi ∈ Ii, i = 1, . . . ,N , (2)
yi = Fi(xi,ui) and ui = ∑
j
Hi jy j, i, j = 1, . . . ,N , (3)
∑
i
rli(xi)≤ cl, l = 1, . . . ,L . (4)
In the above formulation the objective is to maximize the
aggregate utility across N involved entities (system ele-
ments); xi is the vector of local decision variables (of di-
mension nxi), ui is the local (vector) interaction input (dim
ui = nui) and yi (dim yi = nyi) is the local interaction out-
put of the ith system element. In Eq. (3) it is assumed that
the interaction output yi is a unique deterministic function
of xi and ui, and that the interaction coupling constraints
ui = ∑ j Hi jy j are linear. Obviously, these relations can be
made more general. Similarly, local decision constraint
sets Ii can be imposed also on ui. Often these sets are
in form of box constraints Ii = [xmini ,xmaxi ] (with xmini being
the vector of lower bounds and xmaxi the vector of upper
bounds on the components of xi). Constraint (4) is the
global resource constraint; there are assumed to be L re-
sources which may be required by the local entities; rli(xi)
represents the consumption of the lth resource by system el-
ement i. It is assumed that the optimization problem (1)–(4)
has a solution.
The above optimization problem can be decomposed into
N parallel local problems by introducing prices (in math-
ematical terms Lagrange multipliers) λi (dim λi = nui),
i = 1, . . . ,N, associated with the coupling constraints ui =
∑ j Hi jy j, and µl , l = 1, . . . ,L, representing prices of the
global resources. The ith local problem is then deﬁned –
for given prices – as follows:
max
xi ,ui
[
Ui(xi,ui,yi)−λ Ti ui +
N
∑
j=1
λ Tj H jiyi−
L
∑
l=1
µlrli(xi)
]
, (5)
where yi = Fi(xi,ui) and subject to xi ∈ Ii. Assuming unique
solutions to the above N problems, xi(λ ,µ), ui(λ ,µ)
and yi(λ ,µ), (where yi(λ ,µ) = Fi(xi(λ ,µ),ui(λ ,µ)) and
λ T = (λ T1 , . . . ,λ TN ), µT = (µT1 , . . . ,µTL )) one can seek such
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coordinating values λC and µC of λ and µ for which the
coupling constraints (3) and the resource constraints (4) are
satisﬁed, that is for i = 1, . . . ,N
yi(λC,µC) = Fi
(
xi(λC,µC),ui(λC,µC)
)
,
ui(λC,µC) = ∑
j
Hi jy j(λC,µC), (6)
∑
i
rli(xi(λC,µC))≤ cl , l = 1, . . . ,L, (7)
µCl ≥ 0, µCl
[
∑
i
rli(xi(λC, pC))−cl
]
=0, l = 1, . . . ,L. (8)
The above conditions (7) and (8) result from the require-
ment to satisfy overall optimality conditions. It simple
terms they state that the optimal prices of the resources
must be nonnegative and that a positive price can be
charged for the commonly available resource only when
this resource is fully utilized, i.e., when the respective re-
source constraint is active. It should be observed that some
or even all values of the components of λCi may be nega-
tive. The assumption about the uniqueness property of the
local problem solutions – for given price vectors µ and λ –
is an essential one [4] for the conditions guaranteeing the
existence of the coordinating prices λC, µC. If these solu-
tions do not have this property, then the coordinating prices
satisfying eqns. (6)–(8) may easily not exist. One could
expect that the lack of uniqueness of xi(λ ,µ), ui(λ ,µ) for
an isolated point (λ 0,µ0), µ0 ≥ 0 should not matter too
much. Alas, it is easy to demonstrate with many impor-
tant examples that if the local solutions are not unique for
some pair (λ 0,µ0), they are also not unique for any pair
(λ ,µ) that could satisfy the coordinating conditions. Now,
the simple suﬃcient conditions guaranteeing the unique-
ness of xi(λ ,µ), ui(λ ,µ) (and hence of yi(λ ,µ)) for any
feasible pair (λ ,µ) are: the strict concavity of the function
Ui(xi,ui,yi) with respect to its arguments, linearity of Fi
and the convexity of rli and of the set Ii. More general
conditions can also be given [5], [8] but in a general non-
linear case the desirable uniqueness property of the local
problem solutions is, unfortunately, not easily achievable.
Assuming the existence of λC,µC, one can propose a num-
ber of algorithms for iterating the values of λ , µ . The basic
strategy is to use the following gradient method:
λ (k+1)i = λ
(k)
i +γ
[
ui(λ (k),µ (k))−∑
j
Hi jy j(λ (k),µ (k))
]
, (9)
µ (k+1)l =
{
µ (k)l + γ
[
∑
i
rli(xi(λ (k),µ (k)))− cl
]}
+
(10)
for i = 1, . . . ,N, l = 1, . . . ,L, where γ is a positive step
size, and k is the iteration index. The algorithm deﬁned
by (9) and (10) is a gradient strategy – with price projection
on the feasible range – since, assuming the uniqueness of
xi(λ ,µ), ui(λ ,µ) for every feasible pair (λ ,µ) and each i,
the expressions in square brackets in (9), (10) are the slopes
(with minus sign) of the dual function deﬁned as the sum
of the maximum local performance values Eq. (5) minus
the term ∑l µ (k)l cl . The dual function attains its minimum
at λC, µC.
The above price adjustment strategy will converge for suf-
ﬁciently small value of γ if all local utility functions are
strongly concave, functions Fi are linear, functions rli are
convex, sets Ii are convex and there exists a feasible point
satisfying all the constraints, such that all the inequal-
ity constraints are inactive. Algorithm (9) and (10) has
a distributed character. In particular, the adjustments of the
resource prices µl can be performed for each price inde-
pendently from the other price adjustments. This property
appears to be most useful.
3. Network congestion control and
price-based schemes
With Internet, the Price Method has found a large-scale
system for which this method seems to be quite well
suited. In several congestion control mechanisms, as re-
cently proposed [9]–[14], the network is represented by
S traﬃc sources, representing particular source-destination
pairs, and a grid of a set of L links. The links, together
with associated routers, are the network resources, of lim-
ited traﬃc carrying capacity cl . Each source i is supposed
to use a set L(i) ⊆ L of links, and has at time k an as-
sociated transmission rate xi; the set of transmission rates
determines the aggregate ﬂow yl(k) through each link, by
the equation:
yl(k) = ∑
i∈S(l)
xi(k), (11)
where S(l) is the set of all sources transmitting through
the link l. Then, the feedback mechanism communicates
to sources the congestion information about the network.
This congestion measure – the price pl(k) – is a positive
valued quantity associated with link l. The fundamental as-
sumption is made that sources have access to the aggregate
price (qi(k), i = 1, . . . ,S) of all links in their route:
qi(k) = ∑
l∈L(i)
pl(k). (12)
4. Network Control by Price Instruments,
Application of Price Method
Let us consider the network with S sources and L links.
Assume now that the traﬃc sources (or source-destination
pairs) are indeed utility oriented, i.e., they have utilities
Ui(xi) expressed in monetary terms and are willing to max-
imize proﬁts equal to utility minus payment charged by the
network. Then, the equilibrium rate xsei will solve the fol-
lowing local source problem:
max
xi
[Ui(xi)−qsei xi], (13)
where qsei = ∑
l∈L(i)
psel and p
se denotes vector of equilib-
rium prices. The role of prices p is to coordinate the ac-
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tions of the individual sources; in fact to ensure that solu-
tions of (13) together solve the network ﬂow optimization
problem
max
x≥0 ∑i Ui(xi) subject to ∑i∈S(l)xi ≤ cl, l = 1, . . . ,L , (14)
where cl is the lth link capacity. This is particular, simple
instant of problem (1)–(4). Hence, it would seem possible –
at least in theory – to propose the following congestion
control scheme: for given link prices pl(k), l = 1, . . . ,L, at
time k, the sources solve local problems
max
xi∈Ii
[Ui(xi)−qi(k)xi] , (15)
where Ii = [xmini ,xmaxi ]. The solutions xsi (k) = xi(qi(k)) are
signaled to all concerned links, which then adjust their link
prices – for the next iteration k + 1 – according to the fol-
lowing rule
p(k+1)l =
{
p(k)l + γ
[
∑
i∈S(l)
xsi (k)− cl
]}
+
(16)
and is a positive step – chosen to allow the scheme to
converge. Then the new link prices are signaled to links,
etc., until the convergence is obtained.
5. Dynamic Routing
Although it would require a serious modiﬁcation of Inter-
net protocols to implement the described scheme of coor-
dination by price instruments in a distributed manner, this
algorithm can be instead used by the centralized controller,
so called bandwidth broker. One can observe, that further
improvement of the proﬁt can be achieved by conscious
choice of routing, in the systems with redundant paths ex-
isting between nodes. Here is an additional proﬁt of using
price instruments for network coordination. Equilibrium
prices pl , calculated in the process of network balancing
can be interpreted as link congestion indicators. As such
they can be used by external shortest-path routing algo-
rithm.
There is a problem connected with this approach. The cal-
culation of routes based on dynamic metrices leads to the
change in the load pattern, and necessity of re-calculating
allocations, and so on. In other words it may lead to oscil-
lations, what was observed in experiments. To avoid this
problem, time scales of routing and bandwidth allocation
have to be separated. For example, rerouting can be per-
formed every few minutes.
The following rerouting scheme is proposed:
Step 0: Sort the list of active sources in descending order
w.r.t. xmaxi .
Step 1: Choose the ﬁrst element from the sorted list and
ﬁnd a shortest length route for it using Dijkstra
algorithm, basing on dynamic metrices deﬁned in
Eq. (17); remove this source from the list.
Step 2: Calculate the new equilibrium prices pattern of the
network solving the problem (15)–(16), update the
metrices.
Step 3: Proceed until the route is found for every pair
source-destination.
The critical issue is to propose an additive metric for the
shortest length search. It must be a scalar value, bound
to the link, which incorporates information about the path
load and capacity at the same time. Finally, the proposed
dynamic metric dl includes the congestion prices, and takes
the form:
dl = pl + αβ e−
cl
cmax
, α ∈< 0,1 >, (17)
where cmax is the highest link capacity in the network,
β = maxi∈S xmaxi . Equation (17) takes into account, that
at the initial iterations the network is “empty”, and none
links are congested – thus pl = 0. The exponential term
reﬂects the fact, that capacity is a non-additive metric, that
must be dealt with by shortest-path algorithm. In this case
the routes with the highest capacities are occupied in the
ﬁrst place by the source-destination pairs with the highest
transmission rates.
6. Results of Experiments
The simulation experiments were performed for a simple
network conﬁguration. Six sources were connected to the
network presented in Fig. 1. All were assumed to trans-
Fig. 1. Test network.
mit to the same destination, symbolized with a dark cir-
cle. The sources compete for the bandwidth of two bot-
tlenecks (link 8 and link 9). Two algorithms for the band-
width broker were compared, one that gives an optimal
solution of the bandwidth allocation problem – mixed in-
teger programming (MIP), and price-based scheme de-
scribed in the previous section. The aggregate utilities were
calculated.
The response of bandwidth broker is presented in Table 1.
Both the MIP and price-based algorithm gave the same
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result in – value of the utility function in both cases
was 1659.4. This result was obtained under the assumption
that all sources in the initial stage were sorted. For com-
parison in Table 1 (right-hand side) the performance of
a modiﬁed price-based algorithm is presented, in which
Table 1
Links and rates, MIP, and price-based algorithm with
sorting (left), price-based algorithm without sorting (right)
With sorting Without sorting
s link numbers rate (x) link’ numbers rate’ (x)
0 6; 8 15.00 6; 8 19.00
1 9; 10 11.25 6; 8 14.00
2 9; 10 6.25 6; 8 9.00
3 7; 9 6.25 8; 11 9.00
4 8; 11 45.00 9; 7 30.00
5 7; 9 6.25 8; 11 9.00
U(x) 1659.4 1510.0
only the Lagrange multipliers are used to represent link
costs (metrics). No sorting was performed in the initial
stage in this case. The obtained value of the utility function
was 1510.0.
7. Final Remarks
In this paper the objective was to present various selected
approaches to pricing, in particular concerned with the
classical role of prices in balancing markets and systems
in view of limited resources. The formulation and the
main properties of the Price Method were reviewed. This
method, developed with various modiﬁcations in the 1970-
ties, still receives much attention. To illustrate this point
possible application of the price-based mechanisms to Inter-
net congestion control was discussed. In fact the size and
the problems with operation of the Internet motivate the
renewed interest in those mechanisms. The pricing “tech-
nology” is very much needed to control modern communi-
cations because there do not exist other optimization based
technologies that could cope with the challenges oﬀered by
the Network.
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Paper Computational Methods
for Two-Level 0-1 Programming Problems
through Distributed Genetic Algorithms
Keiichi Niwa, Tomohiro Hayashida, and Masatoshi Sakawa
Abstract—In this paper, we consider a two-level 0-1 program-
ming problem in which there is not coordination between the
decision maker (DM) at the upper level and the decision maker
at the lower level. We propose a revised computational method
that solves problems related to computational methods for ob-
taining the Stackelberg solution. Specifically, in order to im-
prove the computational accuracy of approximate Stakelberg
solutions and shorten the computational time of a computa-
tional method implementing a genetic algorithm (GA) pro-
posed by the authors, a distributed genetic algorithm is intro-
duced with respect to the upper level GA, which handles de-
cision variables for the upper level DM. Parallelization of the
lower level GA is also performed along with parallelization of
the upper level GA. The proposed algorithm is also improved
in order to eliminate unnecessary computation during oper-
ation of the lower level GA, which handles decision variables
for the lower level DM. In order to verify the effectiveness of
the proposed method, we propose comparisons with existing
methods by performing numerical experiments to verify both
the accuracy of the solution and the time required for the
computation.
Keywords—distributed genetic algorithm, Stackelberg solution,
two-level 0-1 programming problem.
1. Introduction
In the real world, we can often encounter situations that
there are multiple decision makers (DMs) in hierarchically
structured organizations, and decisions may be taken se-
rially or simultaneously in order to optimize each of the
objectives. This kind of problem has been formulated as
a two-level programming problem [1]. In two-level pro-
gramming problems, the upper level DM makes his/her
decision first, and then, with full knowledge of the deci-
sion of the upper level DM, the lower level DM makes
his/her decision in order to optimize his/her own objec-
tive function. According to this rule, the upper level DM
also makes a decision so as to optimize the objective func-
tion of self. The solution defined as the above mentioned
procedure is a Stackelberg solution. In this paper, both
the upper level and the lower level have one DM, and the
problem is treated as a two-level 0-1 programming problem
in which both DMs treat all of their decision variables as
0-1 variables.
As an overview of research dealing with two-level program-
ming problems that include discrete variables, Bard et al.
presented an algorithm based on the branch-and-bound
approach in order to derive the Stackelberg solution for
two-level 0-1 programming problems [2] and two-level
mixed integer programming problems [3]. Wen et al. [4]
have presented a computation method for obtaining the
Stackelberg solution to two-level programming problems
which have 0-1 variables for the decision variables in the
upper level and real variables for the decision variables in
the lower level.
On the other hand, the adaptive process of systems in the
natural world has been explained, and genetic algorithms
(GAs) which imitate the evolution occurring in living or-
ganisms have been receiving attention at international con-
ferences related to GAs, publications by Goldberg [5], as
have methodologies for optimization, adaptation and learn-
ing. GAs have also been adopted for a variety of combi-
natorial optimization problems, and their effectiveness has
been reported [6].
An example of research related to two-level programming
problems using GAs is given by Anandalingam, et al. [7]
which presents a method for deriving a Stackelberg so-
lution for two-level linear programming problems. Also,
Nishizaki, et al. presented an algorithm based on GAs in
order to derive the Stackelberg solution for two-level inte-
ger programming problems [8] and two-level mixed integer
programming problems [9]. In order to derive a Stack-
elberg solution for 0-1 programming problems related to
two-level decentralized systems, the authors [10] have also
proposed a computational method that adopts the double
string proposed by Sakawa, et al as the individual repre-
sentation. In order to improve the computational accuracy
of approximate Stakelberg solutions, the authors have pro-
posed computational methods that implement sharing [11]
and cluster analysis [12] methods. Furthermore, the au-
thors have proposed a computational method using parallel
genetic algorithm [13]. Use of these methods allows for the
derivation of approximate Stackelberg solutions with rela-
tively high precision and in a relatively short time, but there
is still room for improvement, particularly with regards to
calculation times.
Therefore, this paper focuses on two-level 0-1 program-
ming problems, and proposes an improved computational
method that addresses problems related to the computa-
tional method proposed by the authors for deriving the
Stackelberg solution. Specifically, a distributed genetic al-
gorithm is introduced with respect to the upper level GA,
which handles decision variables for the upper level DM,
in order to improve the computational accuracy of approxi-
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mate Stackelberg solutions and decrease the computational
time of a computational method implementing a genetic
algorithm proposed by the authors. Also, parallelization
of the lower level GA is performed along with paralleliza-
tion of the upper level GA. The proposed algorithm is also
improved in order to eliminate unnecessary computation
during operation of the lower level GA, which handles de-
cision variables for the lower level DM. In order to verify
the effectiveness of the proposed method, we propose com-
parisons with the existing method and the computational
method using parallel GA by performing numerical exper-
iments to verify both the accuracy of the solution and the
time required for the computation.
2. Two-Level 0-1 Programming Problem
For the sake of brevity, we denote the upper and lower level
DMs by DM1 and DM2, respectively. The two-level 0-1
programming problem is expressed as
maximize
x
z1(x,y) = c1x + d1y
where y solves
maximize
y
z2(x,y) = c2x + d2y
subject to Ax + By≦ b
x ∈ {0,1}n1 ,y ∈ {0,1}n2,


(1)
where x = (x1, . . . ,xn1)
T , and y = (y1, . . . ,yn2)T are the vec-
tors of decision variables for DM1 and DM2; z1(x,y), and
z2(x,y) respectively represent the objective functions of
DM1 and DM2; c1 = (c11, . . . ,c1n1), d1 = (d11, . . . ,d1n2),
c2 = (c21, . . . ,c2n1), and d2 = (d21, . . . ,d2n2) denote the co-
efficient vectors of the objective functions; A and B are
m× n1 and m× n2 coefficient matrices in the constraints,
respectively; b = (b1, . . . ,bm)T is a coefficient vector of the
right hand side of the constraints; the superscript T means
transposition of a vector.
For the sake of simplicity, in this paper, it is assumed that
each component of A, B, b, c1, c2, d1, and d2 is positive.
It is possible to express the process for choosing the Stack-
elberg solution for a two-level 0-1 programming problem
in the following manner. Each decision maker completely
knows objective functions and constraints of the opponent
and self, and DM1 first makes a decision and then DM2
makes a decision in order to maximize the objective func-
tion with full knowledge of the decision of DM1. That
is to say, when the decision by DM1 is denoted xˆ, DM2
solves the 0-1 programming problem (2) with parameters xˆ,
choosing the optimal solution y(xˆ) as the rational reaction
to xˆ.
maximize
y
z2(xˆ,y) = d2y + c2xˆ
subject to By≦ b−Axˆ
y ∈ {0,1}n2

 (2)
Under this premise, DM1 also determines x by choosing
the value which maximizes its own objective function. For
problems which adopt the Stackelberg solution to concep-
tualize their solution, it is assumed that there is no consen-
sus among DMs that might mutually constrain decisions.
Putting it another way, their relationship may be described
as non-cooperative.
3. GA Based Computational Method
We propose a computational method through GA in order
to obtain Stackelberg solutions to the two-level 0-1 pro-
gramming problems. In Subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, first,
we describe fundamental elements of GA, which are cod-
ing procedure, a decoding procedure and genetic operators,
used in the computational method using GA [10]. In this
paper, we call the computational method using GA [10]
normal GA (NGA). Furthermore, we show additional el-
ements used in the proposed computational method using
distributed genetic algorithm and the computational method
using parallel genetic algorithm [13] in Subsections 3.4
and 3.5. Finally, the algorithm used in the proposed com-
putational method using distributed genetic algorithm is de-
scribed in Subsection 3.6.
3.1. Coding and decoding
When solving 0-1 programming problems using GAs,
binary strings are usually adopted to express individu-
als [5], [14]. However, under this representation it is pos-
sible that infeasible individuals that do not satisfy the con-
straints may be generated, so there is a danger that the
performance of the GAs may degrade. Thus, in this pa-
per, a double string [6] is used which is composed of the
substring corresponding to the decision of DM1, x, and
the substring corresponding to the decision of DM2, y, as
shown in Fig.1 in order to derive only feasible solutions.
The decisions of DM1 and DM2 are handled by performing
genetic operators on each sub-individual. We call the GA
operating to the decision x of DM1 the upper level GA,
and the GA operating to the decision y of DM2 the lower
level GA.
← Individual for x → ← Individual for y →
ix(1) · · · ix(n1) iy(1) · · · iy(n2)
Six(1) · · · Six(n1) Siy(1) · · · Siy(n2)
Fig. 1. Double string.
In Fig. 1 six(m) ∈ {0,1}, ix(m) ∈ {1, . . . ,n1}, and for m 6= m
′
it is assumed that ix(m) 6= ix(m
′
). Similarly, siy(m) ∈
{0,1}, iy(m) ∈ {1, . . . ,n2}, and for m 6= m
′
it is assumed
that iy(m) 6= iy(m
′
). Also, in the double string, ix(m), iy(m)
and six(m), siy(m) express indexes of the elements of each
solution vector respectively, and their values.
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In order to generate only feasible solutions, a decoding
algorithm proposed by the authors [10] is also applied to
the upper level and the lower level GA.
3.2. Reproduction
We describe the reproduction operator of the lower
level GA. Substituting the given value x of the decision
variable in the upper level GA and the value of y obtained
by decoding individuals in the lower level GA into the ob-
jective function of DM2, z2(x,y), the value of the eval-
uation function for each individual is obtained. Next, the
fitness value for each individual is derived using linear scal-
ing, and the individuals remaining in the next generation
are determined by applying elitist expected value selection.
We describe the reproduction operator of the upper
level GA. Substituting the value of x obtained by decoding
individual in the upper level GA and the value of the ratio-
nal reaction y(x) obtained by applying the lower level GA
into the objective function of DM1, z1(x,y(x)), the value
of the evaluation function for each individual is obtained.
Next, the fitness value for each individual is calculated by
applying linear scaling and adopting a clustering method.
The individuals remaining in the next generation are deter-
mined by applying elitist expected value selection based on
these fitness values.
3.3. Crossover and Mutation
For double strings, if single-point or multi-point crossover
operators are performed then there is a possibility that in-
feasible individuals may be generated because the indexes
occurring in the offspring, ix(m), ix(m
′
), m 6= m
′
or iy(m),
iy(m
′
), m 6= m
′
, may have the same number. When solv-
ing the traveling salesman problem or the scheduling prob-
lem through GAs, this kind of violation occurs. In order
to circumvent such violation, partially matched crossovers
(PMX) have been devised. In this paper, a modified ver-
sion of PMX is used in order to handle the double strings
proposed by Sakawa et al. [6]. Also, when determining
whether or not to apply the crossover operator, a probabil-
ity pc is used. Its value is set in advance.
PMX procedure
Step 1: For two individuals expressed using double strings,
s1 and s2, two crossover points are set at random.
Step 2: According to PMX, the upper strings of s1 and
s2, along with the corresponding lower strings are
reordered, generating s
′
1 and s
′
2.
Step 3: For double strings, the offsprings, s
′′
1 and s
′′
2, result-
ing from the application of the revised PMX are
obtained by exchanging the lower strings between
the two crossover points s
′
1 and s
′
2.
It is well recognized that the mutation operator plays a role
of local random search in genetic algorithms. In this paper,
the mutation operator is applied to each string, and inver-
sion is used for index strings. For binary strings, mutation
of bit-reverse type is adopted. When applying the mutation
operator to individuals, it is first determined whether or
not the mutation operator will be applied to an individual
according to the mutation probability pm. In the case that
mutation is applied, it is then determined whether to apply
inversion or bit-reverse according to the mutation selection
constant MPum.
Mutation procedure
Step 1: For an individual s, expressed using a double
string, a random number rm is generated. If
rm ≦MPum, a point on the 0-1 string is chosen at
random and bit-reverse is performed, yielding s
′
1.
Otherwise, Step 2 is adopted.
Step 2: Two points on the index string are chosen at ran-
dom, and inversion is applied to the substring be-
tween the two points, yielding s
′
2.
3.4. Application of the parallel genetic algorithm
In genetic algorithms, it is possible to perform parallel pro-
cessing in the greater part of the operations included in the
algorithm. In reproduction operations, however, because it
is necessary to calculate evaluation values for each individ-
ual in a population, and based on that value determine the
fitness of each individual, direct application of parallel pro-
cessing is difficult. Research related to the parallelization
of GAs started with improvements to such barriers to the
implementation of parallelization, and a variety of types of
models have been proposed and their effectiveness noted by
numerous researchers [15], [16], [17]. Today, GAs that im-
plement parallel processing have come to be called parallel
genetic algorithms.
The computational method proposed by the authors [13]
divides the lower level GA operations and assigns them
across multiple processors. Also, the computational method
adopts the single-population master-slave GAs as the up-
per level GA. By assigning the calculation of individual
fitness values, crossover operator and mutation operator
to multiple processors, calculation times are reduced. We
call the computational method proposed by the authors the
computational method using parallel GA (PGA). However,
while the computational method using parallel GA suc-
ceeds in obtaining good approximate solutions and reduc-
ing the amount of computational time, there is still likely
much more room for improvement. In this study, there-
fore, we aim for further improvements of the precision of
approximate solutions and further reductions in computa-
tional time, and consider parallelization of the upper level
GA and the lower level GA implemented by the computa-
tional method using parallel GA.
The multiple-population genetic algorithms performs paral-
lel processing by dividing the population and assigning the
partial populations (sub-populations) to multiple proces-
sors. If we adopt this model as our computational method,
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it is possible to use the computational method using GA
proposed by authors [12] without a lot of modifications.
In that case, the multiple-population genetic algorithm is
adopted as the upper level GA. The upper level GA opera-
tions proposed by authors are applied for partial population
assigned to each processor. Additionally, migration oper-
ator is performed in every migration interval. Also, it is
able to divide the lower level GA operations and assign
them across multiple processor in the same way as PGA.
In this paper, we employ a multiple-population genetic al-
gorithms (distributed genetic algorithms) so as to obtain
good approximate Stackelberg solutions and reduce calcu-
lation times. We call the proposed computational method
using distributed GA (DGA).
3.5. Lower Level GA Avoidance Procedures
In this paper we introduce a storage region as shown
in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Storage for saving x and y(x).
Here, xi, i = 1, . . . ,x max indicate those values of x that
were used in the past for handling individuals of the upper
level GA, and yi(xi), i = 1, . . . ,x max indicate the values
of the rational reactions associated with xi obtained by the
lower level GA. xicounter ∈ {1,2, . . . ,y max}, i = 1, . . . ,x max
indicate the number of times that the lower level GA was
used to find the rational reaction yi(xi) for xi. x max in-
dicates the maximum number of DM1 decisions x saved,
and y max indicates the maximum number of times that
the lower level GA can be repeatedly used to find the ra-
tional reaction yi(xi) for xi. z1(xi,yi(xi)) and z2(xi,yi(xi))
are stored xi,yi(xi) values used in place of DM1 and DM2
objective functions. By using the following algorithm, the
number of applications of the lower level GA is reduced,
and unnecessary calculation times eliminated.
Storage of the rational reaction y(x) and lower
level GA avoidance procedures
Step 1: If there exists in xi an upper level GA individ-
ual x¯, proceed to Step 2. If one does not exist,
then check if the number of xi has reached x max,
and if so continue on to Step 3. If not, proceed to
Step 4.
Step 2: If xicounter has reached y max, then the saved yi(xi)
is returned to the upper level GA as the rational re-
action and the algorithm terminates. If not reached,
proceed to Step 4.
Step 3: Select the least of the values z1(xi,yi(xi)) from
the saved xi, and take that xi value as xk. After
applying the lower level GA and thus obtaining
the rational reaction y(x¯) for x¯, if z1(xk,yk(xk))≤
z1(x¯,y(x¯)), save x¯, y(x¯), z1(x¯,y(x¯)), z2(x¯,y(x¯))
in the storage region xk, and terminate the algo-
rithm.
Step 4: After obtaining the rational reaction y(x¯) for x¯
by applying the lower level GA, save x¯, y(x¯),
z1(x¯,y(x¯)), z2(x¯,y(x¯)), and terminate the algo-
rithm.
Implementation of the algorithm described above improved
upon previous methods.
3.6. The Algorithm for the Improved Computational
Method
The algorithm used in the computational method after im-
provement can be described as follows, Np denotes the num-
ber of processors.
Step 1: For each processor q,q = 1, . . . ,Np, apply the up-
per level GA operations on Step1 through Step 7.
Taking the generation of the upper level GA as
tuq := 0, Nu initial individuals are randomly
generated.
Step 2: For each individual x in the upper level GA,
determine whether or not to apply the lower
level GA, and find the number of lower level GA
to apply, Nul . For those individuals Nul , apply
the lower level GA operations in Step 2-1 through
Step 2-3, and obtain the rational reaction y(x). For
those Nu−Nul individuals to which the lower level
GA will not be applied, take the saved y(x) as the
rational reaction, and proceed to Step 4.
Step 2-1: Set tl := 0. Randomly generate Nl lower
level GA individuals y, and take these as
the initial population of the lower level
GA . Proceed to Step 2-2.
Step 2-2: By using x given as the upper level GA
individual and y generated by the lower
level GA, the DM2 objective function
value is calculated. After applying lin-
ear scaling to the value, the repro-
duction operator is applied. Proceed to
Step 2-3.
Step 2-3: If tl has exceeded the previously defined
a maximum number of generation Ml ,
take the individual with the best fitness
value as the optimal individual y(x), and
proceed to Step 3. Otherwise, apply
crossover operator and mutation opera-
tor to each lower level GA individual,
let tl = tl + 1, and proceed to Step 2-2.
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Step 3: By using the lower level rational reaction y(x) ob-
tained by operation of the lower level GA and the
individual x of the upper level GA, calculate the
values for the DM1 and DM2 objective functions.
Perform the procedures required to save x and its
rational reactions y(x) to the storage region, and
proceed to Step 4.
Step 4: Calculate the DM1 objective function for each up-
per level GA individual x, and after performing
linear scaling, apply the clustering method to mea-
sure the level of convergence of the individuals.
Depending upon the degree of convergence, calcu-
late the fitness value of each individual. Proceed
to Step 5.
Step 5: If tuq has exceeded the previously set a maximum
number of generation Mu, then terminate the algo-
rithm. In that case, the individual obtained up to
that generation with the best fitness value is taken
as the optimal individual (x,y). Otherwise, pro-
ceed to Step 6.
Step 6: Reproduction operator is performed using the fit-
ness values of each individual of the upper level
GA. Apply crossover operator and mutation opera-
tor to each upper level GA individual, and proceed
to Step 7.
Step 7: If tuq mod mi (migration interval) = 0, after
performing synchronization between the proces-
sors, apply migration. Return to Step 2 with
tuq := tuq + 1.
4. Numerical Experiments
Numerical experiments are carried out in order to demon-
strate the feasibility and the effectiveness of DGA. We apply
DGA, PGA, and NGA to twelve types of two-level 0-1 pro-
gramming problems as shown in Table 1. Each problem
has five constraints.
Table 1
Problems used in the numerical experiments
Problem
DM1 DM2 Constraint
variables variables strength
I (50%)
A 15 15 II (70%)
III (90%)
I (50%)
B 20 20 II (70%)
III (90%)
I (50%)
C 25 25 II (70%)
III (90%)
I (50%)
D 30 30 II (70%)
III (90%)
In this case, the elements A, B, c1, c2, d1, and d2 of the
two-level 0-1 programming problem are selected at random
from the closed interval [10,99], and the bi element of b is
set according to the equation
bi = ri
(
n1∑
j=1
ai j +
n2∑
k=1
bik
)
, i = 1, . . . ,m. (3)
Furthermore, ai j represents the i j element of matrix A, and
bik represents the ik element of matrix B. Here, ri repre-
sents the strength of the constraint. In the strong constraint
problem (I), a random number is determined at random
from the closed interval [0.45,0.55], in the middle con-
straint problem (II), a random number is selected at ran-
dom from the closed interval [0.65,0.75], and in the weak
constraint problem (III), a random number is determined at
random from the closed interval [0.85,0.95], respectively.
The decimal portion of the bi value is rounded off, and the
result is stored as an integer value.
Next, the GA parameters are set for NGA, PGA, and DGA
as follows. First, there are parameters that are used in com-
mon by all three methods, namely the population sizes of
the upper level GA and the lower level GA, the crossover
rate, the mutation rate, and the maximum number of gen-
eration, and those values are set as 120 for the population
size, 0.9 for the crossover rate, 0.02 for the mutation rate,
and 300 for the maximum number of generation. Next, for
PGA and DGA, α is set to 0.25. The initial number of
clusters, k, is set to 5, and dmax and dmin, used to measure
the distance between individuals, are set to 2.5 and 1.0,
respectively. In addition to these parameters, x max and
y max are set to 100 and 5, respectively. The number of
processors is set to 3. Finally, for DGA, we apply the ran-
dom ring model to the communication topology and adopt
Best-Hole model as the selection of emigrants and immi-
grants. The number of migration interval mi is set to 15.
The migration rate is set to 2.5%.
Fig. 3. Comparison of calculation times (the strong constraint
problem (I)).
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Table 2
Comparison of solution precisions
Problem
Constraint DGA PGA
strength best worst average variance best worst average variance
I 1078 1078 1078.0 0.00 1078 1078 1078.0 0.00
A II 1377 1377 1377.0 0.00 1377 1377 1377.0 0.00
III 1727 1727 1727.0 0.00 1727 1727 1727.0 0.00
I 1342 1342 1342.0 0.00 1342 1342 1342.0 0.00
B II 1764 1764 1764.0 0.00 1764 1764 1764.0 0.00
III 2157 2157 2157.0 0.00 2157 2157 2157.0 0.00
I 1713 1713 1713.0 0.00 1713 1713 1713.0 0.00
C II 2221 2207 2214.6 43.84 2221 2207 2215.7 20.81
III 2680 2680 2680.0 0.00 2680 2680 2680.0 0.00
I 1864 1857 1859.8 11.76 1864 1851 1856.8 12.36
D II 2480 2444 2469.6 253.44 2480 2439 2449.7 233.01
III 2930 2930 2930.0 0.00 2930 2930 2930.0 0.00
Problem
Constraint NGA
Enumerationstrength best worst average variance
I 1078 1068 1077.0 9.00 1078
A II 1377 1377 1377.0 0.00 1377
III 1727 1727 1727.0 0.00 1727
I 1342 1328 1340.4 17.24 -
B II 1764 1754 1763.0 9.00 -
III 2157 2157 2157.0 0.00 -
I 1713 1713 1713.0 0.00 -
C II 2221 2207 2210.7 23.81 -
III 2680 2672 2678.5 9.05 -
I 1864 1849 1856.9 11.29 -
D II 2480 2444 2470.0 80.80 -
III 2930 2915 2927.0 20.00 -
Fig. 4. Comparison of calculation times (the middle constraint
problem (II)).
Next we will describe the experimental environment. The
experiment is run on a personal computer with a 2.80 GHz
CPU and running Windows XP. The compiler used is Mi-
crosoft Visual C++ 6.0.
Fig. 5. Comparison of calculation times (the weak constraint
problem (III)).
For each problem, NGA, PGA, and DGA are run ten times
each. The results are given in Table 2 through Table 5.
In Table 2, for all trials of Problem A, DGA, PGA, and
NGA derive precise Stackelberg solutions. But, for the re-
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Table 3
Comparison of calculation times
Problem
Constraint DGA PGA
strength best worst average variance best worst average variance
I 220.78 351.25 269.82 1138.83 213.64 434.43 319.70 3611.94
A II 247.30 320.80 275.36 482.07 108.05 166.72 128.41 316.94
III 215.46 281.27 253.94 427.14 62.20 99.46 82.38 191.60
I 394.09 801.84 599.33 12700.54 599.11 856.95 770.43 4550.59
B II 464.08 772.94 610.84 7149.91 419.83 569.50 504.90 2619.66
III 345.83 633.73 473.91 5558.42 248.95 360.14 293.30 1186.14
I 975.14 1326.10 1149.18 10536.46 1728.47 1913.19 1824.04 4479.17
C II 1092.68 1569.18 1337.10 25015.18 1067.88 1199.30 1116.03 1888.83
III 772.44 1191.86 965.45 16951.74 537.94 665.39 605.52 1484.93
I 1640.06 2426.27 2000.36 53181.01 3347.20 3547.55 3428.30 3115.52
D II 1568.27 2515.28 1980.26 81371.51 1753.85 1781.79 1767.90 97.18
III 1012.63 2268.36 1619.37 89178.03 1073.29 1169.15 1125.58 848.64
Problem
Constraint NGA
Enumerationstrength best worst average variance
I 8379.75 8613.52 8414.59 4578.06 566.73
A II 8550.34 8668.06 8618.90 842.89 652.38
III 8708.25 8714.92 8711.78 3.91 665.81
I 10882.38 11006.64 10954.14 1946.30 –
B II 11296.80 11467.94 11360.96 2888.93 –
III 11447.75 11907.14 11520.65 17290.82 –
I 13467.95 13651.13 13573.35 1886.21 –
C II 14022.60 14067.24 14032.10 147.58 –
III 14060.64 14090.92 14081.75 80.04 –
I 17532.97 17794.47 17646.13 4659.97 –
D II 18208.95 18263.34 18250.02 235.16 –
III 18424.03 18541.39 18461.96 1912.68 –
Table 4
Lower level GA avoidance counts
Problem Constraint DGA PGA
strength best worst average variance best worst average variance
I 35558 34898 35283.7 46901.01 32008 27418 29742.4 1589311.44
A II 35539 35093 35291.8 24252.76 31094 26980 29362.6 1272588.24
III 35634 35133 35371.4 24639.24 32006 29261 30431.2 948838.16
I 34983 33060 33995.6 265319.84 21852 14956 17355.0 3164457.60
B II 34757 32693 33959.8 317217.36 20845 14153 17304.8 4949162.76
III 35274 34007 34667.5 121787.45 23258 17347 20721.5 3514280.45
I 32740 30118 31504.7 518636.01 8626 5577 6963.4 1213648.44
C II 32705 30017 31094.1 677375.69 5164 1599 3707.9 1823801.69
III 33408 31591 32853.0 390069.20 16092 10170 13038.9 3552493.09
I 30696 26108 27780.8 1576362.56 1205 83 490.9 110786.89
D II 30819 26494 28875.6 2235743.84 847 114 292.5 46420.85
III 32731 27108 30240.6 1688052.64 5939 3469 4376.3 514510.01
sults of Problem A-I, NGA is not possible to obtain pre-
cise Stackelberg solutions in some trials. Performance in
deriving the best solutions to Problem B is equal for all
three methods, but comparing the worst values and the av-
erage values shows that DGA and PGA present the best
performance. Observe that the best values and the worst
values obtained by DGA for Problem C and Problem D are
equal or superior to the corresponding values obtained by
NGA. Also, for Problem C and Problem D without Prob-
lem D-II, comparing the average values shows that DGA is
superior to NGA. Finally, for Problem C and Problem D,
DGA is superior or approximately equivalent to PGA in all
results. When comparing the three methods with regards
to the solution precision obtained, DGA is superior.
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Table 5
Comparison of generations in which the best solution was found
Problem
Constraint DGA PGA
strength best worst average variance best worst average variance
I 5 147 37.8 2210.96 3 42 13.9 130.09
A II 6 20 11.7 16.81 2 13 9.0 8.80
III 5 20 11.0 20.80 3 16 9.3 18.81
I 5 158 54.4 1845.04 13 147 62.2 2204.76
B II 9 53 16.7 155.01 7 22 16.2 27.56
III 9 29 16.6 35.24 9 30 18.9 35.69
I 15 71 23.0 258.60 15 59 38.3 180.01
C II 14 165 61.1 3067.89 50 292 141.1 6644.29
III 13 247 75.6 6204.84 26 53 40.8 75.76
I 12 256 68.4 7015.44 62 291 157.3 5343.41
D II 23 299 117.7 9811.21 36 249 159.9 4262.09
III 19 70 39.6 275.04 30 239 74.9 3441.69
Problem
Constraint NGA
Enumeration
strength best worst average variance
I 5 208 48.0 6130.80 –
A II 4 16 8.4 10.64 –
III 3 126 22.4 1205.84 –
I 13 133 45.7 1728.41 –
B II 9 44 16.3 91.61 –
III 9 63 19.5 223.25 –
I 11 35 20.5 34.85 –
C II 16 66 28.2 352.76 –
III 13 26 18.8 17.36 –
I 19 108 34.7 666.61 –
D II 14 103 51.1 721.69 –
III 23 284 64.1 5833.29 –
Fig. 6. Comparison of average avoidance counts (the strong
constraint problem (I)).
Fig. 7. Comparison of average avoidance counts (the middle
constraint problem (II)).
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Examining the calculation time results displayed in Table 3,
for all trials of all problems, DGA and PGA are superior
to NGA. Also, the calculation times of DGA are less than
15% of the calculation times of NGA.
Figure 3 shows the average calculation times for each size
of the strong constraint problems (I). We can see that as
compared to PGA, DGA is superior.
The average calculation times for each size of the middle
constraint problems (II) are illustrated in Fig. 4. When
comparing DGA and PGA, DGA is approximately equiva-
lent or slightly inferior.
The average calculation times for each size of the weak
constraint problems (III) are shown in Fig. 5. From
Fig. 5, DGA is approximately equivalent or slightly inferior
to PGA.
The results of the avoidance count for the lower level GA
are shown in Table 4. From the results listed in this table,
we see that with both DGA and PGA, as the scale of the
problem increases the number of lower level GA avoidances
is reduced.
Fig. 8. Comparison of average avoidance counts (the weak con-
straint problem (III)).
The average avoidance counts for each size of the strong
constraint problems (I), the middle constraint problems (II),
and the weak constraint problems (III) are shown in
Figs. 6–8. Examining the results displayed in these fig-
ures, we see that the avoidance counts of DGA gradually
decrease as the size of the problem increases. On the other
hand, the avoidance counts of PGA rapidly decrease.
Finally, the results of the comparison of generations in
which the best solution was found are illustrated in Table 5.
The results listed in Table 5 show that with both DGA and
PGA, the generation deriving the best result is even later
than with NGA, and so it is likely that by introducing clus-
ter analysis methods the diversity of individuals within the
population of the upper level GA would be maintained,
and rapid population convergence avoided.
From the above results, compared to the other two com-
putational methods, DGA is the superior computational
method, both from a standpoint of solution precision and
required calculation time.
5. Conclusion
This paper has focused on a two-level 0-1 programming
problem in which there is not coordination between the
decision maker at the upper level and the decision maker
at the lower level. The authors have proposed a modi-
fied computational method that solves problems related to
computational methods for obtaining the Stackelberg solu-
tion. Specifically, in order to improve the computational
accuracy of approximate Stakelberg solutions and shorten
the computational time of a computational method imple-
menting GA proposed by the authors, a distributed genetic
algorithm has been introduced with respect to the upper
level GA, which handles decision variables for the up-
per level DM. Also, parallelization of the lower level GA
has been performed along with parallelization of the upper
level GA. The proposed algorithm has been improved in or-
der to eliminate unnecessary computation during operation
of the lower level GA, which handles decision variables
for the lower level DM. In order to verify the effectiveness
of the proposed method, numerical experiments have been
carried out. From the results, we have shown that the pro-
posed method is the superior to the other two computational
methods, both from a standpoint of solution precision and
required calculation time.
References
[1] K. Shimizu, Y. Ishizuka, and J. F. Bard, Nondifferentiable and Two-
Level Mathematical Programming. Norwell: Kluwer, 1997.
[2] J. Bard and J.Moore, “An algorithm for the discrete bilevel program-
ming problem”, Nav. Res. Log., vol. 39, pp. 419–435, 1992.
[3] J. Bard and J. Moore, “The mixed integer linear bilevel programming
problem”, Oper. Res., vol. 38, pp. 911–921, 1990.
[4] W. P. Wen and Y. H. Yang, “Algorithms for solving the mixed in-
teger two-level linear programming problem”, Comput. Oper. Res.,
vol. 17, pp. 133–142, 1990.
[5] D. E. Goldberg, Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization, and
Machine Learning, Norwell: Addison Wesley, 1989.
[6] M. Sakawa and M. Tanaka, Genetic Algorithms. Tokyo: Asakura
Publishing, 1995.
[7] G. Anandalingam, R. Mathieu, C. L. Pittard, and N. Sinha, “Ar-
tificial intelligence based approaches for solving hierarchical opti-
mization problems,” in Impacts of Recent Computer Advances on
Operations Research, R. Sharda, B. L. Golden, E. Wasil, O. Balci
and W. Stewart, Eds. New York: Elsevier Science Publishing, 1989,
pp. 289–301.
[8] I. Nishizaki and M. Sakawa, “Computational methods through ge-
netic algorithms for obtaining Stackelberg solutions to two-level
integer programming problems”, Cybernet. Syst. Int. J., vol. 36,
pp. 565–579, 2005.
[9] I. Nishizaki and M. Sakawa, “Computational methods through ge-
netic algorithms for obtaining Stackelberg solutions to two-level
mixed zero-one programming problems”, Cybernet. Syst. Int. J.,
vol. 31, pp. 203–221, 2000.
[10] K. Niwa, I. Nishizaki, and M. Sakawa, “Decentralized two-level
0-1 programming through genetic algorithms with double strings”,
in Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Knowl. Int. Electron. Syst., 1998, vol. 2,
pp. 278–284.
86
Computational Methods for Two-Level 0-1 Programming Problems through Distributed Genetic Algorithms
[11] K. Niwa, “Revised computational methods for using genetic al-
gorithms for obtaining Stackelberg solutions to two-level 0-1 pro-
gramming problems”, in Essays and Studies in Commemoration of
the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of Hiroshima University of
Economics, Hiroshima University Economics, 2007, pp. 771–794
(in Japanese).
[12] K. Niwa, I. Nishizaki, and M. Sakawa, “Two-Level 0-1 Programming
Using Genetic Algorithms and a Sharing Scheme Based on Cluster
Analysis”, in Proc. Int. MultiConf. Eng. Comput. Sci., Hong Kong,
China, 2008, pp. 1931–1936.
[13] K. Niwa, I. Nishizaki, and M. Sakawa, “Two-level 0-1 programming
through parallel genetic algorithms”, in Proc. Int. MultiConf. Eng.
Comput. Sci., Hong Kong, China, 2009, vol. 2, pp. 2000–2005.
[14] D. E. Goldberg and R. Lingle, “Alleles, loci, and the traveling sales-
man problem”, in Proc. First Int. Conf. Genet. Algorithms Appl.,
Hillsdale, USA, 1985, pp. 154—159.
[15] D. Abramson and J. Abela, “A parallel genetic algorithm for solving
the school timetabling problem”, in Proc. 15th Austr. Comput. Sci.
Conf., Hobart, Australia, 1992, vol. 14, pp. 1–11.
[16] E. Cantu´-Paz, Efficient and Accurate Parallel Genetic Algorithms.
Norwell, Massachusetts: Kluwer, 2000.
[17] T. C. Fogarty and R. Huang, “Implementing the genetic algorithm
on transputer based parallel processing systems”, in Proc. First
Int. Conf. Parallel Prob. Solv. Nat., Dortmund, Germany, 1990,
pp. 145–149.
Keiichi Niwa received the
Ph.D. degree in systems engi-
neering from Hiroshima Uni-
versity in 2000. Since 2000,
he has jointed Hiroshima Uni-
versity of Economics where he
is currently a Associate Pro-
fessor at Department for In-
formation Systems in Business.
His main research interests in-
clude meta-heuristics and inte-
ger programming.
e-mail: ki-niwa@hue.ac.jp
Department for Information Systems in Business
Faculty of Economics
Hiroshima University of Economics
Hiroshima, 731-0192, Japan
Tomohiro Hayashida is cur-
rently Assistant Professor at
Department of Artificial Com-
plex Systems Engineering,
Graduate School of Engineer-
ing of the Hiroshima Univer-
sity, Japan. His current research
interests are agent-based sim-
ulation analysis, game theory,
and decision making theory.
e-mail: hayashida@hiroshima-u.ac.jp
Department of Artificial Complex Systems Engineering
Graduate School of Engineering
Hiroshima University
Higashi-Hiroshima, 739-8527, Japan
Masatoshi Sakawa received
B.Sc., M.Sc., and Ph.D. de-
grees in applied mathematics
and physics at Kyoto University,
in 1970, 1972, and 1975, re-
spectively. From 1975 he was
with Kobe University where,
since 1981, he was an Asso-
ciate Professor in the Depart-
ment of Systems Engineering.
From l987 to 1990, he was
a Professor of Department of Computer Science at Iwate
University. At present he is a Professor of Hiroshima Uni-
versity, Japan, and is working with the Department of Ar-
tificial Complex Systems Engineering, Hiroshima Univer-
sity. His research and teaching activities are in the area
of systems engineering, especially, mathematical optimiza-
tion, multiobjective decision making, fuzzy mathematical
programming and game theory.
e-mail: sakawa@hiroshima-u.ac.jp
Department of Artificial Complex Systems Engineering
Graduate School of Engineering
Hiroshima University
Higashi-Hiroshima, 739-8527, Japan
87
Paper Coordination Games
with Communication Costs in Network
Environments
Ichiro Nishizaki, Tomohiro Hayashida, and Noriyuki Hara
Abstract—In this paper, we deal with a coordination game
in a network where a player can choose both an action of
the game and partners for playing the game. In particular,
a player interacts with players connecting through a path con-
sisting of multiple links as well as with players directly con-
necting by a single link. We represent decay or friction of
payoffs with distance as communication costs, and examine
the effect of the communication cost on behavior of players
in the game and network formation. We investigate proper-
ties of equilibrium networks by classifying the link cost and
the communication cost, and show diversity of the equilibrium
networks.
Keywords—communication costs, coordination games, equilib-
rium, networks.
1. Introduction
Studies on formation of social systems and conventions
have been accumulated by mathematically modeling social
interaction between individuals through sequences of play-
ing a game. In such game theoretic approaches, interaction
between individuals is represented as playing coordination
games, and selection of equilibria is considered in a dy-
namic process with perturbations or mutations. Recently,
several articles have been devoted to similar attempts in
network environments by allowing players to choose part-
ners for playing the game as well as actions in the game [1],
[2], [3], and our concern is also to consider this topic.
To examine formulation of conventions, Kandori et al. [4]
and Young [5] deal with 2× 2 coordination games which
are repeatedly played by randomly matched pairs of play-
ers in a population. Ellison [6], Droste et al. [7], and Fa-
giolo [8] focus on locality of interaction between play-
ers. Oechssler [9], Ely [10], and Bhaskar and Vega-
Redondo [11] consider location models where the popu-
lation is divided into several groups and players choose
which group to join. In the recent years, similar attempts
in network environments have been attracting attention [1],
[2], [3]. In such models, players are allowed to choose part-
ners for playing the game as well as actions in the game. It
should be noted that the network game models are related
with studies on formation of networks [12], [13], [14].
Assuming that the link formation can be realized by an uni-
lateral decision of a player and the player pays all the link
cost, Goyal and Vega-Redondo [2] define Nash equilibrium
networks, and consider stability of networks in the long run.
For the case where interaction is restricted to a pair of two
players connected by a direct link, they show the following
result. For games where two players can obtain positive
payoffs even in disequilibrium, the completely connected
network is in equilibrium, and when the link cost is higher
than the level of the payoff, networks with two completely
connected components and the empty network are also in
equilibrium. For the stability in the long run, if the link cost
is smaller than a certain threshold, the risk dominant equi-
librium networks are stochastically stable, and if the link
cost is larger than it, the payoff dominant equilibrium net-
works are stochastically stable. Furthermore, they consider
a network game model where any two players without a di-
rect link are allowed to interact through two or more links
connecting them. In this setting, they find that the unique
stochastically stable structure of networks is a minimally
connected network called a center-sponsored star network,
and also find that there exists a certain threshold dividing
two types of coordination: the risk dominant and the payoff
dominant actions.
A study of Hojman and Szeidl [3] deals with a network
game model with directed links similar to that of Goyal
and Vega-Redondo [2]. In their model, it is assumed that
interaction between two players connected not only by a sin-
gle link but also by a path of multiple links is allowed,
but a player can obtain payoffs only from interaction with
other players to whom there are directed paths of links.
They show that the structure of Nash equilibrium networks
is wheel-shaped. For the long run stability, when the link
cost is small and the disequilibrium payoff is positive, the
risk dominant equilibrium is a unique stochastic stable net-
work, and otherwise the payoff dominant equilibrium is
uniquely stochastically stable on the condition that the pay-
off dominant equilibrium creates quite high positive gain
or the degree of the risk dominance is small.
Although Goyal and Vega-Redondo [2] and Hojman and
Szeidl [3] deal with interaction through a path, i.e., multiple
consecutive links connecting players, it is assumed that the
interaction between players connected by a path does not
require any communication cost or such interaction is fric-
tionless. However, it is natural to think that interaction with
distant players costs and/or takes time much more than in-
teraction between directly connected players. In this paper,
we assume that a payoff arising from interaction through
a path decreases with distance. This can be represented by
a discount of the payoff or a communication cost of the
network. While a discounted payoff is always nonnegative,
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the payoff from which the communication cost is subtracted
may be negative. In this paper, employing a representation
of decreasing the payoff by the communication cost, we
deal with a network game model with interaction between
distant players. Assuming that a link between two players
is formed or maintained if the payoffs of both players do
not decrease and they equally pay the link cost, we examine
equilibrium networks. In Section 2, we introduce a network
game model with the communication costs, and the equi-
librium networks are shown in Section 3. Some concluding
remarks are given in Section 4.
2. A Model
We deal with a network game model where a player chooses
partners for interacting through direct links or paths consist-
ing of multiple consecutive links. The interaction through
a path requires the communication cost which increases
with a distance between two players.
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be the set of players which is called
a population. The interaction between two players is rep-
resented by a 2× 2 coordination game shown in Table 1.
Let ai ∈ {α,β} denote an action selected by player i. Each
entry of the payoff table is a 2-dimensional vector and, the
first element of the vector is a payoff of the row player
and the second one is that of the column player. A vec-
tor a = {a1, . . . ,an} of actions selected by all the players is
called a profile of actions.
Table 1
Payoff table of a coordination game
Row player
Column player
α β
α (a,a) ( f ,e)
β (e, f ) (b,b)
Because we deal with a coordination game with conflict
between the risk dominant equilibrium and the payoff dom-
inant equilibrium, it is assumed that the following condi-
tions are satisfied for the parameters of the payoffs given
in Table 1.
a > b, a > e, b > f , a + f < b + e. (1)
Thus, the outcome (α,α) is the payoff dominant equilib-
rium, and (β ,β ) is the risk dominant equilibrium.
The following notation is used. If there exists link i j
between players i and j, li j = 1, and otherwise li j = 0.
A set of links of player i is expressed by li = (li1, . . . , li,i−1,
li,i+1, . . . , li,n) ∈ {0,1}n−1. Because player i can decide to
choose which links to maintain, the link set li of player i
can be interpreted as a strategy for choices of links. A vec-
tor l = (l1, . . . , ln) of link sets of all the players is a profile
of links, and a set of links in the population is expressed
by g(l) = {i j | li j = l ji = 1}.
If li j = 1 or there exist a series of players j1, . . . , jm such
that li j1 = · · · = l jk jk+1 = · · · = l jm j = 1, it is said that there
exists a path between players i and j. The existence of the
path is denoted by ¯li j = 1, and the path is also expressed
by i ↔ j. A set of paths of player i is expressed by ¯li =
(¯li1, . . . , ¯li,i−1, ¯li,i+1, . . . , ¯lin). For a path i ↔ j, the length of
the path or the distance between players i and j is defined
as the minimal number of links connecting i and j, and it
is denoted by Li j. A set of nodes corresponding to g(l) is
expressed by N(g(l)) = {i | ∃ j, i j ∈ g(l)}. For a subset of
links g(l′) ⊂ g(l), g(l′) is called a component of g(l) if,
for any pair of i ∈ N(g(l′)) and j ∈ N(g(l′)), there exists
a path i ↔ j, and i j ∈ g(l) implies i j ∈ g(l′).
To form or maintain link i j, players i and j need to pay the
cost c. When there exits a path between players i and j,
i.e., ¯li j = 1, they play the 2× 2 coordination game paying
the communication cost d(Li j), where d(·) is a strictly in-
creasing monotone function with the length of the path,
and d(1) = 0. It is assumed that player i takes the same
action ai for all games with partners connected by direct
links or paths. Let a−i = (a1, . . . ,ai−1,ai+1, . . . ,an) and
l−i = (l1, . . . , li−1, li+1, . . . , ln) be, respectively, a profile of
actions and a profile of links for N−i = N \{i} which is the
set of players except for player i. Then, a utility of player
i with a strategy (ai, li) is written by
pii((ai, li),(a−i, l−i)) =∑
j: ¯li j=1
u(ai,a j)−∑
j:li j=1
c−∑
j: ¯li j=1
d(Li j), (2)
where u(ai,a j) is player i’s payoff of the game shown in
Table 1 when player i chooses action ai ∈ {α,β} and player
j chooses action a j ∈ {α,β}. For concise representation,
the part of costs in (2) is defined by
Di = ∑
j:li j=1
c +∑
j: ¯li j=1
d(Li j). (3)
Let A, {α,β} and L, {0,1}n−1 denote the strategy sets of
actions and links, respectively. The strategy set of a player
is represented by X , A×L. A strategy of player i is rep-
resented by a pair of an action and a set of links, and it is
denoted by si = (ai, li)∈ X , ai ∈ A, li ∈ L. A strategy profile
s = (s1,s2, . . . ,sn)∈ Xn of all the players indicates a state of
the network, and we call a strategy profile s a network or
a state. We assume that each of the players knows a state s
and can calculate the utilities of the other players pi j(s),
j 6= i as well as the utility pii(s) of self. Moreover, we as-
sume that link i j is formed only if both of the utilities of
i and j do not decrease by forming link i j. Namely, when
player i is selected to revise a strategy, for any player j such
that li j = l ji = 0 at the state s before revising the strategy
of i and li j = l ji = 1 at the state s′ after revising it, the
condition pi j(s′) ≥ pi j(s) must be satisfied. It is said that
the strategy s′i of player i is feasible if this condition is sat-
isfied, and a set of feasible strategies of player i is denoted
by Xi ⊂ X . It follows that player i chooses a strategy s′i
among the feasible strategy set Xi, i.e., s′i ∈ Xi. Because we
assume that each player always chooses a strategy among
the feasible strategy set, Nash equilibrium networks can be
defined as follows.
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Definition 1: A state sˆ = (sˆ1, . . . , sˆn) is said to be an equi-
librium state or an equilibrium network if, for any player
i ∈ N and any feasible strategy si ∈ Xi, the following con-
dition holds:
pii(sˆi, sˆ−i) ≥ pii(si, sˆ−i). (4)
Such a strategy sˆi = (aˆi, ˆli) is called an equilibrium strategy
of player i, and a component in an equilibrium network is
called an equilibrium component.
In this paper, focusing on actions of players and the for-
mation of links, we examine static equilibrium networks
in the network game with the communication cost. At the
beginning of the examination, we give some definitions
on actions of players and structures of networks. We call
a player who chooses action α an α-player, and a player
who chooses action β a β -player. A player holding only
one link is called a leaf player, and a player holding no link
is called an isolated player. If all of players who belong
to a component g(l′) choose action α , the component g(l′)
is called an α-component, and similarly a β -component is
defined. If any pairs of players i, j ∈N(g(l′)) are connected
by a direct link, i.e., l′i j = l′ji = 1, the component g(l′) is
said to be completely connected. If a component is divided
by severing any link in the component, the component is
said to be minimally connected. If after severing a ceratin
link in a component, the component is not divided, there
should exist a loop of links in the component. A compo-
nent without any leaf player is called a leafless component.
In particular, if all the players in a component have only
two links and they are arranged like a circle, the compo-
nent is called a ring component. These definitions are given
for components, and similar definitions are also given for
networks.
3. Equilibrium Networks
We deal with coordination games in network environments
and examine equilibria of networks in this section. If an
equilibrium network is not the empty network, there ex-
ists at least one component. Then, we first characterize
equilibrium components.
Lemma 1: In any equilibrium component, all the players
in the component choose the same action.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix, and the proofs
of the subsequent lemmata and theorem are also given in
Appendix. While we focused on behavior of players in
Lemma 1, the next lemma deals with structures of equi-
librium components. Let C and |C| denote a component
and the number of players in the component, respectively.
As shown in Lemma 1, all players choose the same ac-
tion in an equilibrium component, and let the action be
x ∈ A = {α,β}. First, we consider the case where the link
cost is smaller than the payoff obtained by coordination of
choices, i.e., c < u(x,x). Let L denote a distance between
players i and j, and let k denote any player on path i ↔ j.
Because a distance between players i and k decreases or
does not change when link i j is formed, the sum of the
communication costs over path i ↔ j decreases, and the
reduced cost is calculated as follows:
RC(L) =
L
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k), (5)
where ⌈x⌉ and ⌊x⌋ mean the minimal integer larger than or
equal to x and the maximal integer smaller than or equal
to x, respectively.
Lemma 2: For a given action x∈A = {α,β}, if c < u(x,x),
an equilibrium x-componentC has the following structures.
(1) If c < d(2), an equilibrium component is completely
connected, and vice versa.
(2) If d(2) ≤ c and c ≤ RC(|C| − 1), there exists an
equilibrium component which is not completely con-
nected. The maximal length of a path in the equi-
librium component is the largest number L satisfying
RC(L) ≤ c and L < |C|.
(3) If d(2)≤ c and RC(|C|−1)< c, an equilibrium com-
ponent is minimally connected.
From b < a, c < u(β ,β ) implies c < u(α,α). Then, the
result of Lemma 2 is valid for α- and β -components if
c < b, it is valid for α-components if b < c < a, and it is
not valid for either of them if a < c.
For (3) of Lemma 2, any minimally connected component
is not always an equilibrium component. As a counterex-
ample, consider a component where 4 players are in line.
From |C| = 4 and the condition of (3) of Lemma 2, the
inequality c > d(3)−d(2) holds. The utility of player i at
the end of the line is pii = 3u(x,x)− c− d(2)− d(3), and
from c > d(3)−d(2), it satisfies the following inequality.
pii = 3u(x,x)− c−d(2)−d(3)
< 3u(x,x)− (d(3)−d(2))−d(2)−d(3)
= 3u(x,x)−2d(3).
Then, the utility pii of player i is negative when 3u(x,x)−
2d(3) < 0. For example, when c = 4.5,u(x, x) = 5,
d(2) = 4,d(3) = 8, because the condition of Lemma 2:
d(2) ≤ c < u(x,x) and d(3)−d(2) < c and the above con-
dition: 3u(x,x)− 2d(3) < 0 are satisfied, the utility pii of
player i is negative. Thus, the best response of player i is
to sever the link, and it follows that the component is not
an equilibrium component.
We also show an example of a minimally connected compo-
nent which is an equilibrium component. Consider a star-
shaped minimally connected component where player 1 is
the center and players 2, 3, and 4 are peripheries. Because
a distance between any pair of players is at most two and
d(2)≤ c, a new link is never formed. From c < u(x,x), the
utility of player 1, pi1 = 3(u(x,x)−c), is positive, and those
of the other players, pi2 = pi3 = pi4 = 3u(x,x)− c− 2d(2),
are positive. When any link is severed, the utility of player
1 decreases by u(x,x)−c. At this moment, the counterpart
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is isolated and her utility becomes zero. Thus, because in
the star-shaped component, a new link is not formed and
any of the existing links is not severed, it is an equilibrium
component.
In Lemma 2, we have considered the structure of compo-
nents, and in the next lemma, we examine whether or not
there exist multiple components in an equilibrium network.
Lemma 3: For a given action x ∈ A = {α,β}, if c <
u(x,x), in an equilibrium network, there exists only one x-
component, and any x-player is connected with some other
player.
Next, we consider the case where the link cost is larger
than the payoff obtained by coordination of choices, i.e.,
c > u(x,x). In general, an x-component is not likely to
be formed in this case, but it could be maintained because
players can obtain a positive payoff arising from interaction
between distant players through paths if the communication
cost is relatively small.
Lemma 4: For a given action x∈ A = {α,β}, if c > u(x,x),
in an equilibrium network, the necessary condition for
existing one or more x-components is that the condition
d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(2l) is satisfied, and there exists an integer
l ∈ (1,n/2] satisfying the condition
c−u(x,x)≤ (l−1)u(x,x)−
l
∑
k=1
d(k). (6)
Moreover, such equilibrium x-components are leafless.
From the above discussion, we have the following results.
Theorem 1: Assuming that the communication cost d(·) is
a strictly increasing monotone function with a distance be-
tween any pair of players, we can characterize equilibrium
networks as follows.
(1) In the case of c < b:
(a) If c < d(2), an equilibrium network is the com-
pletely connected α-network or the completely
connected β -network.
(b) If d(2) ≤ c and c ≤ RC(n − 1), an equilib-
rium network is an incompletely connected
α-network or an incompletely connected β -net-
work. The maximal length of a path in the equi-
librium network is the largest number L satis-
fying the conditions RC(L) ≤ c and L < |C|.
(c) If d(2) ≤ c and c > RC(n− 1), an equilibrium
network is a minimally connected α-network
or a minimally connected β -network.
(2) In the case of b < c < a:
(a) If c < d(2), an equilibrium network is a com-
pletely connected α-network or an empty
β -network.
(b) If d(2) ≤ c and c ≤ RC(n − 1), an equilib-
rium network is an incompletely connected
α-network or an empty β -network. Moreover,
if there exists an integer l ∈ (1,n/2] satisfying
the condition c−b≤ (l−1)b−∑lk=1 d(k), a net-
work with one or more leafless β -components
can be an equilibrium network, and it may in-
clude one α-component. The maximal length
of a path in the equilibrium network is the
largest number L satisfying the conditions
RC(L) ≤ c and L < |C|.
(c) If d(2) ≤ c and c > RC(n− 1), an equilibrium
network is a minimally connected α-network or
an empty β -network.
(3) In the case of a < c:
(a) If c < d(2), an equilibrium network is an empty
network.
(b) If d(2) ≤ c and c ≤ RC(n − 1), an equilib-
rium network is an empty network. Moreover, if
there exists an integer la ∈ (1,n/2] satisfying the
condition c− a ≤ (la − 1)a−∑lak=1 d(k), a net-
work with one or more leafless α-components
can be an equilibrium network; and if there ex-
ists an integer lb ∈ (1,n/2] satisfying the con-
dition c−b ≤ (lb −1)b−∑lbk=1 d(k), a network
with one or more leafless β -components can be
an equilibrium network.
(c) If d(2) ≤ c and c > RC(n− 1), an equilibrium
network is an empty network.
The structures of equilibrium networks shown in Theorem
1 are summarized in Table 2. In Theorem 1, the structures
of equilibrium networks are characterized by the relation
between the link cost c and the communication cost d(2)
of distance 2. In general, when the link cost c is smaller
than the payoff of the game such as the payoff dominant
equilibrium payoff a and the risk dominant equilibrium pay-
off b, a link is formed. Moreover, when the communication
cost d(·) is large, compared to the link cost c, a link be-
tween any pair of players is likely to be formed, and when
the communication cost d(·) is small, the number of links
decreases because not direct links but paths allow players to
interact with other players at lower costs. Moreover, com-
paring the link cost c and the communication cost d(2)
of distance 2 reveals whether or not players should form
a link. By analysis taking into account the communication
cost of distances larger than 2, we can examine the length
of a path in a network.
In (1) of Theorem 1, because the link cost c is smaller than
the payoff b of the risk dominant equilibrium, an equi-
librium network is either an α-network which means the
risk dominant equilibrium or a β -network which means
the payoff dominant equilibrium. For the case of (a), be-
cause interaction by using direct links is profitable due to
c < d(2), the completely connected network is formed. In
the case of (c), interaction by using direct links is costly
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Table 2
Equilibrium networks
Case Condition (1) c < b (2) b < c < a (3) a < c
(a) c < d(2) complete α complete α empty
complete β empty β
(b) d(2)≤ c incomplete α incomplete α empty
c ≤ RC(n−1) incomplete β empty β (leafless α)
(leafless β ) (leafless β )
(c) d(2)≤ c minimal α minimal α empty
c > RC(n−1) minimal β empty β
(leafless α) or (leafless β ) is conditional.
compared to interaction through paths because of d(2)≤ c,
and from c > RC(n−1), any loop is not formed. Thus, an
equilibrium network is minimally connected.
Fig. 1. A minimally connected (star) network.
As an example of a minimally connected network, a star-
shaped network is given in Fig. 1. In this network, a new
link between players of two units of distance is not formed
because forming such links results in decrease of the utili-
ties of the players. Moreover, any existing link is not sev-
ered because by severing a link the utilities of two players
decrease by at least b− c. Thus, this type of networks are
in equilibrium.
In the case of (b), because of d(2)≤ c and c ≤ RC(n−1),
an equilibrium network is not completely connected but it
includes a loop. The density of networks, i.e., the number
of links depends on the relation between the link cost c and
the communication cost d(·), and it can be characterized
by the maximal length of paths.
An example of an incompletely connected equilibrium net-
work is given in Fig. 2. The length of a path in this net-
work is at most 3, and if max{d(2),RC(3)} ≤ c, a new
Fig. 2. An incomplete network.
link is not formed. Because severing any link in the loop
makes a pair of players of 4 units of distance, the utili-
ties of them decrease by severing the link if c < RC(4).
For example, let d(k) = k. Then, from RC(3) = 1 and
RC(4) = 5, this network is an equilibrium network if
2 ≤ c < 5. On the other hand, the condition of Theorem
1, d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(8), can be written as 2 ≤ c ≤ 16. Then,
when c = 2,3,4, both of the equilibrium condition of this
network, max{2,RC(3)} ≤ c < RC(4), and the condition
of Theorem 1, d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(8), are satisfied simultane-
ously. With the above mentioned parameters, the incom-
pletely connected network given in Fig. 2 is an equilibrium
network.
In (2) of Theorem 1, because the link cost c is larger
than the payoff b of the risk dominant equilibrium and it
is smaller than the payoff a of the payoff dominant equi-
librium, it is supposed that an equilibrium network is an
α-network but a β -network is not the case. However, it is
shown that if the condition given in the theorem is satis-
fied, some β -network can be an equilibrium. For the case
of (a), from c < d(2), the completely connected network is
formed when all the players choose action α , and as a spe-
cial case, a state where all the players choose action β in
the empty network is an equilibrium network. In the case
of (c), because interaction by using direct links is costly
compared to interaction through paths for the same reason
as in (1), a minimally connected equilibrium α-network is
formed. The empty β -network is also an equilibrium. In
the case of (b), because of d(2)≤ c and c ≤ RC(n−1), an
equilibrium network is not completely connected. More-
over, as special structures of equilibrium networks, besides
the empty β -network, networks with one or more leafless
β -components and networks with one α-component and
one or more leafless β -components can be equilibria. How-
ever, an equilibrium network with a β -component can exist
only when the condition given in the theorem is satisfied.
Even if the link cost c is larger than the payoff b of the
game, the utilities of players may become positive because
of interaction between distant players, and then leafless
β -components can be included in an equilibrium net-
work. It is noted that there does not exist a leaf player in
a β -component because the utility of a player who shares
a link with the leaf player increases by severing the link.
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We give some examples of equilibrium networks with mul-
tiple components in Figs. 3 and 4. In a network shown
in Fig. 3, assume that the payoffs of the game are set at
a = 11, b = 6.71, e = 1, and f = 0, and the costs of the
link and the communication are set at c = 10, d(2) = 5,
d(3) = 5.1, and d(4) = 20, respectively.
Fig. 3. A network with two β -components.
In Fig. 3, a β -network with two β -components is given.
Forming a link within a component results in decrease of
the utility, and therefore a new link within a component is
not formed. Because by severing a link the distance be-
tween players becomes more than or equal to 4 and then
the cost of a player increases, any link is not severed. Next,
consider formation of a link between components. Because
the utilities of players decrease by forming a link connect-
ing two players in different components, a link between
two components is not formed. In the case where links
within a component and between components are formed
simultaneously, no player is better off. Moreover, by mov-
ing to the other component, the utility of any player does
not increase. Thus, the network with two β -components in
Fig. 3 is an equilibrium network.
A network with coexistence of an α-component and
a β -component is shown in Fig. 4. Let the payoffs of the
game be a = 8, b = 6, e = 1, and f = 0, and suppose that the
costs of the link and the communication are c = 7, d(2) = 3,
d(3) = 4, and d(4) = 12. With these parameter values, by
a similar consideration, one finds that the network with
coexistence of an α-component and a β -components in
Fig. 4 is an equilibrium network.
Fig. 4. A network with α- and β -components.
In (3) of Theorem 1, because of c > a, an equilibrium net-
work is generally an empty network where the actions of
players are unspecified. However, if d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(n−1)
is satisfied, a leafless component can be included in an
equilibrium network. In the case of (a), from c < d(2), one
finds that there does not exist an integer l satisfying the
condition (6) in Lemma 4 because the left hand side of (6)
is negative, and then only the empty networks are equilib-
ria. For the case of (c), similarly, the condition of Lemma
4 is not satisfied due to c > RC(n−1), and then there does
not exist any nonempty equilibrium network. In contrast,
in the case of (b), from d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(n− 1), if play-
ers can obtain larger payoffs from the interaction between
distant players through paths, besides the empty equilib-
rium networks, there can exist an equilibrium network with
a leafless component.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we dealt with the network game model in
which a player can choose partners for playing the under-
lying coordination games as well as an action of the game,
assuming that interaction between distant players is possi-
ble, but it requires the payment of the communication cost.
We examined influence of the communication cost on the
behavior of players in the game and the structure of net-
works. We showed a diversity of the equilibrium networks.
The relevant studies [1], [2], [3] examine the long-run
stability of the equilibrium networks. Naturally, it is
interesting to investigate the stability of the equilibrium
networks in the network game model considered in this
paper, and we will intend to deal with this topic.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that a component with α-players and β -players is
an equilibrium component, and let nα and nβ denote the
numbers of α-players and β -players, respectively. Then,
the utility of α-player i defined by (2) is expressed by
piαi =
{
(nα −1)u(α,α)+ nβ u(α,β )
}
−Di , (7)
where Di is the total cost defined by (3). Assume that
player i changes his action of the game from α to β , and
let piβi denote the utility of player i at the time. Because
the structure of the component is the same as before, Di
does not change, and then the utility piβi is expressed by
pi
β
i =
{
(nα −1)u(β ,α)+ nβu(β ,β )
}
−Di . (8)
Because the component is in equilibrium before player
i changes his action, the inequality piαi ≥ pi
β
i holds, and
from Eqs. (7) and (8), one finds that
(nα −1)a + nβ f ≥ (nα −1)e + nβb . (9)
Similarly, for β -player j in the component, the following
inequality holds.
nα e +(nβ −1)b ≥ nαa +(nβ −1) f . (10)
93
Ichiro Nishizaki, Tomohiro Hayashida, and Noriyuki Hara
From Ineqs. (9) and (10), one finds that
−(b− f )≥ a− e . (11)
Because the inequality (11) is inconsistent with the assump-
tion (1) of the payoffs of the game, a > e and b > f , the
component with α-players and β -players is not an equilib-
rium component. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Let L be the distance between players i and j, i.e, Li j = L,
2 ≤ L < |C|. First, we show the condition that link i j is
not formed. The total cost of player i for path i ↔ j is
calculated as follows:
c +
L
∑
k=1
d(k) . (12)
If link i j is formed, i.e., li j = 1, the total cost of player
i changes to
c +
⌈L/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c . (13)
Thus, if the cost (13) after link i j is formed is larger than
the original cost (12), i.e.,
c ≥
L
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) , (14)
then link i j is not formed.
To prove (1), assume that an equilibrium component is not
completely connected. Then, there exists at least one pair of
players i and j such that Li j ≥ 2. In this case, because link
i j is not formed, the condition (14) is satisfied. When L = 2,
one finds that c≥ d(2)−d(1) = d(2), which is inconsistent
with the assumption of (i): c < d(2). Thus, if there exists an
equilibrium network, its component should be completely
connected.
Consider a completely connected component. The utility
of player i arising from the interaction with player j is
u(x,x)− c−d(1). Then, if link i j is severed, the utility of
player i changes to u(x,x)−d(2). Because, from d(1) = 0
and c < d(2), severing link i j results in decrease of the util-
ity, the completely connected component is an equilibrium
component.
Consider the case of (3) before the case of (2), and assume
that there exists an equilibrium component with a loop con-
sisting of L players. Let i and j be adjacent players in the
loop. Because of the assumption of equilibrium, severing
link i j results in increase of the cost, and one finds that the
following inequality holds:
2c +
⌈L/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) ≤ c +
L
∑
k=1
d(k) .
Namely, we have
c ≤
L
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) = RC(L) . (15)
Because d(·) is a strictly monotone increasing function and
the right hand side of (15) is at most RC(|C|−1), for any
L < |C|, the inequality (15) is inconsistent with the assump-
tion of (3): c > RC(|C|−1). Thus, there does not exist any
loop in an equilibrium component, and then it is a mini-
mally connected component.
Finally, for the case of (2), assume that an equilibrium com-
ponent is completely connected. Because severing a link
results in increase of the cost, it follows that 2c < c+d(2).
This is inconsistent with the assumption of (2): d(2) ≤ c,
and therefore an equilibrium component is not completely
connected. To show that an equilibrium component is
not restricted to be minimally connected, we demonstrate
that a ring shaped component can be an equilibrium com-
ponent.
Let C and |C| denote a ring shaped component and the
number of players in the component, respectively. First,
we give the condition that severing a link of player i results
in increase of the cost of player i. The total cost Di of
player i in the component is
Di = c +
⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c . (16)
When player i severs a link, the total cost of player i changes
to
D−i = c +
(|C|−1)
∑
k=1
d(k) . (17)
Thus, the condition that severing a link of player i results
in increase of the cost of player i is Di < D−i , i.e.,
c <
|C|−1
∑
k=⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) . (18)
Second, consider the condition that forming a new link
results in increase of the cost. Let the distance between
players i and j be Li j = L. When player i is directly con-
nected with player j, two loops are formed; one loop has
L+1 players, and the other has |C|−L+1 players. At this
time, the cost of player i changes to
D+i = c +
⌈L/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c
+
⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c . (19)
Thus, the condition that forming a new link of player i re-
sults in increase of the cost of player i is Di < D+i , i.e.,
c >
⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)
+
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k) . (20)
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Third, suppose that player i severs link i j and forms a new
link is, s 6= j, where Lis = L. At this time, the cost of player
i changes to
D−+i =
L
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c +
⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+ c . (21)
Because d(·) is a strictly monotone increasing function, one
finds that D−+i < Di, namely, the cost of player i decreases
by this operation. As for the cost of player s, it is
D−+s = c+
L
∑
k=1
d(k)+c+
⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+c , (22)
and therefore D+s < D−+s . Because if (20) is satisfied,
Ds < D+s < D−+s holds, player s rejects player i’s offer
to form link is. Therefore, if both Ineqs. (18) and (20)
are satisfied simultaneously, the ring shaped component C
is an equilibrium component. Moreover, because from the
proof of (1), if c < d(2), an equilibrium component is com-
pletely connected, d(2)≤ c should be also satisfied. Thus,
under the following condition, a component which includes
a loop but is not completely connected can be an equilib-
rium component.
max
{
d(2),
⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉
∑
k=⌈L/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊L/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)+
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=⌈(|C|−L)/2⌉+1
d(k)
−
⌊(|C|−L)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)
}
< c <
|C|−1
∑
k=⌈(|C|−1)/2⌉+1
d(k)−
⌊(|C|−1)/2⌋
∑
k=1
d(k)
= RC(|C|−1) . (23)
As for the maximal length of a path, because (14) is the
condition that link i j is not formed when the distance be-
tween players i and j is L, the maximal length is derived
straightforwardly from the condition. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that a network with two or more x-components is
in equilibrium, and select any two components C1 and C2
in them. Let |C1| and |C2| be the numbers of players in C1
and C2, respectively. Consider player i in C1 who selects
action ai and player j in C2 who selects action a j. If player
i severs all his links in C1, takes the same action as a j, and
offers to form a new link with player j in C2, then player
j accepts the offer because of u(a j,a j) > c, and therefore
any player can move another component.
For the case of c < d(2), because any component is com-
pletely connected, the condition that player i does not have
any incentive to move from C1 to C2 is as follows.
(|C1|−1)(u(ai,ai)− c)≥ |C2|(u(a j,a j)− c) . (24)
For player j, the following similar condition is obtained.
(|C2|−1)(u(a j,a j)− c)≥ |C1|(u(ai,ai)− c) . (25)
Thus, if the following inequality condition is satisfied, both
players do not move.
0 ≥ (u(ai,ai)− c)+ (u(a j,a j)− c)
However, because min{u(ai,ai),u(a j,a j)} > c, the above
inequality does not hold, and therefore in the case of c <
d(2) a network with two or more x-components is not an
equilibrium network.
For the case of c ≥ d(2), assume that player i forms a new
link with player k in C2 who has a link with player j. At
this time, the utility of player i is represented by
pii = |C2|u(a j,a j)− (D j + d(2)) ,
where D j denotes the total cost of player j. If the following
inequality condition is satisfied, player i does not have any
incentive to move from C1 to C2.
(|C1|−1)u(ai,ai)−Di ≥ |C2|u(a j,a j)−(D j + d(2)) . (26)
For player j, the following similar condition is obtained.
(|C2|−1)u(a j,a j)−D j ≥ |C1|u(ai,ai)−(Di + d(2)) . (27)
Thus, if the following inequality condition is satisfied, both
players do not move.
0 ≥ (u(ai,ai)−d(2))+ (u(a j,a j)−d(2)) .
However, this inequality is inconsistent with
min{u(ai,ai),u(a j,a j)} > c ≥ d(2), and therefore even
in the case of c ≥ d(2), a network with two or more
x-components is not an equilibrium network.
Finally, consider the case where there exists an isolated
x-player. Assume that player j, j 6= i, is in some compo-
nent C. Similarly to the cases of c < d(2) and c ≥ d(2),
the condition that player i is not willing to form any link is
expressed as follows.
0 ≥ |C|(u(a j,a j)− c), if c < d(2) , (28)
0 ≥ |C|u(a j,a j)− (D j + d(2)), if c ≥ d(2) . (29)
If the component C is an equilibrium component, the util-
ity pi j of player j is nonnegative, i.e.,
pi j = (|C|−1)(u(a j,a j)− c)≥ 0, if c < d(2) , (30)
pi j = (|C|−1)u(a j,a j)−D j ≥ 0, if c ≥ d(2) . (31)
Because (28) is inconsistent with (30), and (29) is
inconsistent with (31), a network with an x-component
and an isolated x-player is not an equilibrium. Moreover,
because u(a j,a j) > c, the empty network is also not an
equilibrium. Thus, by these facts, the lemma is proven.

Proof of Lemma 4
If player i is directly connected with a leaf player j,
the utility of player i increases by severing link i j be-
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cause c > u(x,x). Therefore, equilibrium x-components are
leafless, and it must include one or more loops.
When player i interacts with a player of distance L, the
condition that link i j is maintained is that c+∑Lk=1 d(k) ≤
Lu(x,x) holds. This condition is rewritten as
c−u(x,x)≤ (L−1)u(x,x)−
L
∑
k=1
d(k) ,
which is the same as condition (6) given in the lemma.
Condition (6) means that if the gain arising from the
interaction with distant players through a path is larger
than the loss, the link cost minus the payoff of the game,
of the interaction with an adjacent player directly con-
nected by a link, the link is maintained. Therefore, main-
taining an x-component requires all the players in the
component to satisfy condition (6). Because the length
of a path in a component is at most ⌊n/2⌋, if condition (6)
is satisfied for the length L ∈ (1,n/2] of a loop in an
x-component, the x-component can be equilibrium com-
ponent.
Next, we show that there can exist multiple x-components
in an equilibrium network. For sake of simplicity, consider
two ring shaped components with L + 1 players, and they
are denoted by C1 and C2. Let i and j be players in C1 and
C2, respectively. After link i j is formed, the variation of
the utility of player i is
(2L+ 1)u(x,x)− c−2
L+1
∑
k=1
d(k) . (32)
From condition (6), (2L+1)u(x,x)−c−2∑Lk=1 d(k) is pos-
itive. However, if d(L+1) is sufficiently large, (32) can be
negative and then forming link i j results in decrease of the
utility of player i. Then, a link between the two compo-
nents C1 and C2 is not formed.
In the other cases such as the case where player i offers
to form two or more links with players in C2, or the case
where player i offers to form two links with players in
C2 and one link with another player in C1, from a similar
discussion, one finds that it is possible that the utility of
player i decreases, and therefore, in an equilibrium network,
there can exist multiple leafless components.
Finally, we consider the condition with respect to the link
cost c such that there exists an integer l satisfying con-
dition (6). Because d(·) is a strictly monotone increasing
function, if the gain arising from the interaction with dis-
tant players through a path is positive, that is, the right hand
side of (6) is positive, it is necessary that u(x,x) > d(2).
If c < d(2), then from u(x,x) < c, one finds u(x,x) < d(2),
and there dose not exist an integer l satisfying condi-
tion (6). Therefore, d(2) ≤ c must be satisfied. When an
integer l satisfies condition (6), there exists a loop with
2l + 1 players choosing action x. In the loop, the cost of
any player i is 2(c + ∑lk=1 d(k)), and when player i sev-
ers a link, the cost changes to c + ∑2lk=1 d(k). Because
severing a link increases the cost of a player, the following
inequality must be satisfied:
c ≤
2l
∑
k=l+1
d(k)−
l
∑
k=1
d(k) = RC(2l) . (33)
Namely, to exist an x-component in an equilibrium
network, d(2)≤ c ≤ RC(2l) must be satisfied. 
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of (1): From Lemma 1, all the players in an equi-
librium component choose the same action: α or β . From
c < b and Lemma 3, there exists only one α-component or
one β -component. For both of the α-component and the
β -component, by Lemma 2, the structure of the equilibrium
network is determined as described in the theorem.
Proof of (2): Consider the empty β -network. Because
there exists no link between players, switching an action
from β to α does not change the payoff of a player. More-
over, because forming a link results in decrease of the
payoff of a player by b− c, such a link is not formed.
Thus, any player does not have any incentive to change
his strategy, and then the β -network can be an equilibrium
network.
As for nonempty networks, from Lemma 1, all the play-
ers in an equilibrium component choose the same action:
α or β . From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, by setting x = α ,
one draws the conclusions of (a), (b), and (c) for α-
networks, and from Lemma 4, by setting x = β , one draws
the conclusion of (b) for β -networks. In the following, we
will prove that a network with both of an α-component and
a β -component can be an equilibrium in (b).
Because d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(n − 1) in (b), from Lemma 4,
a β -component can be an equilibrium component. Con-
sider the condition that in an equilibrium network, an
α-component with m (≥ 2) players coexists with a ring
shaped β -component with 2L + 1 players. If no link be-
tween the α-component and the β -component is formed or
an α-player and a β -player do not move to the β -component
and the α-component, respectively, the network with both
of the α-component and the β -component can be an equi-
librium.
When a link between an α-player and a β -player is formed,
the upper limit of the utility variation of the β -player is
mu(β ,α)− c−(m−1)d(2) , (34)
and it occurs when the α-component is star shaped. Be-
cause (34) is negative if u(β ,α) = e < d(2), then such
a link is not formed. When a β -player changes her action
to α , the upper limit of the utility of the β -player is
2Lu(α,β )−2c−2
L
∑
k=1
d(k)+ mu(α,α)−c−(m−1)d(2) .
(35)
From u(α,β ) = f < e, the sum of the first, the second,
and the third terms of (35) is negative if e < d(2),
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and then if L is sufficiently large compared with m,
(35) can be negative. Therefore, under the above situation,
no link between an α-component and a β -component is
formed.
Next, consider the case where an α-player moves into the
β -component after the α-player changes his action to β , or
a β -player moves into the α-component after the β -player
changes her action to α . In the former case, it results in
decrease of the utility of a β -player originally included in
the β -component. Conversely in the latter case, the util-
ity of an α-player originally included in the α-component
increases. After the β -player changes her action from β
to α , the utility variation of the β -player is
2
(
Lb−
(
c +
L
∑
k=1
d(k)
))
−(ma− c−(m−1)d(2)) , (36)
and if (36) is nonnegative, the β -player does not have any
incentive to migrate to the α-component. In order for (36)
to be nonnegative, a ≤ Lb− (c + ∑Lk=3 d(k)) must be sat-
isfied, and it holds if L is sufficiently large and b > d(L).
The condition of ring shaped components in Lemma 2 is
compatible with b > d(L), and therefore if L is sufficiently
large, (36) can be nonnegative.
From the facts shown above, the network with both of
the α-component and the β -component can be an equi-
librium.
Proof of (3): From a < c, forming a new link results in
decrease of the utility of a player, i.e., u(ai,a j)− c < 0
and u(a j,ai)−c < 0, and therefore an empty network is an
equilibrium.
As for nonempty networks, from Lemma 1, all the play-
ers in an equilibrium component choose the same action:
α or β . For x = α , from Lemma 4, if there exists an integer
l = la satisfying condition (6), there exists an equilibrium
network with an α-component. Similarly, for x = β , if there
exists an integer l = lb satisfying condition (6), there exists
an equilibrium network with a β -component.
When c < d(2), the right hand side of condition (6) is nega-
tive, and then an equilibrium network does not include any
component. Namely, an equilibrium network is an empty
network, because there does not exist an integer l satisfying
condition (6). If there exists an integer l satisfying condi-
tion (6), d(2)≤ c≤RC(2l) must hold. However, because of
2l+1≤ n, d(2)≤ c≤RC(2l) implies d(2)≤ c≤RC(n−1),
and therefore when d(2)≤ c and c > RC(n−1), there does
not exist such an integer l. Then, an equilibrium network
does not include any component. On the contrary, when
d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(n− 1), because this condition is compati-
ble with d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(2l), it is possible that there exists
a nonempty equilibrium network.
For the coexistence of an α-component and a β -component
in the case of d(2) ≤ c ≤ RC(2l), in a way similar to that
of (2), it is shown that a link between the α-component
and the β -component is not formed if u(β ,α) < d(2).
Because of b < a < c, migration from one component to
the other one results in decrease of the utility of a player
as shown in the proof of (2). Thus, the network with
the α-component and the β -component can be an equilib-
rium.

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